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Abstract 
Background. Health information system security and privacy are critical issues that impact the 
wide use of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) in healthcare including hospitals, providers and 
health systems (Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2017). These issues have been 
researched from a technology standpoint in this era of accelerated electronic health record 
adoption, but less has been done related to the EHR users in the United States.  Most of the 
literature related to security and privacy explores research topics, peripheral and direct, regarding 
policy adherence mechanisms. Yet to be studied is a social science exploration of nurses’ risk 
knowledge and risk behaviors associated with security and privacy issues. 
Purpose. This dissertation examines characteristics related to cybersecurity practices of new 
nurses a year following graduation from nursing school where they may have been prepared to 
work in environments with EHRs. The study will explore their understanding of cybersecurity as 
it relates to use and protection of the sources of information in the EHRs, and their own personal 
risk behaviors with mobile technologies that may put them at risk to outside hacking or misuse of 
information. The questions that drive the study are the associations with nurses’ knowledge of 
information system security, risk behaviors specifically with mobile device use, and their threat 
appraisal that may influence their personal habits and their concern for potential misuse of their 
own electronic health information. 
Method. A web-based survey was emailed to a sample of new graduates who completed the 
National Student Nurses’ Association (NSNA) Annual Survey and gave their permanent email 
address voluntarily to be contacted again for additional surveys. The survey designed in 
SurveyMonkey®, the same approach used with this sample in prior studies, was sent to a list of 
3,000 addresses. The variables of interest are Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS), 
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Risk Behaviors (RB), Personal Technology Practices (PTP), Mobile Device Habits (MDH), 
Threat Appraisal (Internal and External), Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP), and 
Information Privacy Protection Response (IPPR). 
Pilot Testing. Several measures developed for the study were tested on a sample of senior 
graduating nursing students (n=167) to assess their validity and reliability, including KISS, RB 
and PTP.  Prior to data collection, the new items were assessed for content validity by five 
judges in preparation to be tested for reliability analysis. A paper-pencil version of the new items 
was distributed to the nursing students just prior to their graduation. Their responses were 
entered and analyzed using SPSS, which yielded a final set of items with acceptable reliability (α 
= .700), These new items were combined with the other variables of previously studied items, 
slightly modified, for integration on the final tool. Additional demographic questions and mobile 
device usage were added. 
Procedures. The final survey was distributed to the list of participants (n=3,000), anticipating a 
10 - 20% return rate that would yield 300 - 600 subjects. A reminder was sent every 2 weeks for 
6 weeks while the study remained open. Participants were offered an incentive of being eligible 
for a $250 drawing at the conclusion of the study. 
Analysis. The first level of analysis included an extensive descriptive analysis of the frequencies 
and measures of central tendency for subject self-reported mobile device frequency and types of 
use. The subsequent analysis included a series of correlations calculated on the variables of 
interest to determine the relationships of predicted relationships. The model did not support the 
predictions and an adjusted model was proposed for future studies on the measured variables and 
demographic variables of interest. 
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Limitations. The pilot study was distributed in a paper format whereas the proposed format for 
the national study used an electronic medium. 
Conclusions. This study provided information about the relationship between the core variables 
and demographic components.  These findings could inform educators and employers about new 
nurses’ knowledge and risk behaviors related to information system security. 
 
Keywords: Electronic Health Record, Protection Motivation Theory, Security, Privacy, 
Informatics, Meaningful Use, ARRA, HITECH, Cybersecurity, Risk 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Medical informatics has entered a new age.  Resistive holdouts notwithstanding, electronic 
health records (EHRs) are nearly omnipresent in the American healthcare system.  Legislation 
and government programs are guiding and accelerating the adoption of EHRs.  There are 
boundless benefits to providers, healthcare systems, governments, and consumers. However, 
securing the right of protection of healthcare information is at an increasing risk as electronic 
health records become more entrenched in our society.  Examples of breaches, nefarious and 
otherwise, are plentiful. Adopters are those hospitals, healthcare providers, practices, and other 
segments of the healthcare delivery system that have adopted the use of an electronic health 
record certified by a federal government sanctioned organization for the federal government’s 
“Meaningful Use” program.  “Meaningful Use” is a method of measuring for the purpose of 
financial incentives the adoption and usage of a certified electronic health record under the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act as part of the 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Adopters of healthcare technology 
may be held financially liable for breaches.  These adopters are compelled to enter into incentive 
programs introducing risks for which they may not adequately able to mitigate.  To add further 
insult to injury, the adopters arguably do not receive adequate government or vendor support to 
prevent catastrophic breaches (Ong, 2015). 
 As good stewards of the dignity of healthcare consumers, healthcare institutions are 
burdened with painstaking measures to fortify their efforts in the prevention of sensitive 
information leakage in the new age of pervasive medical informatics.  Under threat of crippling 
fines, healthcare entities such as hospitals and providers must be vigilant in safeguarding 
precious data while the threat of possible data leakage looms in part beyond their control.  
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Overall, this new paradigm presents a paradox of data liberalization for the benefit of patients 
with an increased risk of harm to the patients’ detriment. 
Health Information Technology (HIT) has lagged far behind the technology of other 
industries such as those in the financial sector.  Speculatively, perhaps this lag may be in part due 
to healthcare technology being classification as a cost within a healthcare business model.  In 
financial sectors, technology is a requirement to thrive or even survive.  Financial database 
systems have competed for the financial prize by edging out one another over milliseconds in 
transactional speeds.  Even the financial systems within healthcare are typically antiquated in 
comparison to technology typical of the financial industry.  To add additional pressures to the 
mix, The Administrative Simplification Compliance Act of 2001 required that all Medicare 
claims must be done electronically (“Medicare Mandates Electronic Claims,” 2003).  This 
transformational piece of legislation forced even the financial portion of healthcare to advance 
into embracing modern information technology. In doing so, this legislation sparked a huge wave 
in the transmitting of electronic protected health information (ePHI). 
 Electronic healthcare systems have evolved considerably since the inception in the latter 
half of the twentieth century which saw the use of mainframe style systems, huge overhead and 
very limited capabilities.  These early systems were often limited to finances, registration, and 
very few clinical components.  The traditional paper chart remained in place for the most part 
during this era while antiquated systems prevailed in pervasiveness.  As the personal computer 
started to become commonplace in the 1990s, so did its prevalence in hospitals to varying 
degrees. According to Tuttle (1997), the 1990s saw a need in healthcare for computer systems 
but a fragmented market coupled with a lack of scalable software. 
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Very clumsy clinical applications began appearing moreover at the turn of the century.  
Many of these early pioneers have their footprints in the applications of larger companies that 
consumed them over the years.  These systems were painful to interface with other proprietary 
systems.  Hospitals began adopting a “best of breed” approach by acquiring a mismatched set of 
proprietary systems, which did not work well in an interoperable manner. Others took a more 
uniformed approach selecting a single vendor for as many services and departments of the 
hospital as possible.  Using a single vendor approach for multiple system often resulted in a wide 
spectrum of quality among these system modules as some portions of the product were the result 
of a quick acquisitions to complete a vendor’s portfolio.  Clinicians outside of hospital systems 
were spared this experience generally, for the pen and paper were always 100% backwards 
compatible with all prior systems. Today, however, this paradigm is rapidly changing. 
Background of the Problem 
A review of contemporary literature reveals that while there is an abundance of studies on 
the impact of health information technology in healthcare, there is little focus on the 
understanding of the safeguarding of electronic protected health information.  There is a paucity 
of literature that directly addresses the nurses’ information system security knowledge.  None of 
the studies reviewed makes subsequent associations with the personal characteristics of nurses 
that would make them to be sufficiently motivated to protect information the way they protect 
patients’ wellbeing in general. Understanding what motivates users to be protective – and 
therefore vigilant in maintaining secure and confidential processes in their routines – may be a 
precursor to their practices with using the EHRs and other patient-identifiable technologies in 
clinical care. Protection Motivation Theory, a theoretical framework may appropriately serve in 
the study of healthcare behavior but has not been applied to health care providers in this way as it 
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has been to health care recipients related to their personal self-care activities. Furthermore, the 
prevalence of mobile device use in the healthcare settings with nurses has not been factored in 
risk behavior studies.  Where studied, the mobile device portions of the survey instruments were 
found to contain elements not relevant to commonplace usage in the United States and lacked the 
smart technologies that creep into everyday use that are prevalent today. 
Based upon the gaps found in the literature review, this author has developed a study based 
upon both the use of existing instruments textured with the construction of a new instrument in 
order to measure variables not previously reported in the body of available literature. 
Background: Knowledge and Risk Behaviors 
To study nurses’ knowledge of security and risk behaviors, it is less important to know 
about the security and encryption literature which is extensive and highly technical, and more 
essential to examine a way to understand human behavior as it applies to taking risk in general. 
Background literature for this study includes an examination of existing reports of knowledge, 
risk behaviors, and responses to the threat of security violations of users of HIT. Specifically, a 
significant segment of healthcare breaches affecting 500 or more individuals has been attributed 
to incidents with mobile devices.  Between 10/21/2009 and 2/23/2017, 472 of the 1,847 large 
reported breaches had a mobile component involved in the incident (calculated from Breaches 
Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2017). Further exploration specific to nurses’ knowledge of 
information system security, risk behaviors with mobile device use, threat appraisal of their 
breaches in security, and their own sense of protection in response to the use of their own 
electronic health records, i.e. personalizing their understanding of confidentiality and security, is 
a framework to connect what nurses know and how they behave relative to their mobile devices. 
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This model may inform healthcare entities how to minimize violations of security or external 
infiltrations into their EHRs. 
Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory has been well applied in the context of patient care 
in that the “fear appeal” may invoke a protective response (Rogers, 1975).  Rogers’ theory may 
be applicable to the healthcare practitioner experiencing a protective response to a fear of 
maleficence such as the inappropriate disclosure of protected health information.  Such a fear 
appeal should be based upon the recognition that certain behaviors may increase the likelihood of 
such a negative occurrence. 
In Protection Motivation Theory, the subject must analyze the existence of a hazardous 
condition, have a perception about the efficacy of the prescribed course of action, and based 
upon this threat appraisal elicit a protective response.  In the case of nurses, the threat is the 
potential unauthorized use or misuse of electronic protected health information.  The efficacious 
course of action would be the sound use of mobile devices.  The protection response would be 
their sentiment in the case of their electronic health information being potentially misused. This 
is known as Information Personal Protection Responses, or the response to the threat appraisal 
(Rogers, 1975). 
For the subject to have a response, they must first recognize a threat and the efficacy of the 
prescribed course of action. The method by which the threat and efficacy was evaluated is by 
way of a knowledge survey. A study of medical students’ knowledge of cybersecurity was 
examined in the context of mobile devices, rapidly becoming a fixture in the healthcare industry 
(Whipple, Allgood & Larue, 2012).  The study addressed the need to examine healthcare 
professionals’ use of mobile devices and the associated risk behaviors that put protected health 
information at risk.  However, in so examining humans as the weakest link in the security chain 
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the largest group of healthcare professionals was not in the scope of study.  This study prompted 
this author to develop an instrument for the purpose of studying nurses’ knowledge and 
associated risk behaviors of mobile device use, a specific area of study not observed having been 
examined in the body of reviewed literature. The areas to be explored were also influenced by a 
study conducted in Turkey, reported as an assessment survey, administered to determine 
cybersecurity awareness related to health information systems (Aydin & Chouseinoglou, 2013). 
The questions driving this dissertation were based on the authors’ personal experience in 
cybersecurity and the general need to know what new nurses learn in their education, what 
electronic devices they may use in their clinical work, and what personal protective habits related 
to security they may have adopted or not. Assessing their knowledge of cybersecurity is 
fundamental to predicting their personal technology practices. 
The knowledge level of nurses will establish a baseline for their understanding of the threat 
appraisal and efficacy of their response to mitigate the threat to the proper use of electronic 
health information.  If these do not adequately mitigate their risk behaviors, it may be explained 
by their personal sense of privacy or lack thereof. Whether or not a nurse treats a patients’ 
information the way they would want their own information to be treated could weigh into the 
consideration of risk behaviors. Do nurses have concern about protecting patient information? 
Do they respond in a way that is congruent with their own beliefs about protection of their own 
information?  
To evaluate the subjects’ Concern for Information Protection and their Information Privacy 
Protective Responses as Rogers’ Protection Motivation mechanism, a study based upon patients’ 
perceptions was used as the basis for the instrument. Kuo, Ma, and Alexander’s 2014 study on 
patient responses to violations of their protected health information protection demonstrated a 
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predicted connection between one’s “concern” with one’s “protective responses.” By using this 
parallel idea, assessing these concepts in nurses may provide insight on nurses’ motivation to be 
vigilant in their personal technology habits related to patient information. This notion serves as a 
basis for studying nurses’ responses to the threat appraisal of their own health records being at 
risk. Furthermore, the study’s relationship among the elements of Information Privacy Protective 
Responses and Concern for Information Privacy may serve in the overall model to uncover the 
aspects of cybersecurity risk that nurses could be taught or motivated to minimize their risk 
behaviors. 
This study will examine the nurses’ knowledge of information security systems, their habits 
with mobile device use, and the threat appraisal (internal and external) that may motivate them as 
they relate to the subjects’ self-report of risk behaviors and/or safeguarding private information 
as if it were their own health information. This will lay the framework for studying nurse risk 
behaviors and the antecedents that may be ameliorated through an educational intervention. 
Significance of the Problem 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 included stipulations for 
improving the United States’ health technology infrastructure.  As part of ARRA, The Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act provides financial 
incentives for providers and hospitals, herein referred to as adopters, to adopt and implement 
electronic medical record technology. Conversely, significant penalties exist for those who 
choose to not adopt the technology.  Computerizing patient data increases the risk of privacy 
breaches for which severe financial penalties exist.  Those adopting the technology may be ill 
prepared to address privacy risk and are vulnerable for incurring substantial penalties. New rules 
imposed from the phases of “meaningful use” now mandate institutions to demonstrate vigilant 
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risk assessments and policies to manage numerous breach incidents. According to a 2012 
Ponemon Institute study, 94% of hospitals surveyed experienced at least one data breach. 
Under the HITECH Act portion of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
hospitals and providers face incentives to adopt and penalties for the failure to adopt an 
electronic health record.  Furthermore, they must demonstrate “meaningful use” in stages.  The 
current stage 2 of “meaningful use” requires hospitals to show that 5% of discharges must use 
the patient portal. 
The patient portal potentially increasing the risk of a breach as protected health 
information and personally identifiable information is now mandated to be displayed in a 
customer-facing, publically-accessible system.  Any mistakes such as inappropriate disclosures 
has the possibility to become calamitous. Between business associates, such as the patient portal 
vendor and the healthcare entity (hospital or practitioner),  HHS has mandated agreements which 
could potentially reduce the liability of the healthcare entity.  Potentially adding to the increase 
in risk, electronic health record vendors had to rush to meet the “meaningful use” stage 2 
specification deadline and bring these features to market.  Hospitals then rushed to implement 
and meet a goal that the majority of the nation’s hospitals failed to do.  Following this rush, CMS 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Systems) delayed the requirement.  However, many 
institutions produced hastily-implemented systems across the country.  Statistics of breaches 
resulting from the patient portal are not available as CMS will only publish those settled cases 
with 500 or more disclosures. Therefore, smaller breach episodes resulting from such hasty 
activities have yet to be realized. 
Mobile applications increase the risk of breaches for the simple reason that they are 
mobile.  Such devices are more readily lost or stolen than desktop devices and have the potential 
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to expose large amounts of sensitive information.  A significant portion of non-paper based 
breaches of 500 or more individuals as reported by CMS indicates that  mobile devices are most 
often the culprit.  Approximately one of every three non-paper large breaches involved a mobile 
device (Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2017).  The common theme is that these 
lost or stolen mobile devices were not encrypted. Appropriately implemented encryption 
provides a covered entity with a “safe harbor” provision essentially considering a breach highly 
unlikely and therefore not reportable.  Unfortunately, encryption is not a default standard 
configuration of the most common laptop operating systems. 
Tablets and smart phones may or may not be protected.  Apple’s iOS is encrypted by 
default, but controls may not be set up correctly to prevent disclosures.  Android, the other 
prevalent mobile operating system, varies from manufacturer to manufacturer and only in the 
future will these devices be encrypted by default.  Even Android encryption has been broken by 
a variety of mechanisms including deep freeze – which actually requires one to freeze the phone 
to a certain temperature before loading a ROM package.  Apple’s latest offering supposedly 
cannot even be undone by the company themselves even in the case of a law enforcement 
request.  However, without the mandated use of mobile device management solutions, the variety 
of configurations leaves mobile devices at risk.  According to a 2012 Ponemon Institute study, 
60% of all workplace mobile phone users circumvent their devices’ security features.  Therefore, 
human behavior must be eliminated from the equation where possible to diminish the risk of a 
breach.  
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Problem Statement 
Nurses, the largest group of healthcare professionals in the United States, use electronic 
health records containing patients’ sensitive information.  As employee mistakes rank among the 
top sources of healthcare data breaches, nurse information system security knowledge and 
behavior should be studied to possibly mitigate security risks and ultimately safeguard a 
vulnerable population’s sensitive information entrusted to healthcare entities.  Data breaches can 
result in harm to patients by way of identity theft and fraud.  Institutions may suffer financial 
penalties and harm to their reputation. Such instances have been frequently reported by news 
outlets (Ong, 2015).  If health information system security knowledge can be improved through 
intervention and it has any influence on nurses’ risk behaviors using mobile technologies, then 
untoward consequences can be prevented rather than prosecuted.  In other words, an effective 
way of maintaining compliance with information system security practices may be to improve 
the knowledge of the subjects and find methods to encourage such practices rather than endure 
consequences to either personnel, the institution, and/or the patients.  This content might be 
taught before the new graduate nurse becomes employed.  However, standardized specific 
instruction on cybersecurity may be an elusive goal for nurse educators in the United States as 
the variations of EHRs, with associated security features continue to proliferate and students 
continue to use the latest electronic devices on the market. According to Gardner and Jones 
(2012), nursing schools have by and large not integrated the EHR into their curricula. The 
American Association of Colleges of Nursing (2008) offers in its latest guidelines for 
baccalaureate nursing education elements about the use of clinical informatics systems without 
mention of either privacy or security of the electronic information. According to available 
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literature, there is a prevalent lack of standardized cybersecurity practices in undergraduate 
nursing programs in the United States. 
Study Aim 
The aim of this descriptive study is to explore level of new nurses’ information system 
security and mobile device risk behaviors along with their Information Privacy Protective 
Responses, looking for patterns of relationships in users’ protection motivation and their 
potential for breaches through risk behaviors related to health information technology (HIT) in 
general and EHRs specifically.  This study will provide information related to a currently 
unstudied area of HIT security risk behaviors among nurses in preparation for future research on 
information system security training in nursing programs. 
Purpose  
 The purpose of this descriptive study is to explore in a national sample of new nurses one 
year after graduation in their HIT knowledge about security and risk behaviors in their use of 
portable electronic devices, their knowledge of information system security, and the influence, if 
any, of their personal protective motivation to protect patient care information.  This sample of 
nurses that are homogeneous with respect to experience will provide a focus on how they were 
prepared in their nursing education in relation to information system security in order to inform 
educators in the future. 
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Research Questions 
The main question for the study is as follows: 
What kind of activities do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, including 
frequency of use, types of activities, and habits or behaviors that make them vulnerable to 
security risk? 
This overall question driving the study can be broken into a series of questions related to the 
new nurses’ specific cybersecurity knowledge, risk, and personal characteristics including: 
1. What is the level of knowledge of new nurses’ information system security (KISS) 
related to patient privacy, security rules, and vulnerability to breaches or threats to 
exposing protected health information (PHI)? 
2. What is the nurses’ level of personal or mobile device risk behaviors and types of 
personal technology practices which may pose a risk to health information systems? 
3. What is the reported level and type of nurse mobile application use? 
4. What is the level of new nurses’ Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) and 
Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) factors? 
5. What nurses’ characteristics and behaviors predict their Information Privacy-Protective 
Responses (IPPR) based upon the Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP) factors 
including: 
a. medical facilities errors (ME)? 
b. unauthorized access to medical information (UA)? 
c. medical facilities secondary use of medical information (SU)? 
d. personal collection of medical information (CO)? 
6. What are the predominantly reported threat appraisals (internal vs external)? 
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7. How do nurses’ threat appraisals mitigate their Knowledge of Information System 
Security, their Privacy Protective Responses or their Risk Behaviors? 
Proposed Model for the Study 
The theoretical framework of Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) is a suitable 
foundation to evaluate the Information Privacy Protective Response (IPPR) as the subjects’ 
reaction component to their Concern for Information Privacy (Rogers 1975, 1983).  The PMT is 
commonly used a framework for the study of patient responses to health threats as found in a 
survey of literature.  Essentially, the patient must have knowledge of a risk. The patient develops 
a sense of a “fear appeal” (threat appraisal) or trepidation of said risk being realized along with 
the negative aspects of the risk in question. The patient then has a sense of belief as to whether 
the ascribed treatment would be efficacious. The patient would then adhere to the ascribed 
treatment to varying degrees or perhaps non-adherence based upon their knowledge, fear 
appeals, and belief in the efficacy of treatment. 
Similarly, applying this to the proposed study, users of EHRs need knowledge about 
security risk to promote their compliance with cybersecurity practices. This knowledge lays the 
groundwork for behaviors that are influenced by the forces that shape their technology practices, 
secure or risky. These forces may be personal motivation such as concern for information 
protection, their information protective responses, their motivation externally or internally (threat 
appraisal) to being compliant, and their increased use of their mobile devices. A potential 
architype for this can be seen in the figure below Information Privacy Protective Responses 
Pathway. The participants were be assessed for their knowledge, their individual protective 
response as attributed to Rogers’ PMT, their fear appeal is their own CFIP index in whole and in 
part as subscales of the CFIP and their self-reported practices and risk behaviors. This study 
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examines correlations between knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and the IPPR response to the 
CFIP as Rogers’ “fear appraisals” as they may be mediated by the threat appraisal of 
punishments to self (internal) or causing harm to others (external). 
 
 
Figure 1 Information Privacy Protective Responses Pathway 
 
Concern For Information Privacy Subscale Definitions 
The Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) index includes the subscales of Medical 
Facility Errors (ME), Unauthorized Access to Medical Information (UA), Secondary Use of 
Medical Information (SU) and the Personal Collection of Medical Information (CO) as its 
subscales (Smith, Milberg & Burke, 1996).  The subscales are considered as the various factors 
of concerns to individuals that contribute to their overall concern for information privacy.  The 
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CFIP serves as the conceptual framework for the study.  Subjects’ CFIP is evaluated using a 
survey to determine their sentiment or concern for the usage of their own medical information 
based upon the subscales which contribute to their overall concern.  
Conceptual Definitions of Variables 
• Knowledge of Information Security Systems Index: This index measurement determines 
the degree to which a subject has knowledge of information system security (KISS). 
 
• Concern For Information Privacy Index (CFIP): This index comprised of the below 
subscales determines the degree to which a subject has concern for the protection of 
information privacy; either their own or that of another subject. 
 
o Medical Errors (ME): Errors may exist in the electronic health record. An 
example may include mistyped information, another patient’s data, or a system 
processing issue resulting in incorrect information present in an electronic health 
record. 
 
o Unauthorized Access of Medical Information (UA): This pertains to the condition 
whereby individuals not authorized by the patient for access to the electronic 
health record may obtain access. An example may be an institution workforce 
member obtaining access to an electronic health record without a clinical or 
business purpose. Another example may be the breach of electronic health record 
system resulting in the leakage of electronic health information to potentially 
nefarious actors. 
 
o Secondary Use (SU): Electronic health record data may be stored by, manipulated 
by, or transported to systems aside from the primary electronic health record.  An 
example may be the transfer of information to a shared healthcare network 
database.  Another example may be either prospective or retrospective research. 
 
o Personal Collection of Medical Information (CO): The personal collection refers 
to the gathering of electronic health information by an individual for personal use 
outside of clinical or business needs.  An example may be the printing of 
electronic health information for potentially nefarious use.  
 
• Threat Appraisal: This is the perception of a threat and motivation to take action as a 
result of this threat perception. An issue must be determined by a subject to be 
threatening and the action must be understood to have efficacy as a mitigating factor 
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against such a threat.  This concept is operationalized into categories of “internal” threat 
to self (job, fines) and “external” threat/harm to others (hospital, patients). 
Conceptual Definitions of Dependent Variables 
• Cyber Security Risk Behaviors (RB): This index measurement determines the 
professional behaviors undertaken by a subject which could present a risk to the 
protection of electronic information; either their own or that of another subject. 
• Information Privacy Protection Response (IPPR): This response to the Concern For 
Information Privacy represents the intended activities to be taken by the subject to protect 
the electronic information, health record or otherwise, against undue privacy 
infringements. 
Summary 
In summary, this chapter has outlined the problem of increased electronic health record 
prevalence in the United States as an increased security risk adjoined with employee mistakes as 
a leading cause of security issues in healthcare organizations and practices with nurses 
representing the largest segment of healthcare personnel and since mobile devices are becoming 
ubiquitous.  To decrease the human risks to protected health information, it is essential to 
understand what nurses know about information system security and their motivation to protect 
information as it relates to their risk behaviors. The descriptive study provides information about 
new nurses in the United States with respect to their information system security knowledge, risk 
behaviors associated with mobile device use, their concern for information privacy as indicated 
by their own information privacy protective responses, and threat appraisal. 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of literature with selected studies on the security of 
health information that are less technical and more based upon human behaviors. It begins with a 
background about HIPAA legislation and the mandates for EHR administrators that followed, 
including a general description about expectations that are technically implemented and 
regulations with punishments that were advanced for breaches in confidentiality. The chapter 
also includes a description of the Protection Motivation Theory as the dissertation theoretical 
framework, information system security knowledge studies, a foundational study on Information 
Personal Protection Response, a social engineering review, and a brief literature review of 
technical perspectives related to electronic health record privacy and security. 
Health information system security and privacy have been researched in this era of 
accelerated electronic health record adoption in the United States.  This literature review 
explores such research topics, peripheral and direct, regarding policy adherence mechanisms.  
There is a large body of literature on the impact of health information technology and related 
electronic health records (EHR), but less on the users of these healthcare organizations and 
practices and even less on the new era of mobile devices. Yet to be studied is a social science 
exploration of nurses’ knowledge and risk behaviors with security and privacy issues with the 
focus on what they have learned in the nursing program and how much they bring to their new 
role as RNs.  This section will also examine the literature pertinent to this study including 
medical students’ cybersecurity knowledge, Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory, response to 
information privacy, response taxonomy, fuzzy logic, and social engineering. 
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In an effort to diminish the risk to protected health information in healthcare organizations 
and practices, this study should inform nursing educators within the healthcare organizations and 
practices as well as educational institutions about the knowledge of new nurses, their risk 
behaviors with mobile devices, and motivation for preventing incidents related to information 
system security. 
HIPAA Rules In Action 
The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) legislated the 
protection of health information privacy (Gilley, 2009). This Act permitted Health and Human 
Services to enact the Privacy and Security Rules of 2003 (“HHS delegates security rule authority 
to OCR”, 2009). Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is tasked with 
enforcing these rules. Both the rules and the enforcement capabilities have been further 
strengthened under the HHS Final Rule of 2013 (Strauss, 2013).  The OCR conducts periodic 
audits of healthcare entities, responds to reports of potential healthcare-related privacy and 
security issues, invokes penalties, and provides remediation guidance for breaches and 
infractions (HCPro, 2013). 
HIPAA has placed a layer of rules that users in healthcare organizations and practices of 
health information data and personal health information, especially physicians and nurses, must 
heed in their active provider roles. On the HHS.gov Health Information Privacy website (April 
16, 2015),  The Department of Health and Human Services summarizes the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
as follows: 
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“The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes national standards to protect individuals’ medical 
records and other personal health information and applies to health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain health care 
transactions electronically.  The Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the 
privacy of personal health information, and sets limits and conditions on the uses and 
disclosures that may be made of such information without patient authorization. The Rule 
also gives patients rights over their health information, including rights to examine and 
obtain a copy of their health records, and to request corrections.” 
 
Paper-based systems could be easily tucked away from prying eyes with little chance of 
exposure en masse.  Traditionally, charts could be copied, faxed, tampered with or viewed 
without the likelihood of access being tracked.  While this modality seems safe contrasted 
against a backdrop of sensational cybersecurity headlines, large and small, paper-based breaches 
have occurred and continue to remain a risk. But these pale in comparison with the proliferation 
of new technologies and social media activities where providers such as physicians and nurses, 
who are human, interact with mountains of protected health information (PHI) and its electronic 
versions (ePHI) that may be vulnerable to security breaches and privacy violations. Healthcare 
organizations and practices now have the added responsibility of oversight of the wide range of 
computerized technologies in health and the ubiquitous systems of tracking health information. 
Their key endeavors in an era of regulation and “meaningful use” now include active risk 
assessment with the traditional maintenance and incident response/management of system 
disasters.  The figure “Key Endeavors of Healthcare Organizations and Practices Information 
Systems Managers” shows some mainstay efforts of institutions to protect clinical systems.  
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These include risk assessments, encryption for both information at rest and in motion, as well as 
disaster recovery strategies. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Key Endeavors of Healthcare Organizations and Practices Information Systems 
Managers (Ong, 2015) 
With the electronic health record, data is available via multiple sources, people and 
systems.  Along with this liberalization of information and massive accessibility come the 
mechanisms by which to track, restrict access, and monitor for inappropriate access.  It’s a brave 
new world with an increase in both benefits and risks. Furthmore, emergening programs and 
technology changes the manifestation of electronic health record usage and changes how 
newfound risks may surface.  For example, the 21st Century Cures Act (H.R.6 - 21st century 
cures act, 2015) calls for EHR vendors to: 
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“publish application programming interfaces and associated documentation, with 
respect to health information within such records, for search and indexing, semantic 
harmonization and vocabulary translation, and user interface applications; and…. 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that health information from such records 
are able to be exchanged, accessed, and used through the use of application 
programming interfaces without special effort, as authorized under applicable law”. 
Such legislation leads to the use of application progammer interfaces which essentially 
requires vendors to open a portal into the electronic health record to other vendors.  This changes 
the expression of risk to ePHI and how controls to mitigate such risk must be considered. 
Security Breach – Privacy Violations 
Data security has at times been front and center on the news and on the minds of the 
general public.  Headline after headline, we are reminded of the potential pitfalls of living in a 
connected world.  American intelligence agencies have accused the Russian government of 
hacking and other activities to influence the United States’ 2016 Presidential election (Shane, 
Sanger, & Kramer, 2017).  Prior to such revelations, the National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor turned whistleblower Eric Snowden exposed some of the NSA’s massive surveillance 
activities.  These disclosures have shaken the foundations of international relations and help to 
create a narrative that America’s own government may be spying on their citizens. When 
combined with the sensitive nature of one’s private health information disclosed to providers 
with expectation of privacy, the public’s trust is threatened if that information appears to be 
available for others to see. 
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The following selected list suggests considerations related to the practices of securing ePHI: 
• How is ePHI access logged?  Is there remote access by healthcare personnel, vendors, 
and other business associates?  Does anyone review or become alerted to potentially 
inappropriate access?  Remember that even trusted employees have been known to have 
inappropriately disclosed information.  Countless examples exist of information sold for a 
variety of reasons.  People have been jailed even after making only a scant profit. 
 
• Is information segmented in a fashion that limits access based on job role or even 
physical location?  Maybe one hospital unit should not have access to another’s.  Maybe 
a physician sees a different set of information than a clerk. 
 
• Is there an education program for the workforce to help in the understanding of 
legislation and organization policies to which they must adhere?  Are there 
supplementary security awareness reminders?  While ignorance is no excuse for the law, 
HIPAA does compel entities to keep its workforce informed. 
 
• Is there a limitation on administrative access or even any access that goes unlogged?  
 
• Can tampering of information be prevented or at least be discovered? 
 
• What mechanisms are in place to prevent leaks from nefarious sources? (i.e. viruses, 
hackers, scammers) 
 
• How secure is the information against damage – physical or otherwise?  Are there 
contingency plans in place for periods of inaccessibility? 
 
• Is there a disaster recovery, business continuity, and backup plan? Have you tested these 
plans? Careers have been cut short in disaster scenarios when untested backups fail. 
 
• What mechanisms prevent accidental disclosure?  Is there a data leak prevention system – 
either comprehensive through a vendor or otherwise via piece-meal?  Can employees 
send patient files over email – internally and externally – where they reside ad-infinitum 
in wait for a potential hacker to come along?  
 
• Is all sensitive data encrypted both at rest and in motion? An inadvertent disclosure could 
be as simple as a download to USB thumb drive that gets lost or an unencrypted stolen 
laptop.  Stolen laptops are a huge source of breaches according to the Office for Civil 
Rights.  Proper encryption means the would-be thief just inherited a brick-shaped laptop 
for all intents and purposes. 
 
• Are the security mechanisms reasonable to implement? If not, workforce members will 
circumvent them.  Anectodally, one company made everyone change their passwords 
every day.  The employees would gather every morning to choose the group password. 
Only their username was different.  In the case of extremely complicated passwords and 
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different usernames for various systems, employees tend to place notes under their 
keyboards on tape them to their monitors. 
 
• Is there an identity and access management solution in place? While this topic is 
complex, consider how to ensure that only those with authorization obtain access.  The 
solutions may be technological in nature (single sign-on, self-service password resets) or 
administrative (activation and termination notification). 
 
Identity theft companies promote their services in light of these new menacing headlines. The 
sensitivity of one’s health information makes privacy in the EHR even more important to 
consumers. For example, a television advertisement shows a physician accidentally leaving a 
patient data-rich laptop in a cab while rushing to a meeting.  Of course, the identity theft 
protection service thwarts the efforts of the thief who just happens to take the same cab 
immediately thereafter. But the potential consequences of a health data breach are being 
highlighted to the public. In this connected age of well-publicized data breaches, the general 
public has become more aware of the threat to their privacy, sacred health information, and 
finances. These create a suspicious consumer – and the health care workers using the information 
need to fully appreciate the great responsibility placed in their trust. Yet nurses, the largest single 
provider group using the healthcare organizations and practices’ electronic technologies, are 
often perpetrators knowingly or unknowingly of vulnerabilities to the protections in place in the 
EHR. 
Social Engineering Behaviors – For Bad and For Good 
Within the context of the information age, Social Engineering is the concept by which 
individuals or groups are manipulated into disclosing information such as access credentials or 
persuaded to elicit specific behavior responses (Greavu-Servan & Serban, 2014).  A term 
historically associated with social sciences, social engineering has become the subject of concern 
in the computer security industry (Anderson, 2008, p.17).  As diverse is the landscape of 
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available information, a wide spectrum of potential effects and bounty resulting from social 
engineering incidents may too be vast.  
Identity theft, one prominent bounty of social engineering, often involves the use of 
others’ names, banking information, social security numbers, and birthdates without the people’s 
knowledge or permission (Hadnagy, 2010, p. 17).  Medical theft involves the unauthorized use of 
health data also known as protected health information which may possibly be obtained through 
social engineering alone or in combination with other tactics. According to a 2012 study by the 
Ponemon Institute, the economic impact of such theft in the United States is $41.3 billion per 
year up 33.66% from the year prior. 
It has become necessary for hospitals and health care entities to put technological 
protections, educational interventions, and punitive policies to address the need to protect patient 
information and to be in compliance with regulatory expectations. These efforts combine people 
and products, designed to prevent, intercept, or threaten punishment of breaches in security. The 
figures below show samples of how a covered entity (health organization) may implement from a 
policy perspective the Health and Human Services guidelines for the administrative, technical, 
and physicial controls of the HIPAA Security Rule. In these samples, every segment of each 
safeguard category has an associated institution policy indicating how elements of the rule are 
addressed. 
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Figure 3 Sample - Levels of Administrative Safeguards (Ong, 2015) 
 
Figure 4 Sample - Levels of Physical Safeguards (Ong, 2015) 
 
Standards Sections Policy Number Policy Name
Risk Analysis R 9100-204 Risk Analysis
Risk Management R 9100-032 Security Management Process
Sanction Policy R 9100-032 Security Management Process
Activity Review R 9100-032 Security Management Process
Assigned Security Responsibility 164.308(2) R 9100-033 Assigned Security Responsibility
Authorization and/or
Supervision
A 9237(100-131 
and 700-702)
See: Human Resources Policies
On Intranet
Workforce Clearance
Procedure
A 9237(100-131 
and 700-702)
See: Human Resources Policies
On Intranet
Termination Procedures A 9237(100-131 
and 700-702)
See: Human Resources Policies
On Intranet
Isolating Health Care Clearinghouse Functions R 9100-034 Isolating Health Care 
Clearinghouse Functions
Access Authorization A 9100-035 Access Authorization
Access Establishment and Modification A 9100-036 Access Establishment and 
Modification
Security Reminders A 9100-037 Security Reminders
Protection from Malicious
Software
A 9100-004 Protection from Malicious
Software
Log-in Monitoring A 9100-038 Log-in Monitoring
Password Management A 9100-205 Password Management
Security Incident Procedures 164.308(a)(6) Response and Reporting R 9100-039 Response and Reporting
Data Backup Plan R 9100-040 Contingency Plan
Disaster Recovery Plan R 9100-040 Contingency Plan
Emergency Mode Operation Plan R 9100-040 Contingency Plan
Testing and Revision Procedures A 9100-040 Contingency Plan
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis A 9100-040 Contingency Plan
Evaluation 164.308(a)(8) R 9100-042 Evaluation
Business Associate Contracts and Other 
Arrangements
164.308(b)(1) Written Contract or Other Arrangement R 9200-331 Business Associate Agreements
Implementation Specifications
R=Required, A=Addressable
Workforce Security
Information Access Management
164.308(1)Security Management Process
164.308(3)
164.308(a)(4)
Contingency Plan 164.308(a)(7)
Security Awareness and Training 164.308(a)(5)
ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
Standards Sections Policy Number Policy Name
Contingency Operations A 9100-044 Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan A 9100-015 Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation Procedures A 9100-030 Access Control and Validation 
Procedures
Maintenance Records A 9100-045 Maintenance Records
Workstation Use 164.310(b) Acceptable Use Policy                                                                      R 9200-385 Acceptable Use Policy                                                                      
Workstation Security 164.310(c) 9100-041 Workstation Security
Disposal R 9100-031 Device and Media Controls
Media Re-use R 9100-031 Device and Media Controls
Accountability A 9100-031 Device and Media Controls
Data Backup and Storage A 9100-031 Device and Media Controls
Device and Media Controls 164.310(d)(1)
Facility Access Controls 164.310(a)(1)
                                                                                                    R
Implementation Specifications
R=Required, A=Addressable
PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS
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Figure 5 Sample - Levels of Technical Safeguards (Ong, 2015) 
 
In support of these sample endeavors is a matrix illustrating how the Health and Human 
Services Office for Civil Rights facilitates the privacy and security undertakings of covered 
entities in pursuit of compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule. The agency holds a balance 
between privacy and security, a public access arm, tools to facility compliance, and an 
enforcement segment. 
 
Standards Sections Policy Number Policy Name
Unique User Identification R 9100-043 Unique User Identification
Emergency Access Procedure R 9100-047 Emergency Access Procedure
Automatic Logoff A 9100-219 Automatic Logoff
Encryption and Decryption A 9100-029 Encryption
Audit Controls 164.312(b)                                                                                                   R 9100-048 Audit Controls
Integrity 164.312(c)(1) Mechanism to Authenticate Electronic 
Protected Health Information
A 9100-046 Mechanism to Authenticate 
Electronic Protected Health 
Information
Person or Entity Authentication 164.312(d)                                                                                                    R 9100-049 Person or Entity Authentication
Integrity Controls A 9100-050 Integrity Controls
Encryption A 9100-029 Encryption
Transmission Security 164.312(e)(1)
Implementation Specifications
R=Required, A=Addressable
Access Control 164.312(a)(1)
TECHNICAL SAFEGUARDS
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Figure 6 Office for Civil Right Facilitates Privacy and Security (Ong, 2015) 
 
Social Engineering by design involves the manipulation of human behavior (Greavu-
Servan & Serban, 2014, P. 5).  The HIPAA Security Rule (Administrative Safeguards, § 
164.308(a)(5) 45 CFR Subtitle A, 2003) addresses this vulnerability by requiring healthcare 
entities to “Implement a security awareness and training program for all members of its 
workforce (including management).”  Using the notion of Social Engineering in reverse, perhaps 
efforts can be constructed to positively influence people who are frequent users to internalize and 
protect patient information as part of their work life. By recognizing the predictors of motivation 
to protect information, interventions aimed at users may be constructed.  
These new efforts must take into account the multiple potential entry points with the growing 
proliferation of mobile devices and social access to a wide range of tools and information that 
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may be useful and/or purely social. These boundaries have become less clear. In order to plan for 
and develop interventions that address future breaches, it is important to study the knowledge 
and behavior of those who are vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional threats to patient privacy. 
Nurses represent the largest group of healthcare professionals according to a July 13, 2015 
United States Department of Labor report (TED: The Economics Daily Image, 2015) and 
therefore represent the largest workforce group mandated to receive security awareness training.  
Furthermore, the growth and adoption of population health endeavors may speculatively seem a 
changing role for nurses potentially increasing their use of technology and their oversight of 
information in healthcare spaces such as primary care.  
As part of an overall effort to minimize breaches and exposure of patient sensitive health 
information, this study will explore the user side of EHR security and the variables that may be 
pivotal in risk behaviors or susceptibility, knowing that mobile devices will continue to grow and 
be part of the healthcare systems currently in place. The Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) 
theoretical framework from Smith et al (1996) based upon the Rogers (1975, 1983) “Protection 
Motivation Theory” (PMT), this study focuses on nurses one year after graduating from nursing 
school, to determine their knowledge, risk behaviors, and personal beliefs related to privacy. 
This group may give insights into what nurses learned in their education as it carries into their 
first year of work. It seeks to explore the information privacy-protective responses (IPPR) of 
nurses (the largest single user group who access protected patient health information routinely) 
and how it might predict their likelihood of risk behaviors of security breaches related to their 
increase use of mobile devices. Knowing what predicts the likelihood of risk behaviors of 
security breaches including the nurses’ susceptibility and/or lack of knowledge, the researcher 
was able to develop an intervention that combines education with social engineering strategies to 
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produce users of EHRs and other healthcare technologies who internalized motivation to protect 
ePHI. 
Theoretical Framework: Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory 
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is centered on Ronald Rogers’ Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT).  This theory may be considered chiefly pragmatic for studies 
pertaining to subjects’ recognition of health consequences resulting in a fear appeal and their 
associated response mechanisms (Rogers, 1975, 1983).  This new nurse study uses the same 
protection motivation and fear appeals mechanism in overlaying the new nurse’s sentiment of 
protecting their own sensitive information with the relationship of protective responses vis à vis 
the subjects’ information system security risk behaviors. 
In Rogers’ 1975 article “A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude 
Change” along with his 1983 revision “Cognitive and Physiological Processes In Fear Appeals 
and Attitude Change,” a concept was formulated describing the relationship between fear and the 
reaction to this given recognition of fear. Initiating the process is the components of the fear 
appeal as magnitude of noxiousness, probability of occurrence, and efficacy of recommended 
response. In other words, the motivation for protection originates at the recognition that an event 
is perceived with a potential degree of harm at a particular degree of likelihood and that the 
recommended response is calculated with a certain degree of effectiveness.  For example, a 
patient must appreciate that non-adherence to a prescribed diet may have likely concrete 
consequences which would be significantly averted by adherence to the recommended regimen.  
Based upon these factors, the patient may elicit a protective response. 
In the Cognitive Mediating Process, the fear appeal is evaluated.  The noxiousness is 
appraised.  The probability is evaluated as the expected likelihood of the event’s occurrence.  
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The efficacy of the recommended treatment is deliberated as a possible coping response.  These 
factors lead to the protection motivation (Rogers, 1983). 
Categorically, the fear appeal and cognitive mediating processes lead to an attitude 
change.  In the above instance, the patient may make the determination that the diet will work 
and thus adopt an adherence to said regimen. 
Rogers discusses the fear appeal process in the context of the power of persuasion. He 
issues a disclaimer of his theory’s limitations. There are vast arrays of confounding variables 
which could potentially affect the response outcome.  Applying this notion to fear appeal as it 
relates to how nurses appraise the noxiousness of a breach in security from a few perspectives: 
(a) a personal protection motivation that connects the breach of security for one’s own 
information and how that information might be abused; (b) an internal threat that a breach will 
result in something bad happening to oneself such as punishment or loss of job; (c) an external 
threat that a breach will result in harm to one’s patient or the hospital. In this study, new nurses 
as subjects self-report their behaviors using mobile devices and their secure practices to protect 
access to their own or hospital information. While the fear emotion may not be adequately 
conveyed through a survey, the nurse assessment was based upon considering themselves as the 
affected victims of potential breaches in cybersecurity and how this may or may not influence 
their secure cyber practices. 
  
 
 
31 
Violation of Information Privacy Responses 
The violation of information privacy protective responses was a study conducted in Taiwan 
with patients. Elements of the study and the results shaped the development of examining nurses’ 
information privacy protective responses and concern for information privacy as variables in the 
dissertation that may predict risk behaviors, particularly with mobile devices. 
In Kuo, Ma, and Alexander’s 2014 study on patient responses to violation of information 
privacy, the taxonomic structure of Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) operated as 
the unifying resultant of factors such as Collection (CO), Unauthorized Access (UA), Secondary 
Use (SU) and Medical Errors (ME) within the framework of Rogers’ Protection Motivation 
Theory. The Taiwan-based study was conducted in a hospital with patients in the investigation of 
their concerns for information privacy and resulting protective responses in reaction to factors 
which may lead to the invasion of patients’ privacy.  The study cited reasons for the increasing 
pervasiveness of the electronic health record in the health industry leading to the foreseeable 
accompaniment of the healthcare entities’ ethical dilemmas and patients’ privacy concerns. The 
variables were found to be factors that were interrelated and predictive of the participants’ 
reported protective responses. By using this structure and known relationships, this dissertation 
modifies the elements to apply to the nurses themselves, interpreting the questions as if the 
information in the EHRs was their own. 
By applying this study to the dissertation focusing on new nurses in the United States as 
subjects with whom the Information Privacy Protective Response mechanism can be explored, a 
potential motivating factor of shaping safe, secure practices might contribute to behaviors in 
addition to the knowledge nurses might have about cybersecurity. The Kuo study refers to the 
plethora of sensitive information held by the electronic health record and the potentially 
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devastating consequences to the affected patient population should an unauthorized disclosure or 
breach occur.  Medical data can be considered as quite sensitive and harm can ensue if 
mishandled.  The authors go on to infer that the risk increases as data accumulates over time.  
The study’s purpose is to assist those entities in a position to improve the mechanisms designed 
to protect patients’ private information. 
The authors specify that only a scarce, limited amount of studies regarding patient concerns 
for their information privacy have been completed. Their study uses the Protection Motivation 
cognitive appraisal of threat in the context of perceived risks to the electronic medical record 
privacy and the Information Privacy Protective Responses as the Protection Motivation resultant 
effect. These findings are specific to the population studied but may be useful to other 
populations such as nurses themselves. These authors present the notion that the perceived threat 
to the security of the electronic health record should result in a decrease in risk behaviors 
contributing to the likelihood of such threats being realized and thereby considering the attitude 
change as a privacy protection behavior by means of the protection motivation conduct. 
The study selected a Southern Taiwanese hospital that provides medical services with 
nearly 1300 inpatient beds and a near average of 5000 outpatients seen daily.  Four interviewers 
recruited a convenience sample of subject by what the authors describe as approaching patients 
“randomly” to conduct in-person interviews for 5 to 10 minute periods. In research, randomness 
typically refers to the random assignment of treatment.  Random selection would be the use of 
selecting from an available pool of subjects. This study in effect used a convenience sample of 
subjects who self-selected to partake in the study upon approach of recruiters. 
The survey collected demographic information in the first section coupled with the second 
section of privacy concerns and subsequent protective responses.  Using a 5-point Likert scale, 
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measures from prior empirical studies were translated into Chinese and categorized into 
collection, secondary use, unauthorized access, and medical errors. The Concern for Information 
Privacy (CFIP) scale involving these factors was modified to suit the context of the electronic 
health record.  A group of ten patients served as a pilot study for the purpose of eliminating 
extraneous or otherwise unsuitable elements. 
The Structured Equation Model (SEM) was used to test the hypotheses using the partial 
least square (PLS) as no distributional assumptions were made.  The results included 204 
subjects out of 300 invitees with demographic details congruent with the general population of 
Taiwan only slightly younger and more educated. 
Reliability and validity were tested in confirmation of the measurement model.  The 
measurement items within the constructs were scrutinized as confirmatory by factor analysis 
resulted in three of the twenty-one items being discarded. The construct validity testing resulting 
in all approved items receiving a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of at least 0.7. 
Bootstrapping was performed using 1000 re-samples showing support for the four hypotheses 
save for the link of unauthorized access link to the Information Privacy Protective Response. 
According to the study, subjects seemed to feel that too much of their patient information 
was collected by medical facilities thereby causing some discomfort.  The authors suggest that 
only a minimal data set of information should be retained by the medical facility.  The subjects 
did not seem concerned with the potential for unauthorized access.  The authors attribute this 
phenomenon to patient familiarity with the medical staff. Perhaps the sample contained 
individuals who were more educated than the general population and had confidence in 
healthcare staff as possible peers.  The subjects did, however, express concern over secondary 
use of information beyond the intended purpose.  Secondary use is required for billing, 
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insurance, and pharmaceutical payers among other recipients.  The authors suggest limiting 
secondary disclosures where applicable and having prior approval before the release of 
information could take place.  Regarding errors, subjects showed concern over the potential 
inaccuracy of their medical information and effect on patient safety.  The authors suggest that 
patients cannot review their data for accuracy and that medical facilities must take it upon 
themselves to protect electronic health records from alterations and inaccuracies.  Please note 
that in the United States, regulations require healthcare entities partaking in the “Meaningful 
Use” incentive program to not only provide a patient portal but are required to have a percentage 
of their population log in as well.  Therefore, patients in the United States may review a subset of 
their chart and potentially request corrective action as warranted. 
The study examined the breadth of patient privacy concerns and their responses.  The study 
sought to suggest increases in lacking protections as the proliferation of the electronic record 
continues over time.  The study did not connect the concept of access by individuals outside of 
the medical facility, a factor of concern in the era of regularly reported breaches of medical 
information.  The authors implore medical facilities and government entities to develop 
mechanisms to reduce patient privacy concerns related to the electronic health record.  The study 
has expanded the use of the Concern For Information Privacy framework to the electronic health 
record paradigm and validated the instrument in the context of the healthcare setting thereby 
narrowing the gap of information found in the body of pertinent literature. 
Medical Students’ Knowledge of Privacy and Security 
In another non-technical study on information system privacy and security, third year 
medical students of a Midwestern university in the United States were surveyed for their 
knowledge of information system privacy and security. Their reported activities using mobile 
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devices was found to be in near ubiquitous use among the sample representative of the institution 
(Whipple, Allgood, & Larue, 2012). This rapid increase in mobile technologies appears to be 
worldwide and notably among young people, including students. 
The researchers found the students’ knowledge of information system privacy and security 
to be lacking and therefore sought to establish a baseline of their familiarity with this essential 
subject matter particularly with mobile device use.  A set of 67 respondents were provided with 
clinical situations to determine their concern for information privacy. 
The results showed that all respondents used their phone for voice communication and 94% 
for text messaging.  Respondents noted only 76.9% used the internet.  Due to the subjects’ 
interpretation of the question and gap in their knowledge of the technology, this author would 
suggest the number is likely to be 100%.  The interpretation of several results such as internet 
use suggests that there are significant knowledge gaps and/or perhaps limitations in the manner 
in which survey questions were constructed. 
Consistent with results conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2012) with workforce 
members, these students bypassed a key security mechanism on their phones more than half the 
time.  The author noted the same with the “PDA” (Personal Data Assistant), a term that fell out 
of use roughly a decade prior to their study but suggestive of perhaps tablet use in its place. 
However, the institution in question also used this outdated PDA technology to operate a 
software package.  Given the availability of advances in technology in the mobile device sector, 
one may presume that these functionally-limited PDA devices were likely used almost 
exclusively for work-related purposes.  Scenarios included the sharing of information via the 
YouTube video sharing service and Facebook, the predominant social media service.  As 
infractions of protected health information have been reported in the media by way of both of 
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these services, the use in scenarios provides for a realistic conduit by which to comprehend 
medical student mobile behavior which may place the privacy and security of patient information 
at risk for inappropriate and potentially unlawful disclosures. 
The forty question Mobile Device Questionnaire (MDQ) was provided to 67 students at the 
commencement of their third year of medical school in attendance of an intersession activity.  
Only a single student claimed to not have a mobile phone.  The survey was initiated with 
demographic details followed by mobile devices use, security knowledge, and concluding with 
clinical scenarios issues. The authors concluded that more education needs to be provided to 
medical students regarding information system security and privacy due to the ease at which data 
may be shared through mobile devices both purposely and inadvertently. 
A principal focus of the finding is centered on the students’ lack of mobile device locking.  
(This author notes that the major vendors of such devices have increased security mechanisms 
and encouraged the use of said mechanisms as default configurations over the years since this 
study was conducted.  Furthermore, mobile device management solutions requiring the locking 
of devices with complex passwords have been created and available to institutions to safeguard 
such devices.)  While still a relevant area of study, the period of time and sample studied may not 
be indicative of the experience of new nurses from across the United States in the year 2016. 
Some of the survey questions in the MDQ were used by this author to develop items for the 
dissertation. Several items required adaptation to suit the target nurse audience and with 
clarifications or modifications reflective of technology in modern use.  For example, “Notepad” 
is vendor-specific application available on a specific mobile device operating system found to be 
in near obscurity at the time of this dissertation draft.  “Address Book” is merely a contact list 
that all participants likely use with every interpersonal interaction.  Responses to the question are 
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likely to be more indicative of respondents’ awareness of how the technology is used rather than 
whether or not the technology is in use by the subject. These were all considered in the 
development of the survey for this study. 
Most telling and arguably of foremost value is the subject responses to scenarios indicative 
of behavior, possibly putting sensitive information at risk.  Such scenarios served as models for 
the instrument directed at nurses with the goal of similarly identifying and describing nurse risk 
behaviors.  In the Whipple et al. (2012) study, more than a quarter would leave their device 
unprotected and alone for up to an hour.  More than half did not take issue with sending 
protected health information to a professor via email and reading such content submitted to them 
via email on their mobile devices.  Depending upon institutional policies and protection 
mechanisms in place, such activities may be considered as contributory to mobile device risk 
behaviors and therefore certainly revealing of a likely educational opportunity for these student 
programs. 
The authors concluded that third year medical students are far enough along in their 
program to have hopefully been exposed to information protection education in having had 
exposure to the clinical setting.  Their study may be informative to those studying mobile 
security risk behaviors in other populations and serve as a basis for further study in other 
populations of interest in the contemporary healthcare and technology worlds. 
Fuzzy Logic of Cyber Security Knowledge 
Cybersecurity knowledge was studied as Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey and 
analyzed using fuzzy logic. Participants included 86 administrative subjects, 69 physicians and 
86 students with various unspecified categories of health-related studies.  The study provided 
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results, interpretation of the survey outcomes, and guidelines for the application of fuzzy logic to 
other healthcare institutions (Aydın, & Chouseinoglou, 2013). 
The article provides a compelling account of the significance of cybersecurity mechanisms 
in health information systems and the rationale for student subjects as “digital natives” expected 
to be the predominant information system user base within the upcoming decade. The persuasive 
explanation of cybersecurity risk is detailed as a rationale for conducting such an investigation of 
cybersecurity habits. 
The authors outline a precedence for the use of fuzzy logic in healthcare research.  Defined 
therein is fuzzy logic as a linguistic methodology for qualitative modeling thereby deducing 
human knowledge to a mathematical elucidation.  Results are not considered a constant, but 
rather gradually measured and without certitude. For the results, researchers had determined a 
baseline of information system training finding the vast majority of students and physicians not 
having received any, while roughly two-thirds of administrative staff had this deficiency.  The 
amount of time spent on the internet seemed to influence the degree of risk behaviors and 
potential for information security incidents. 
A five-point Likert scale with 80 questions out of a total of 89 was applied to 470 subjects 
using an instrument tested by 62 experts for reliability and validity judgment with a Cronbach’s 
alpha statistic estimate of 0.935.  Rich data consisting of upper and lower limits by demographic 
category and instrument item were yielded. 
The instrument items contributed in the development of this researcher’s new nurse survey.  
However, either perhaps due to the translation from native Turkish into English or through the 
choice of terms invoked by the translators, this author’s sentiment is that the articulation of 
several objects’ phrasing could better be served to invoke the intended inquiry of the subject.  
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Furthermore, some of the technology described therein the study was found to either be obscure 
or otherwise outdated such as the LimeWire application.  Other items such as “citizenship 
number” may be considered as regional-specific and perhaps substituted with an item of similar 
concern for subjects within United States.  The same regional-specific applicability would apply 
to technologies perhaps more prevalent in Turkey than in the United States such as the use of 
Skype as a chat service. 
The authors noted that while their study could provide some insight into risk behaviors 
with users of health information system, the results should be considered as specific to the 
institution in Turkey.  Results may differ among studied populations.  However, a principal goal 
of this study is to serve as a model or framework for further studies using fuzzy logic in the 
context of safeguarding health information systems. 
Social Engineering 
Within the context of the information age, Social Engineering is the concept by which 
individuals or groups are manipulated into disclosing information such as access credentials or 
persuaded to elicit specific behavior responses (Greavu-Servan & Serban, 2014).  A term 
historically associated with social sciences, social engineering has become the subject of concern 
in the computer security industry (Anderson, 2008, p. 17).  As diverse is the landscape of 
available information, a wide spectrum of potential effects and bounty resulting from social 
engineering incidents may too be vast.  
Identity theft, one prominent bounty of social engineering, often involves the use of 
others’ names, banking information, social security numbers, and birthdates without the people’s 
knowledge or permission (Hadnagy, 2010, p. 17).  Medical theft involves the unauthorized use of 
health data also known as protected health information which may possibly be obtained through 
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social engineering alone or in combination with other tactics. According to a 2012 study by the 
Ponemon Institute, the economic impact of such theft in the United States is $41.3 billion per 
year up 33.66% from the year prior. 
Kevin Mitnick and William Simon (2003) echoed a dire warning of how even the most 
stringent of traditional security mechanisms may be thwarted by unsuspecting individuals 
performing their duties in good faith. 
“A company may have purchased the best security technology that money 
can buy, trained their people so well that they lock up all their secrets 
before going home at night, and hired building guards from the best 
security firm in the business.  That company is still totally vulnerable.  
Individuals may follow every best-security practice recommended by the 
experts, slavishly installed every recommended security product, and be 
thoroughly vigilant about proper system configuration and applying 
security patches.  Those individuals are still completely vulnerable.” 
(p. 3) 
Following upon the premise styled by Kevin Mitnick that humans are likely to be the 
source of breaches in the milieu of most strident security mechanisms, Aydın and Chouseinoglou 
(2013) likewise identified health information system users as the Achilles’ heel of information 
security.  Researchers cited sources supporting the assertion that risks from inside the 
organization, both accidental and purposeful, produced the key offenders of security.  As a result, 
these researchers focused their study on newly graduated subjects from Turkey in the evaluation 
of their security awareness using a fuzzy analysis, a system with precedence in studying health 
information systems.  The purpose of this study was to evaluate the security awareness of health 
 
 
41 
information system workers in Turkey with varying degrees of information system knowledge 
and experience.  In doing so, the researchers have developed a gauge to determine areas of 
deficiency necessitating further intervention. 
Social Engineering by design involves the manipulation of human behavior (Greavu-
Servan & Serban, 2014).  The 2003 Security Rule addresses this vulnerability by requiring 
healthcare entities to “Implement a security awareness and training program for all members of 
its workforce (including management).”  Nurses represent the largest group of healthcare 
professionals in this workforce according to The United States Department of Labor (2015).  
Therefore, nurses speculatively would be expected to be a proportionally significant recipient of 
such training.  This study examines the security awareness, social engineering aspects of 
Registered Nurses in the United States, in healthcare organizations and practices of all sizes and 
configurations across the country, with the common aspect that they all graduated less than one 
year prior to the study from an accredited institution. 
Social engineering has garnered a reputation as a deceptive force of nefarious intent in 
the context of elaborate and high-profile information systems theft. However, social engineering 
theories such as Roger’s Theory of Protection Motivation may be germane to the preservation of 
information system privacy and security. 
According to Rogers (1975): 
“A protection motivation theory is proposed that postulates the three 
crucial components of a fear appeal to be (a) the magnitude of 
noxiousness of a depicted event; (b) the probability of that event's 
occurrence; and (c) the efficacy of the protective response. Each of these 
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communication variables initiates corresponding cognitive appraisal 
processes that mediate attitude change.” (P. 93) 
In other words, appealing to subjects’ nature that severely adverse events are likely to 
occur in a particular instance should increase the protective responses in these subjects.  Rogers 
(1983) later introduced the concept of “fear appeals.” A modern example might be a commercial 
showing young drivers briefly texting and seemingly a moment later being airlifted for medical 
treatment as a deceased friend remains by the tragic accident. 
Kuo, Ma, and Alexander (2014) referred to the theory of protection motivation in 
studying a patient population in Taiwan to find a relationship between their healthcare 
information privacy concerns and protective responses.  In doing so, researchers discovered the 
specific matters of importance were related to collection, possible inaccuracies, and additional 
uses of their private health information.  Unauthorized access by staff members did not elicit 
protective responses.  This study served as a barometer reading for hospitals to appreciate patient 
concerns in the context of preserving a positive standing while commissioning the use of an 
electronic health record.  In this context, the protection response mechanism is the dependent 
variable being measured in a population of Taiwanese patients and may or may not be 
generalizable to the population in the United States.  
Systematic Technical Perspective Review of Electronic Health Record Systems 
Rezaeibagha, Win and Susilo (2015) performed a systematic, technical review of electronic 
health record systems examining elements of privacy and security using grading criteria based 
upon industry standards. 
The systematic review explicitly omitted the element of mobile devices as stated in the 
authors’ exclusion criteria.  Mobile device use as a potential risk factor in maintaining the 
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privacy of EHR information is a key element in this dissertation study.  The omission in the 
technical review further builds a case for the need to explore an element of healthcare technology 
that is rapidly increasing in prevalence.  In addition to the absence of mobile device use, the 
authors note the study limitation exclude factors such as administrative and organizational 
aspects of electronic health record data safeguards.  
The authors used the International Organization For Standardization (ISO), International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standardized elements to review the security and privacy 
components of various electronic health records to evaluate the security and privacy elements of 
the system described therein the literature examined literature reviews.  The ISO standards used 
include ISO/EIC 27002:2013 and 2900:2011.  Findings were outlined in the review and included 
a matrix of each system graded against multiple elements of the ISO/EIC standards. 
Rezaeibagha et al. (2015) summarized their investigation findings of the technology-based 
evaluation and highlighted the following determination: 
“Our findings demonstrate, regardless of the enormous effort required, 
well defined access control policies should be mandated in order to 
provide patient privacy by limiting the access rights to patient data with 
proper access control policy language and standards. Applicability of 
privacy and security rules and scalability of EHR system implementations 
can be provided with proper architectures and frameworks, cryptography 
techniques and policies.” (p. 30) 
 In other words, the authors stress the imperative of invoking technical safeguards for the 
protection of electronic health record systems.  The various implementation manifestations of 
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such safeguards, while imperative to address the international standards, may diminish but do not 
eliminate the human behavior risk factors examined in this dissertation. 
 This meta-analysis surveyed literature reviews of electronic health record systems from a 
technical perspective using international standards as evaluation criteria.  The authors expressed 
study limitations related to mobile device use and administrative controls which are associated 
with human risk behaviors.  These study limitations are explored by way of this dissertation 
study. 
Nursing Education: National Student Nurses’ Association (NSNA) 
The National Student Nurses’ Association provides cybersecurity guidance for its members 
in part to protect the privacy of patient information.  This information has been made available 
on the NSNA website page section titled “Recommendations for: Social media usage and 
maintaining privacy, confidentiality and professionalism”. 
The NSNA highlights risk to the safeguarding of patient information related to student 
nurses’ use of social media outside of the work and school settings.  The guidelines state that 
although institutions may provide guidance in their setting, student nurses’ behaviors can pose a 
risk to the integrity of patient privacy and ultimately pose a risk of sanctions to themselves, 
especially when common practices of sharing information with peers electronically is 
commonplace. Healthcare organization and practice policies demand vigilance in protecting the 
privacy of patients and abhors sharing information outside of sharing with other providers who 
have a right to that particular information.  Such verbiage lends itself well to the “threat 
appraisals” portion of Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory in that the threat and consequences 
are provided to the subject for appraisal. 
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The scope of social media includes the use of both web-based and mobile social platform 
and outlines contemporary social media services as examples of platform types. The guidelines 
not only provide context by referencing HIPAA and examples of how social media activity may 
lead to breaches, but also discuss the protection of the public perception of nurses.  The 
guidelines do not only provide verbiage of caution to its members, but they also tout the virtue of 
social media when used appropriately. 
The National Student Nurses’ Association members have been provided with social media 
guidelines in an effort to protect patient privacy.  The information contained therein the 
guidelines are particularly suitable to include in this literature review as the targeted membership 
audience services in part as the subjects of this dissertation study thereby providing a contextual 
backdrop of education germane to the study (Recommendations for: Social media usage and 
maintaining privacy, confidentiality and professionalism.2018). 
Nursing Education: National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSB)  
Like the National Student Nurses’ Association (NSNA) guidelines for its members’ social 
media use, the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) provides a similar 
direction (White paper: A nurse's guide to the use of social media.2011).  These guidelines point 
out the beneficial uses of social media while cautioning about its pitfalls which could lead to the 
improper disclosure of patients’ protected health information.  This document provides education 
on social media use in the context of federal regulations such as HIPAA and site fictitious 
examples of how improper use made lead to inappropriate disclosures. 
The document also provides information about consequences to the patient as well as the 
nurse.  As with the National Student Nurses’ Association guidelines, these consequences are in 
alignment with the dissertation’s theoretical framework of using Rogers’ Protection Motivation 
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Theory “threat appraisals.” The nurses should understand the threat and the perceived efficacy of 
the treatment to mitigate the identified threat.  In other words, the guidelines show the threat of 
consequences and provide the means by which to mitigate such consequences. 
In both social media document guidelines, the threat of nurse-invoked breaches is placed 
into the context of social media use, but such guidelines are applicable as general safeguards in 
the workplace.  These documents serve as a reference for the type of educational material nurses 
may receive in safeguarding protected health information by decreasing risk behaviors with the 
use of electronic devices. 
Summary 
In summary, this chapter explored pertinent literature regarding the technical safeguards, 
baseline education of nurses in behavior-based threats to patient privacy, social engineering, 
cyber-security knowledge, mobile device use, and the theoretical framework of Rogers’ 
Protection Motivation Theory. 
Through the literature review, gaps in the literature have been identified thereby 
necessitating the need for a national study of new nurses one year post-graduation to determine 
their information system security knowledge, mobile device use, risk behaviors, Concern for 
Information Privacy, level of Information Privacy Protection Response, the internal or external 
threat appraisal, and associations among these factors. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the study, research design, study population, 
sample and sampling procedures. With two new measures developed for the study and several 
existing measures modified for the national study, a full description about the instrument 
development in stages and pilot study data analysis are described. 
The Pilot Study to Develop the Measures – Study Variables 
This study examines the associations between variables in the proposed model of nurses’ 
knowledge, concern for information privacy, threat appraisal, risk behaviors, and information 
privacy protective responses. The following variables are operationally defined. 
Risk Behaviors (RB): The information system risk behaviors factors associated with mobile 
device use amongst new nurses are variable results in the measurement of an overall risk score. 
These self-reported behaviors were compiled by the investigator, derived from several sources in 
the literature and developed into a measure (RB) of 21 items that are summed to yield a score 
from 0 to 21. These items and the resulting measures were assessed for content validity and 
reliability in the pilot study. 
Knowledge of Information System (KISS): The knowledge of information systems security 
factors are variables presented to the subjects on the questionnaire. The level of nurses’ 
information system security knowledge is a score from the survey questionnaire items resulting 
in an overall score that measures their information system security knowledge. The items were 
influenced from and authored similarly to studies conducted to assess medical students’ 
knowledge of patient privacy and security issues concerning mobile devices (Whipple, Allgood, 
& Larue, 2012); health information system users’ awareness of security issues (Aydın & 
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Chouseinoglou, 2013); but essentially authored by the investigator. The items selected for use in 
the survey were compiled by the investigator into a Knowledge of Information System Security 
(KISS) score ranging from 0 to 28 which was later slated for reduction to a range of 0-24 
following the item elimination process.  Each multiple choice item was considered as a single 
point in value with one point yielded per each correct response. These items and the resulting 
measures were assessed for content validity and reliability in the pilot study. 
Concern For Information Privacy Index. (CFIP): The protection response mechanism of the 
use of the nurses own electronic health record is based upon the Concern For Information 
Privacy CFIP. This instrument was modified from the study by Kuo, Ma and Alexander (2014), 
incorporating additional items by Smith, Milberg and Burke (1996). It is composed of several 
subscales. The instructions for the items were changed to capture the nurses’ response about his 
or her own personal information.  The CFIP sum scores range from 0 to 15. The reliability was 
assessed in the pilot study. 
CFIP Subscales: The subscales of the CFIP include the factors medical errors (ME), 
unauthorized access of medical information (UA), secondary use (SU), and personal collection 
of medical information (CO). The CFIP sum scores range from 0 to 12. 
Mobile Device Practices: The level of nurses’ information system security risk behavior 
and personal technology habits with mobile devices is another variable. The sum risk behavior 
scores range from 0 to 10 with the higher score indicating riskier behavior practices. 
Information Privacy Protective Responses: Measuring the nurses’ response to how they 
would feel about their own electronic health record use or information privacy protective 
responses (IPPR) mechanism is a dependent variable.  Examined are the associations between 
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risk behaviors with the CFIP and IPPR.  The sum scores of the IPPR range from 0 to 8 for the 
pilot. 
Threat appraisal: This is the perception of a threat and motivation to take action as a result 
of this threat perception. This variable is operationalized into categories of “internal” threat to 
self (job, fines) and “external” threat/harm to others (healthcare institutions, patients). The four 
items are rank ordered by the respondent and sorted by rank in to threat groups. 
Pilot – Data Collection 
Prior to data collection, the investigator developed new items for the Knowledge and Risk 
Behaviors measures based on the literature and the investigator’s professional experience. These 
items were presented to five judges with advance information system and/or security knowledge 
in order to assess for content validity. See the Appendix H - Content Validity: Student Nurses’ 
Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors.  Items were revised to 
consensus of form and wording. These were supplemented by the modified items on a 
questionnaire used in the pilot data collection. 
On March 16, 2016, a pilot survey was distributed to Molloy College nursing students in 
advance of the subsequent nation-wide survey to be conducted with National Student Nursing 
Association member participants. This class of seniors completed the survey in paper-pencil 
form with all of the items on one questionnaire. These preliminary items were assessed for 
reliability based on the data collected. 
Sample	
 
A sample of 167 third year Molloy College nursing students attending a scheduled group 
scholastic event served as subjects for the pilot study. With IRB approval for the pilot study as 
shown in Appendix D – Molloy College Institution Review Board Approval, this convenience 
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sample completed the survey and delivered them to the researcher in unmarked envelopes to 
maintain anonymity. 
 The Molloy College graduating nursing students completed all the items on the paper-
based survey.  The descriptive, correlational study was intended to assess participants’ 
knowledge, information security risk behaviors with mobile devices and information personal 
protection responses to inform the researcher.  The full study recruited new nurses one year 
following graduation from nursing school to obtain a national sample of volunteers who were 
members of the NSNA and had previously agreed to be surveyed in the future about their new 
jobs. Using this homogeneous group related to education as a criterion negates the possible 
influential factors deriving from a plethora of circumstances and involvements in subjects’ 
occupational experiences. While subjects may vary in age, their nursing practice would be held 
constant to interpret the findings closer to issues related to their recent education than their life 
experiences in multiple healthcare institutions, controlling somewhat for education across all 
respondents. 
Design	and	Instrument	Development	
 
The survey consists of demographic details, an information systems security knowledge 
assessment section, appraisal of risk behaviors and information privacy protective responses.  
The demographic section blended SurveyMonkey® certified items with population specific 
interest items to inform the researcher.  The knowledge section was entirely developed solely by 
the principal investigator.  The information privacy protective responses section used items 
modified from the Kuo, Ma, & Alexander study ( 2014). This collective instrument was 
evaluated by a jury of five subject matter experts and modified to suit the elicited feedback. The 
fuzzy logic study from Aydın and Chouseinoglou (2013) spurred the development of the risk 
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behavior elements of the instrument’s development. Many of this study’s elements in many 
respects referred to technology that is either currently not trending in usage or not relevant to the 
population in question being studied. Therefore, elements were selected where relevant and 
altered to reflect the current information technology landscape and perceived potential usage 
among the population of interest. The knowledge survey was also developed by the dissertation 
author and submitted to the same jury of experts during the same period that the risk behavior 
elements were distributed for evaluation. See Appendix H - Content Validity: Student Nurses’ 
Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors for details. 
 The demographic information included on the survey was drafted to be congruent with 
the National Student Nurse Association annual survey questions. The pilot study demographics 
were not used in the analysis. 
Procedures	
 
 The investigator-developed measures were first assessed for content validity and prepared 
for data collection to assess reliability. 
Content	Validity	Index	and	Item	Elimination	Process	
 
The knowledge and risk behavior portions of the survey instrument were developed in 
advance for the pilot through validation of five expert jurors. Following the content validity 
analysis, the survey was prepared for distribution. 
The surveys were distributed to 167 senior nursing students as a convenience sample. The 
surveys were delivered as paper-pencil instruments by two Molloy College professors.  Three 
$25 Amazon gift cards were offered via a raffle and participation in whole or in part was not 
deemed to be a requirement for entry into the raffle.  Students were instructed that their 
responses were to be kept anonymous and no identifiable data was requested.  Students were 
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permitted to abstain from part or even all the survey responses. Students submitted the paper 
responses to the professors who collected and delivered the responses to the study investigator 
for evaluation.  
Knowledge	Instrument	Item	Elimination 
  
The sample results served to finalize the knowledge instrument.  One subject was 
eliminated due to minimal participation in the survey.  Others who did not respond to a question 
were graded as incorrect for that question.  Those elements which received less than 50% correct 
response from the subjects were considered as eliminated for the instrument to be used for the 
national survey. 
Furthermore, items were examined for the percentage correct by all pilot subject and 
graded on a shaded scale shown in the figure Elimination of Knowledge Items as either above, 
below, or near the 50% mark.  All items found to be below the 50% mark were eliminated as part 
of an item discrimination and difficulty index manner of assessment for item elimination and 
retention. 
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Figure 7 Elimination of Knowledge Items 
 
Human	Protection	
 
  A Molloy College Institution Review Board application was filed and approved prior to 
conducting the survey process.  Subjects were advised that participation was completely 
voluntary and without coercion.  A statement to the voluntary nature of the survey was placed 
upon each page header along with the option to omit part or all the survey item responses. In 
addition, the header stated that all survey submission information would remain anonymous and 
participants’ names were not requested. Three Amazon gift card valuing $25 USD were awarded 
by a random raffle conducted by instructors with the explicit understanding that survey 
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omissions, in whole or in part, would not have been considered disqualifiers for participating in 
the award activity.  The principal investigator maintained an active Collaborative Institutional 
Training Initiative Graduate Nursing Biomedical certification throughout the survey collection 
process. 
Reliability Statistics Methodology 
The reliability statistics elimination process incorporated psychometrically sound steps 
involving the reduction of items that did not support the intended scale and subscale 
measurements. 
Reliability	Statistics	–	Knowledge	Test	
The knowledge questions were tallied for each subject to produce an overall knowledge 
score.  With 28 items, an N=126, and an exclusion of 40 participants, the Cronbach’s alpha 
statistic estimate was .769.  A reduction of items to 24 provided a Cronbach’s alpha statistic 
estimate of .775 and those items could be used for the nationwide survey. In the final survey, 27 
items were selected for use based on the item content (See Appendix H - Content Validity: 
Student Nurses’ Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors). 
Reliability	Statistics	–	Risk	Behaviors	
A total of 10 participants with incomplete data were removed leaving an N=157.  A 
Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .728 was obtained following the elimination of 5 of the 21 
items thereby leaving 16 items remaining for the nationwide study. 
Reliability	of	Investigator	Developed	Measures	
Using a thorough process of examining each item for its item discrimination index, 
difficulty index and coefficient alpha analysis, items were eliminated.  The Knowledge of 
Information System Security (KISS) received a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .775 after 
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eliminating four items and leaving 24 remaining. The Risk Behaviors (RB) score received a 
Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .728 after eliminating five items and leaving sixteen 
remaining. These revised and finalized items were included on the SurveyMonkey® survey to 
the participants in the full study.  
Threat Appraisals 
 The Threat appraisals (Internal and External) are 4 statements where respondents are 
asked to rank order them in the order of how much they perceive them as a threat, or in other 
words would “worry about” the consequence.  These rankings are mutually exclusive. The 
statements were developed to yield assigned “threat” ranks to each respondent for the four items 
representing “internal” (I) or “external” (E) threat groupings. The statements were operationally 
defined by the rank of the perceived threat for respondents, yielding a grouping for each threat 
and differentiated as “internal threat appraisal” (i.e. an undesirable consequence that affects the 
self, such as losing a job, position, or being fined) and “external threat appraisal” (i.e. an 
undesirable consequence that affects others including hospital fined or patients’ privacy 
exposed). The survey included these four statements with the following instruction: 
 To measure Threat appraisal (I) and (E): Which of the following statements reflects your 
motivation to keep your patient information on the EHR secure? Rank order from lowest (least 
worry) to highest (most worry) (1 to 4). 
Table 1 Threat Appraisal Taxonomy 
INTERNAL THREATS ___ I would worry about fines on me or my loss of position. 
___ I would worry about my loss of employment. 
EXTERNAL THREATS ___ I would worry that my patients’ privacy would be exposed. 
___ I would worry that my hospital would be fined. 
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Reliability	Statistics	–	Concern	for	Information	Protection	(CFIP)	Total	and	IPPR	 
 
• The Cronbach’s Alpha for all CFIP factors, including the IPPR, was found to be .890 
with an N=153 after 14 participants had been excluded due to insufficient participation in 
this section of the survey. 
• The Cronbach’s Alpha for IPPR was .704 for 6 items, an N=156, and an exclusion of 11 
participants. 
Reliability	Statistics	–	CFIP	Subscales	
 
• The Cronbach’s Alpha for UA, a subscale of the CFIP index, was found to be .861 with 3 
items, and N=163, and after 4 participants had been excluded. 
• The Cronbach’s Alpha for SU was .883 for 3 items, an N=161, and an exclusion of 6 
participants. 
• The Cronbach’s Alpha for ME was .875 for 3 items an N=159, and an exclusion of 8 
participants. 
• The Cronbach’s Alpha for CO was .887 for 4 items, an N=159, and an exclusion of 8 
participants. 
 
The Full National Study 
 The main question to be answered by the national study includes: What kind of activities 
do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, including frequency of use, types of 
activities, and habits or behaviors that make them vulnerable to security risk? With the pilot 
study complete and a final survey instrument refined based on the pilot data, the full study was 
done on a national sample of new nurses in the United States.  This descriptive, correlational 
study was done using an electronic version based upon the original paper survey and distributed 
via SurveyMonkey® to a list of 4,352 students from the National Student Nurses Association 
(NSNA) database of student members who graduated in 2016 and voluntarily provided their 
email addresses for follow-up. 
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Sample 
The National Student Nurses Association (NSNA) database was used to derive roughly 
4,352 email contacts of RNs throughout the nation who have granted permission for follow-ups 
from past surveys.  An approximate 30% of responses was anticipated to provide a samples size 
of approximately1000. 
Per a 2009 Economic Modeling Specialists International report, an estimated 190,615 
individuals completed a nursing program.  Without considering factors precluding graduates 
from being registered nurses one year later and assuming the 2009 figures are roughly an 
indicator of current graduation trends, the estimated sample size accounts for 0.53% of the 
population of all newly registered nurses. This study was estimated to have a 0.8 sufficient 
power and a medium size significance at α = 0.05.  With a 95% confidence interval and 5% 
accepted margin for error, a population size of 190, 615 and 50% response distribution would 
require a sample size of 384. 
 Therefore, an estimated sample size of 1000 would exceed the required 384 as a 
sufficient sample size. 
National Student Nurses Association Membership 
Per the NSNA website, this nonprofit organization was founded in 1952 for enrolled 
nursing students with a dedication to fostering the professional development of nursing students.  
With over 60,000 members, this organization has representation through the United States 
including all fifty states, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. 
Its mission is “to mentor students preparing for initial licensure as registered nurses, and to 
convey the standards, ethics, and skills that students will need as responsible and accountable 
leaders and members of the profession.” (NSNA, 2015). 
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According to Feeg and Mancino (2015), this organization has conducted annual web-
based surveys over the past seven years including recently graduating past members who agree 
to receive follow-up surveys. 
Method 
A sample of new nurses with approximately one year of experience completed a web-
based survey.  The descriptive, correlational study acquired participants’ educational experiences 
to inform the researchers.  Using the limited experience among nurses as a criterion reduces the 
possible influential factors deriving from a plethora of circumstances in subjects’ occupational 
activities, including likely limiting the exposure to security awareness training though the 
employer.  The HIPAA Security Rule requires workforce awareness training for covered entities 
such as hospitals and physician practices.  Therefore, reducing work experience limits the 
subjects’ likely exposure to employer training.  Subjects may vary in age while the analysis of 
the data reflects that the work experience factor is controlled. 
Population Studied 
The population consists of new nurses throughout the United States who were members 
of the National Student Nurse Association. This database provides the investigator with a 
national sample of nurses from all types of hospitals or health care organizations with similar 
experience at the time of the study. These individuals gave their permanent email addresses for 
future studies. They had graduated approximately one year prior. 
Sample 
The sample drawn from a list of more than 4,000 past members of the National Student 
Nurse Association who willingly agreed to volunteer for surveys by giving their email addresses.  
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Recruitment Method 
  The NSNA has a database of members, a subset of which are graduates who have agreed 
to receive surveys. The NSNA had permitted the distribution of surveys although they retained 
control over the distribution and at no time did the principal investigator have access to the 
member database or the ability to distribute the surveys. The SurveyMonkey® application allows 
for blinded email addresses to receive the survey with assurance of anonymity. Each invitation 
had information about the survey, estimated time of duration to complete the survey, and an 
option to be eligible for a $250 drawing. Using the Dillman, Smyth, & Melani (2008) method of 
distribution, subjects were recruited and reminded with subsequent mailings. 
Variables Specified – Instrument Items (Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey)) 
Descriptive Variables 
• Demographics – Items 1-5 
• Personal Use of Mobile Devices (PUMD) – Items 8-11 
• Personal Technology Practices (PTP) – Items 12-15 
• Mobile Device Habits (MDH) – Item 16 
Aggregate Measures 
• Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS) – Items 18-44 
• Risk Behaviors (RB) Score – Item 17 
• CFIP: Concern for Information Privacy – Items 6, 7g-j) 
• Subscales of CFIP: 
o UA: Unauthorized Access to Medical Information (6a-c) 
o SU: Secondary Use of Medical Information (d-f) 
o ME: Medical Facility Errors (g-i) 
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o CO: Personal Collection of Medical Information (7g-j) 
• IPPR: Information Privacy Protective Responses, a response to the CFIP – Item 7 (c-h), 
Items 7a-b omitted to elevate the coefficient alpha=.758 with 6 items 
• Threat Appraisal as a measure of statements (Internal and External) – Item 45 
Refer to corresponding items as listed in Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey). 
 
Figure 8 Descriptive Variables and Aggregate Measures 
  
Descriptive 
Variables
• Demographics  - Items 1-5
• Personal Use of Mobile Devices (PUMD) - Items 8-11
• Personal Technology Practices (PTP) - Items 12-15
• Mobile Device Habits (MDH) – Item 16
• Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS) – Items 18-44
Aggregate 
Measures
• Risk Behaviors (RB) - Item 17
• Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP) - Items 6, 7g-j
• Subscales of CFIP - from CFIP items
• IPPR - Item 7 (c-h)
• Threat Appraisal - Item 45
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Relational Variables 
The variables studied in relation to the CFIP include the information system security 
behaviors of the subjects specifically with mobile devices.  Examined are the relationships 
between this behavior and the CFIP.  Knowledge is considered to be the precursor and another 
variable for which relations with other variables were examined. Threat appraisal may play a 
mediating role. Particular demographics may influence risk behaviors as well and is also tested. 
Procedure 
The survey was sent via SurveyMonkey® to the eligible list of subjects’ email addresses 
with a statement of informed consent and information to proceed. The list was supplied by and 
the delivery managed by the National Student Nurse Association (NSNA).  Subjects were 
instructed that their participation was voluntary, and responses considered to be anonymous. An 
incentive of a $250 gift card raffle was offered to a single participant selected at random out of 
those who voluntarily include their email address for follow-up on the raffle results.  This 
information was technically de-identified from the response set of answers to the survey 
questions.  Participants were informed that their email addresses collected for the raffle and 
survey responses would be collected and kept separate. 
Data Collection Methods 
The data were collected electronically via SurveyMonkey® and sent without subject-
identifying factors to the principal investigator. 
Hypotheses 
A series of hypotheses were tested on the variables of interest. A correlation matrix for 
selected variables were done to determine where and if relationships among the variables exist. 
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The preliminary correlation analyses allowed further consideration of specific tests of models 
derived from the literature and theory. These focused on the following hypotheses tested: 
Hypothesis Statements 
H0: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses does not result in a decrease 
in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H1: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses results in a decrease in 
identified risk behaviors. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
identified risk behaviors. 
 
H2: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in 
identified risk behaviors. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
Concern for Information Privacy. 
 
H3: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern 
for Information Privacy. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
Concern for Medical Facility Errors. 
 
H4: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern 
for Medical Facility Errors. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information. 
 
H5: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern 
for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information. 
 
H6: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern 
for Secondary Use of Medical Information. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information. 
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H7: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in Concern 
for Personal Collection of Medical Information. 
 
H0: An increase in information system security knowledge does not result in a decrease in 
Information Privacy Protective Responses. 
 
H8: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a decrease in 
Information Privacy Protective Responses. 
 
H0 An increase in Concern for Information Privacy does not result in a decrease in 
identified risk behaviors. 
 
H9 An increase in Concern for Information Privacy results in a decrease in identified risk 
behaviors. 
 
H0 An increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors does not result in a decrease in 
identified risk behaviors. 
 
H10 An increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors results in a decrease in identified 
risk behaviors. 
 
H0 An increase in Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information does not result 
in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H11 An increase in Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical Information results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H0 An increase in Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information does not result in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H12 An increase in Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information results in a decrease 
in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H0 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information does not result 
in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H13 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H0 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information does not result 
in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
H14 An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical Information results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
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Threat	Appraisals	–	Stated	in	the	Null	
 
For the threat appraisal hypotheses to test knowledge, risk, concern or protective response 
mean score differences by rankings of threat on each of the four statements of threat, the 
hypotheses are stated in the null: 
Internal Null Hypotheses: Internal threats are not associated with knowledge, risk, concerns 
or protective responses. 
 
External Null Hypotheses: External threats are not associated with knowledge, risk, 
concerns or protective responses. 
 
 
Ethical Consideration and Consent – Human Subject Protection 
The study was submitted to the Molloy College Institutional Review Board (IRB) for 
approval. The National Student Nurses Association (NSNA) managed the correspondence to the 
eligible sample so that the researcher could not identify participants who do not self-disclose 
their email addresses by choice.  
 The information collected must be kept completely identified and anonymous.  Subjects 
may have trepidation about disclosing their professional behavior and knowledge should they 
perceive a possibility that this information may be associated with their identity and recorded.  
The absence of requesting employer information is intended to encourage socially desirable 
responses. Using the anonymity function of SurveyMonkey® assured respondents that their 
information could not be shared with anyone. The separation of their information from their 
request to be eligible for the $250 raffle was done electronically. No identifying information can 
be associated with any answers. 
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Analysis 
Descriptive analysis of the survey statistics on this national sample for items that assess 
mobile device use, frequency of use and other behaviors. The demographics and variables of 
interest are described with frequency statistics and measures of central tendency. As preliminary 
tests of inter-correlations between the subjects’ knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR, 
correlation and regression analyses were done. Threat appraisal was established as categories for 
each of the four threats and used to test differences in study variables by participants’ threat 
ranks. 
The results of the survey in SurveyMonkey® were exported in SPSS format and into 
SPSS Version 23 for analysis. Descriptive, correlational were done if the data met assumptions 
and the measures were deemed reliable.  Analysis of the CFIP index and its subscales for 
granularity were evaluated for associations with knowledge, risk behaviors, and the subjects’ 
IPPR and threat appraisal. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
Introduction 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore in a national sample of nurses one year 
after graduation in HIT knowledge about security and risk behaviors related to their use of 
portable electronic devices, their knowledge of information system security, and the influence, if 
any, of their personal protective motivation to protect patient care information.  This sample of 
nurses that are homogeneous with respect to experience provided a focus on how they were 
prepared in their nursing education in relation to information system security in order to inform 
educators in the future. This chapter presents the sample characteristics, descriptive summary of 
the general responses, and psychometric properties of the measures used in the research 
questions.  It summarizes the overall questions and then specifies and tests hypotheses for the 
final research questions. Finally, summaries the general and specific findings to begin to 
construct a model for understanding the main research question and sub-questions: 
1. How much do new nurses know about security of information systems and does 
their knowledge influence their risk behaviors in using mobile technology? 
 
a. What kind of activities do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, 
including frequency of use, types of activities, and habits or behaviors that 
make them vulnerable to security risk or concern about protecting patient 
information? 
 
b. What is the level of new nurses’ knowledge, risk, concern for information 
privacy, their protective responses to information privacy; how are these 
related and affected by their threat appraisal (internal or external) to 
themselves, their hospitals, or their patients? 
 
c. Is knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses influenced by select 
demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education (education type 
or school type)? 
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 Using Dillman’s (2008) method of distribution, subjects were recruited via an email 
distribution to NSNA members who were one-year post-graduation and had agreed to be 
contacted for survey purposes.  The result yielded 649 returned SurveyMonkey® surveys from 
nurses.  Analysis of the data resulted in the removal of 135 respondent results as they did not 
complete the knowledge section of the survey.  Therefore, a sample of n=514 was selected for 
analysis as the responses were either fully or nearly fully complete. Information pertaining to 
phone type is not analyzed with other variables and stood alone for analysis. Therefore, all 
respondents who provided this information were used for an N=550, not just the 514 who 
completed or nearly completed all elements in the survey. 
Characteristics and Demographics 
For all of the characteristic and demographic details discussed in this chapter, the final 
cleaned data from the sample of n=514 is used.  The gender analysis indicated an 87.9% female 
(N=452) to 12.1% male (N=62) composition, which is roughly consistent with the United States’ 
nursing population.  The United States Department of Labor indicates a 92% to 8% female to 
male composition of registered nurses overall nationwide without any differentiation of 
education or experience, however, the membership of the National Student Nurses Association 
(NSNA) compares favorably with this sample. The education analysis indicates that 71% of 
respondents have a baccalaureate degree or higher for (n=365) whereas those with an Associate 
degree or diploma (n=142) account for 27.6%. These results are comparable with the results 
from other NSNA survey data as well. Those aged 32 or younger (n=345) are roughly double the 
representation of their counterparts over the age of 32 (n=169). Those aged 49 or older (n=36) 
make up only 7% of the sample.  A conceivable explanation for the age make up is that the 
intended target for the survey was comprised of nurses who graduated the year prior in an effort 
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to limit variation in experience among the sample.  Presumably, some of the advanced degree 
nurses may have had prior experience, but overall respondents’ reported education type indicates 
recent entry into the profession.  Degrees generally considered entry points to the profession 
(Associates Degree Diploma, Baccalaureate Degree, Accelerated BSN program) make up the 
91.4% majority (n=470) of the sample.  Race was collected as an NSNA standard demographic 
element and displayed as part of the descriptive analysis. At 73.3%, the majority of the 
respondents (n=377) reported themselves as Caucasian. The ratio of public-private school type is 
comparable to the membership of NSNA with twice as many public school respondents as 
private (not for-profit schools) and four times as many public school respondents as private-for-
profit schools. 
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Table 2 Sample Characteristics 
Sample Characteristics 
  Frequency Percent 
Gender Male 62 12.1 
 Female 452 87.9 
 Total 514 100.0 
Degree Type Other (please specify) 5 1.0 
 Associates Degree 125 24.3 
 Diploma 17 3.3 
 Baccalaureate Degree 243 47.3 
 Accelerated BSN program 85 16.5 
 Master’s Degree 9 1.8 
 Clinical Nurse Leader Masters 5 1.0 
 Doctorate 1 .2 
 RN to BSN 22 4.3 
 Total 512 99.6 
 Missing 2 .4 
Age Range ≤32 345 67.1 
 33-48 133 25.9 
 ≥49 36 7.0 
 Total 514 100.0 
Race Other (please specify) 7 1.4 
 American Indian or Alaskan Native 3 .6 
 Asian 38 7.4 
 Black or African American 35 6.8 
 Caucasian 377 73.3 
 Hispanic or Latino 29 5.6 
 Mixed Race 21 4.1 
 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 1 .2 
 Total 511 99.4 
 Missing 3 .6 
School Type Other 13 2.5 
 Public  292 56.8 
 Private not-for-profit  138 26.8 
 Private proprietary for-profit  71 13.8 
 Total 514 100.0 
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Phone Characteristics 
As the survey instrument pertains to the use of mobile devices among new nurses, the 
types of mobile phones used among respondents was collected to texture the study with 
descriptive data.  This information was collected as free-text entries and tabulated both by 
manufacturer and operating system.  Please note that the survey collected information about 
“personal use of technologies at work and at home.” The survey did not draw a distinction 
between hospital-issued and personally-owned devices whether for work on home use.  At the 
time of this dissertation, the use of personal mobile phones in the workplace for clinical use has 
yet to be established commonplace for nurses. In the clinical setting, phone use among nurses is 
most commonly limited to voice functionality for communication (Parker, 2014).  The 
emergence of bring-your-own-device (BYOD) modalities for smart phone features are more 
commonly witnessed among non-clinical staff for business purposes. 
 
Table 3 Phone Operating System  
Phone Operating System Frequency Percent 
Android 159 28.91 
iOS 389 70.73 
Windows 2 0.36 
Total 550 100 
 
 New nurses tend to use the iOS phone operating system more so than the general 
population. According to Gartner, Android had captured 86.1% of the world’s phone market 
compared to 13.7% for iOS in the first quarter of 2016 (Reisinger, 2017).  Save the two 
Windows entries, the phone operating system appears among respondents to be somewhat 
inverse to the worldwide prevalence. The sales figures for Apple and Samsung, its major 
competitor in the Android marketplace, are tabulated by the respective manufacturers differently 
 
 
71 
thereby making the comparison an arduous task.  Furthermore, Google’s Android operating 
system produces a broad range of device models from a plethora of competitors and even 
numerous concurrent offerings from each manufacturer. With even more manufacturers, a 
fractured marketplace with an assortment of devices of varying qualities and features is 
emerging.  Apple on the other hand exclusively supports a single model operating system type 
(iOS) on a single line of phone products (iPhone) thereby controlling both the hardware and 
software with a single manufacturer. 
 Apple represents 70.73% of the usage among new nurses.  Samsung is the largest 
competitor to Apple with their phones using the Android operating system.  The results of the 
study show Samsung representing 21.64% of the phone usage and represents by far the largest 
denomination of manufacturers using Google’s Android operating system. 
 
Table 4 Phone Manufacturers 
 
 
 
  
  
Phone Manufacturer Frequency Percent 
Alcatel 1 0.18 
Android 1 0.18 
Apple 389 70.73 
Blackberry 1 0.18 
Blu 1 0.18 
Google 12 2.18 
HTC 2 0.36 
LG 12 2.18 
Motorola 8 1.45 
Nokia 1 0.18 
Samsung 119 21.64 
Windows Based 1 0.18 
ZTE 2 0.36 
Total 550 100 
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As the information pertaining to individual phone manufacturers was collected as a free-
text field, results were at times carefully inferred by various spellings and use of ambiguous 
model numbers.  The information is provided but any analysis using these data is out of this 
study’s scope. One manufacturer was listed as “Windows” with the Blu phone speculatively as 
the other possible Windows operated phone making up the two Windows phones from previous 
table.  Blu has historically made phones with the Windows operating system, but typically 
markets lower cost phones operated by Android. 
Descriptive Findings of The Study 
To answer the main question of the study “How much do new nurses know about security 
of information systems and does their knowledge influence their risk behaviors in using mobile 
technology?” it is important to first describe the common mobile technology use of the 
participants. The first sub-question for the study is as follows: 
What kind of activities do new nurses engage in with mobile technologies, including 
frequency of use, types of activities, and habits or behaviors that may make them 
vulnerable to increasing the security risk? 
To begin to answer this question, a series of descriptive statistics were performed on 
questions about mobile application use and reported practices in securing devices on personal 
and hospital devices. 
Mobile	Application	Use	
To answer the survey question “What is the reported level and type of new nurse mobile 
application use?” a series of descriptive analyses were done on their reported responses in the 
table Smart Phone Use By Feature.  The category of “very often” received the most responses for 
the following features: Text Messaging (N=272), Social Media (N=250), and Web Browsing 
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(N=234).  An 88.5% majority of respondents (N=455) reported use of social media frequency 
between sometimes to very often.  Those features that were most often not used include the 
following: Chatting (N=94), Online Library (N=90), and Video/Movies (N=50).  Very few 
respondents declared that features were unavailable; the largest segment include the following: 
Online Library (N=14), Chatting (N=8), and Contact List (N=2).  Given that all respondents 
declared that they use a modern smart phone with the exception of a few ambiguous responses, 
the surveyed features should all be available.  The exception may be that work-managed phones 
may have such features disabled and such differentiation was not determined in the survey.  The 
Online Library feature, like many others surveyed, is not necessarily a native phone application, 
but rather an additional application or website.  This feature was declared by the most number as 
not being available which may suggest that the question was not understood.  
 
Table 5 Smart Phone Use By Feature 
Mobile (Smart Phone) 
Usage               
 Minimal Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often Do Not Use Feature Not Available 
Talking 54 65 195 125 63 11 1 
Web Browsing 3 14 97 161 234 3 1 
Chatting 73 87 92 90 67 94 8 
Email 16 21 144 197 130 3 0 
Text Messaging 3 8 62 166 272 2 1 
Multimedia Messaging 28 60 166 121 114 22 1 
Camera 30 41 166 162 108 6 1 
Calendar 36 46 125 166 136 4 1 
Notes 75 105 166 100 41 26 0 
Contact List 33 78 193 129 76 3 2 
Maps/Navigation 14 34 146 184 128 6 0 
Social Media 19 27 78 127 250 13 0 
Music 38 60 125 135 136 20 0 
Video/Movies 94 128 111 75 54 50 1 
Online Library 104 132 101 38 34 90 14 
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Security Practice Results 
 
To answer the survey question about basic security practices, a series of descriptive 
statistics were calculated on participants’ reported responses as indicated in the Practice 
Reponses table describing the frequencies of basic security practice of locking a device among 
new nurses. The survey included a matrix style question to determine how often respondents 
lock their phones and other mobile devices which includes both hospital-owned and person 
devices.  The process of locking a device does not permit usage until subsequent authentication 
is validated. Contemporary common methods of validation include a username-password 
combination, numerical passcode, password, finger scan, pattern drawing, and facial recognition. 
 
Table 6 Practice Results (By Percentage) 
Practices Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always Device Not Capable Not Applicable 
Lock Personal Phone 10.5 2.3 3.3 4.5 79.0 .2 .2 
Lock Personal Mobile 
Device (Laptop/Tablet) 6.2 4.3 5.3 11.1 68.9 1.6 2.7 
Lock Hospital-Provided 
Phone 4.1 .8 2.5 2.7 16.9 16.9 56.0 
Lock Hospital Provided 
Mobile Device 
(Laptop/Tablet) 
1.9 .8 2.1 8.6 23.9 4.5 58.2 
 
 The results indicate that the “always” response is prevalent with personal phones and 
mobile devices whereas over half of respondents list the same hospital-owned devices as not 
applicable for locking. Hospital provided phones and mobile devices are considered as not 
applicable 56.0% and 58.2% respectively.  A possible explanation for the rate whereby locking is 
not applicable may either be related to the lack of hospital-owned devices in use by nurses.  
Another possibility is that the prevalence of device and network management systems in hospital 
settings may enforce an automatic locking of devices regardless of human intervention. 
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The locked personal phones and devices indicate a rate of 83.5% and 70.5% respectively 
for those who responded with often and always as a practice.  This indicates a high rate of safe 
practices among respondents for the security of physical access to their personal devices. 
Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors of New Nurses 
The main question driving the study can be broken into a series of questions related to the 
new nurses’ specific cybersecurity knowledge, risk, and personal characteristics including:  
What is the level of new nurses’ knowledge of information system security (KISS), risk 
behaviors (RB), concern for information privacy (CFIP), their information privacy protective 
responses (IPPR), and how are these affected by their threat appraisal (internal or external) to 
themselves, their hospitals, or their patients? Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP) can also 
be categorized by factors including: 
a. medical facilities errors (ME)? 
b. unauthorized access to medical information (UA)? 
c. medical facilities secondary use of medical information (SU)? 
d. personal collection of medical information (CO)? 
 
The following variables have been collected on the survey questionnaire as follows. The 
CFIP along with subscales, the IPPR, KISS, RB, and threat appraisal are analyzed descriptively 
in the following section. The measures developed for this study to measure knowledge and risk 
were assessed in the pilot study and psychometrically assessed for reliability again in this study. 
Displayed below are the variables with corresponding item numbers from the survey.  Following 
the declaration of variables is a table displaying a breakdown of the scales and a separate table 
for threat appraisal (Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey). 
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• Demographics – Items 1-5 
• CFIP: Concern for Information Privacy – Items 6, 7g-j) 
• Subscales of CFIP: 
o UA: Unauthorized Access to Medical Information (6a-c) 
o SU: Secondary Use of Medical Information (d-f) 
o ME: Medical Facility Errors (g-i) 
o CO: Personal Collection of Medical Information (7g-j) 
• IPPR: Information Privacy Protective Responses, a response to the CFIP – Item 7 (c-h), 
Items 7a-b omitted to elevate the coefficient alpha=.758 based on 4 items. 
• Personal Use of Mobile Devices Items 8-11 
• Personal Technology Practices – Items 12-15 
• Knowledge of Information System Security (KISS) – Items 18 -44 
• Risk Behaviors (RB) Score – Items 17 
• Threat appraisal (Internal and External) – Item 45  
 
Level	of	Knowledge	
 
What is the level of new nurses’ knowledge of information system security (KISS) 
related to patient privacy, security rules, and vulnerability to breaches or threats to exposing 
protected health information (PHI)? 
 The tables Knowledge Score Descriptive Statistics and Knowledge Results for 
instrument element-specific results.  The Knowledge Score Frequency Chart displays the 
frequency distribution. 
 
Table 7 Knowledge Score Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Knowledge 
Score 514 0.33 1 0.8297 0.10667 
 
 
 
 
77 
 The KISS scores overall show an average of 82.97% correct results.  Within the KISS 
instrument are a few items with results diverging noticeably from the overall instrument mean 
score. 
The knowledge item pertaining to the right to access a relative/spouse/partner/friend’s 
electronic health information (Item 4) is the second lowest result in correct responses at 42.2%.  
Note that the questions are displayed in their entirety in the table with the ellipses completed by 
the multiple choice answers. The complete knowledge instrument with all response options and 
indicators for correct responses can be viewed in Appendix H - Content Validity: Student 
Nurses’ Knowledge of Information System Security and Risk Behaviors.  
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Table 8 Knowledge Results 
Item Number Question Percent Correct 
Knowledge 1 Putting patient information on a USB drive is acceptable if…. 92.8 
Knowledge 2 Texting patient information is acceptable if…. 88.7 
Knowledge 3 Placing patient information on my personal computer is acceptable if…. 75.5 
Knowledge 4 I may access my relative/spouse/partner/friend’s electronic health information if…. 42.2 
Knowledge 5 If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s chart… 99.0 
Knowledge 6 If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I…. 95.7 
Knowledge 7 If I discover a coworker has accessed their relative’s information, I… 64.2 
Knowledge 8 If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my password, I…. 60.5 
Knowledge 9 I can put patient data on a USB stick if…. 96.1 
Knowledge 10 If a website informs me that JAVA must be updated, I…. 73.3 
Knowledge 11 If a computer message from the FBI states my files have been scrambled and I must pay a $300 fine, I… 88.7 
Knowledge 12 If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and requests a wire transfer, I…. 99.6 
Knowledge 13 An email from my bank states my account had been compromised and I must verify my identity by clicking on a link and filling out some information, I…. 99.4 
Knowledge 14 My coworker received a strange email from me requesting money, I…. 65.8 
Knowledge 15 
A well-known national realtor sends an email with the subject “Hot Properties in Your 
Neighborhood." The link requests a Gmail or Yahoo login to proceed.  Assuming there’s 
an interest, I…. 
27.4 
Knowledge 16 The corner deli that typically delivers lunch complains they received a fax with patient information, I…. 80.4 
Knowledge 17 When leaving a computer logged in with my password, I…. 97.9 
Knowledge 18 A pop-up appears informing me the computer is running slow, I…. 69.5 
Knowledge 19 Taking patient or chart photos with my own cell phone is acceptable if…. 84.6 
Knowledge 20 A person without a hospital badge states he is from IT and needs me to login for him to fix the slowness problem, I…. 94.2 
Knowledge 21  I may work with documents containing patient information on my home computer or laptop…. 91.6 
Knowledge 22 If I need to look at my health records, I…. 90.7 
Knowledge 23 If a law firm requests patient information, I…. 98.8 
Knowledge 24 If a standard computer without encryption has a sensitive file that is purposefully deleted… 84.4 
Knowledge 25 It’s acceptable to backup patient information to my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox, iCloud, etc...) for safekeeping... 96.5 
Knowledge 26 If my coworker suspects someone must have looked at his/her health record due to gossip about his/her condition, I would… 89.1 
Knowledge 27 If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing sensitive information, I… 93.6 
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The knowledge scores displayed in the graph below shows a slightly skewed frequency 
distribution of respondents tending to score in the higher end range according to the Knowledge 
Score Frequency Chart.  While outlying scores exist in the lower range, this graph suggests that 
new nurses one-year tend to have a homogenous knowledge of information system security 
generally speaking. Given that nursing schools are responsible for at least some training to 
prepare students for hospital experiences, it is a reasonable expectation that the shape of the 
curve reflects how tests might be graded with the mean, median and mode around a grade of B. 
No inference of knowledge related to information system security is however presumed but 
rather the curve is akin to school test score distributions. 
Figure 9 Knowledge Score Frequency Chart 
 
Level	of	Risk	
 
What is the level of risk behavior of nurses and types of risk behaviors related to their use 
of mobile devices? 
 
The Risk Behavior Score Descriptive Statistics table shows the instrument element-
specific results.  With an n=154, the mean risk behavior score is 68.86 with a standard deviation 
of 9.348. 
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Table 9 Risk Behavior Score Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Risk Score 514 46 145 68.86 9.348 
 
 The Risk Behavior scores overall show a mapping of the behavior frequency among new 
nurses.  Within the Risk Behaviors’ elements are results that stand out as items for discussion. 
 An overwhelming 94.9% of new nurses do not send patient information via personal 
email.  That leaves 3.6% of new nurse, who in varying levels of frequency, would send patient 
information via email. Note that purpose for using personal email to send PHI was not asked.  To 
some degree 18.9% of participants obtain content outside of legitimate sources. 
Security modalities such as antivirus and firewalls are not used by 41.4% of new nurses.  
One plausible explanation is that security modalities tend to have historically been more in 
commonplace usage with desktops and laptops than the prolific mobile devices such as phones 
and tables.  Speculatively, these may not be used among respondents with their laptop use, but 
this has not been asked in such a granular fashion. 
In the reported behaviors, it would appear that financial data breaches occurred in 30% of 
new nurses.  Conversely, only 27.4% of new nurses recognized the phishing attack from the 
knowledge survey. The question did not offer any determination as to how the data may have 
been breached or to what degree.  The data suggests that new nurses may lack knowledge of key 
areas of common attack by nefarious agents, do not employ protective security modalities by and 
large, and many may have already suffered data breaches with financial implications by the time 
they embarked on their career. 
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Table 10 Risk Behaviors Results 
Risk Behaviors Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
I accept social media invitations for applications. 35.8 30.0 23.9 4.1 1.2 
I shop on the Internet. .6 6.2 41.4 43.0 8.6 
I use Facebook, Twitter and similar social network sites. 3.7 6.0 18.3 44.0 27.8 
I download/save music, movies, programs and files from the Internet. 14.0 30.9 28.4 21.0 5.1 
I share my contact information on the Internet when required. 8.0 28.8 43.0 16.9 2.9 
I use security programs like anti-virus, spyware removal, firewall, etc. 41.4 18.9 19.8 9.9 6.4 
I delete the temporary files and Internet history before leaving a public 
computer. 24.1 13.6 17.7 17.7 13.8 
I password protect my files. 24.3 15.6 23.0 17.5 17.5 
I use complex and long passwords that cannot be easily guessed. 41.8 29.6 21.6 4.1 2.7 
I change my passwords periodically. 19.5 26.1 31.5 15.8 7.0 
I share my passwords with others. 68.1 25.5 5.1 .6 .2 
I transfer (send or receive) files while I chat. 38.7 29.6 18.9 5.3 2.1 
I use passwords when turning on all of my devices. 52.1 20.4 15.0 6.0 5.3 
…“jailbreak”, or use a customized environment to get free apps. 83.9 7.4 2.1 .8 .2 
…click on email links to reset my password. 32.3 17.5 35.0 10.7 3.3 
…use free Wi-Fi at public locations such as cafes and airports. 3.5 22.4 45.1 22.4 6.6 
…keep my device attended and in my possession. 74.9 20.4 2.9 1.0 .6 
…text patient information with colleagues (aside from corporate 
applications). 84.4 8.8 3.1 1.0 .8 
…use personal email containing patient information. 94.9 1.8 .8 .8 .2 
…accept invitations for games and apps through social networks. 66.9 21.0 9.3 1.2 .4 
…download movies/music/apps by pirating or otherwise without 
paying (aside from legit streaming services). 80.4 12.1 6.0 .4 .4 
…share my password (any) with others such as family, friends, or 
coworkers 68.1 23.9 6.2 1.2 .6 
…use autofill to complete my information in websites. 12.8 21.0 43.8 18.1 4.1 
…submit my personal information such as name, address, phone 
number, and credit card info into websites when requested. 11.7 23.0 43.4 19.1 2.7 
…chat with strangers online. 85.8 11.1 2.1 .8 .2 
…post personal information on social media sites. 45.7 36.0 13.6 3.9 .6 
…have had my financial/credit information personally breached (aside 
from publicized breaches of corporations). 69.3 21.8 7.0 1.0 .2 
…have had my passwords stolen/misused. (Evident by unauthorized 
emails/posts or services accessed by unauthorized entities) 75.3 18.5 4.1 .2 .4 
…chat with others about patient information outside of work. 79.0 13.6 5.4 .6 .2 
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The risk behavior score frequency in the graph below shows an approximately normal 
distribution around the mean.  While outlying scores exist in the higher range, this graph 
suggests that new nurses tend to have a relatively even distribution of knowledge of risk 
behaviors with most falling in the medium risk range. 
 
Figure 10 Risk Habit Score Frequency Distribution 
Information	Privacy	Protection	Responses	and	Concern	For	Information	Privacy	
 
What is the level of new nurses’ Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) and 
Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) factors? 
The survey questions to capture measures for Concern for Information Privacy and 
Information Privacy Protective Responses were developed from an original questionnaire by 
Kuo, Ma, and Alexander (2014) and modified to capture new nurses’ responses to the items as 
they would pertain to themselves rather than patients’ responses. These new variables were 
tested for feasibility and reliability in the pilot study and reported in Chapter 3. The items were 
reduced following a careful assessment of the item analyses and the items were captured on the 
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full study. A descriptive analysis was done on the CFIP total scale and the 4 subscales as 
described by Kuo et al. (2014) and reported in the CFIP and IPPR Descriptive Statistics table. 
 
Table 11 CFIP and IPPR Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Total CFIP AU 513 6 18 11.56 2.463 
Total CFIP SU 514 3 18 13.63 1.957 
Total CFIP ER 510 6 18 11.60 2.302 
Total CFIP CO 510 4 22 10.52 3.867 
Total CFIP 505 28 65 47.35 6.861 
Total IPPR 512 4 24 15.93 2.997 
 
 
Reliability	of	All	Measurement	Scales	
 
The instrument reliability for all the study scales were assessed and reported in the 
Instrument Reliability table (Table 12), showing the Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate for both 
the pilot (n=167) and current nationwide study (n=514).  The reliability goal was to have a 
Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .70 or greater for each instrument.  While elements from 
the pilot study original questionnaire were dropped to achieve this goal, remaining elements of 
the current nationwide study were left intact.  All elements except the knowledge instrument 
attained the goal with KISS having a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .669.  The 
determination to leave the knowledge score intact was made following analysis indicating that an 
incremental reduction of elements within the scale would yield a diminishing minute increase in 
the Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate. The IPPR scale had two items removed to achieve a 
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Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .758.  Variables were used in the study included the full 
scale of the Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP), 4 of the 6 items in the Information Personal 
Protective Response (IPPR), the four subscales for the Concern for Information Privacy (AU= 
Unauthorized Access; SU=Secondary Use; ME=Medical Errors; CO=Personal Collection of 
Medical Information), Knowledge of Information Security Systems (KISS) and the Risk 
Behaviors (RB). 
 
Table 12 Instrument Reliability - Pilot and Current Study 
 Instrument Reliability - Cronbach's Alpha 
Instrument Pilot Study Current Study 
CFIP 0.890 0.800 
CFIP_AU 0.861 0.810 
CFIP_SU 0.883 0.771 
CFIP_ME 0.875 0.746 
CFIP_CO 0.887 0.883 
IPPR 0.704 0.758 
RB (Risk) 0.728 0.715 
KISS (Knowledge) 0.775 0.669 
 
Reported Threat Appraisal – “Worry” About a Consequence – Ranked Groups 
 
The survey asked respondents to rank in order from 1-4 statements that indicated 
consequences that they would “worry about” as a result in a security breach. These ranking were 
used to determine the level of threat by the respondents related to internal harm (threat to 
themselves) or external harm vis-à-vis harm related to external entities (threats to others). The 
question was: Which of the following statements reflects your motivation to keep your patient 
information on the EHR secure? Rank order from lowest (least worry) to highest (most worry) (1 
to 4). 
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Table 13 Threat Appraisal Taxonomy 
INTERNAL THREATS 
___ I would worry about fines on me or my loss of position. 
___ I would worry about my loss of employment. 
EXTERNAL THREATS 
___ I would worry that my patients’ privacy would be exposed. 
___ I would worry that my hospital would be fined. 
 
The ranked groups for each of the threats were identified and used in subsequent analyses 
to test if the group of individuals who ranked a particular threat (internal or external) at a 
particular similar level (lowest threat group to highest threat group). These can be used to 
interpret variables associated with those groups who considered “internal threats” highest or 
lowest and/or “external threats” highest or lowest with each threat serving as an independent 
variable to test knowledge, risk, concern for information protection and information protective 
responses. 
 
Table 14 Threat Rankings – Frequency of The Responses 
Worry/Threat Order of Threat (Higher = More Threat) 
 1 2 3 4 
Fines on me or loss of position 52 182 164 86 
Loss of employment 77 126 162 128 
Patient privacy exposed 89 151 135 120 
Hospital would be fined 275 30 32 162 
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Hypothesis Testing: Knowledge, Concern for Information Privacy, Information Privacy 
Protective Responses, Risk Behaviors, and Threat Appraisal 
 To test the second part of the sub-question: “How are knowledge, risk, concern and 
protective responses related and affected by their threat appraisal (internal or external) to 
themselves, their hospitals, or their patients?” several hypotheses were developed. 
 The following questions were further specified to use in testing relationships among the 
variables of interest and differences that might be affected by threat appraisal. These are used to 
organize the results reported. 
Question: Is Knowledge a Predictor of Risk and Concern for Information Privacy Total and 
Factors? 
 
 
The following are hypotheses associated with the research question: 
 
1. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
2. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an 
increase in Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP). 
 
3. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an 
increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors (ME). 
 
4. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an 
increase in Concern for unauthorized access to medical information (UA)? 
 
5. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an 
increase in Concern for medical facilities secondary use of medical information 
(SU)? 
 
6. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an 
increase in Concern for personal collection of medical information (CO)? 
 
7. Hypothesis: An increase in information system security knowledge results in an 
increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR). 
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Knowledge	Related	To	Risk	
 
To test the hypotheses, the data were analyzed statistically using SPSS Version 23. The 
following table shows the correlation analysis of the Risk Behaviors (RB) and Knowledge of 
Information System Security (KISS).  With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to 
determine significance at the p ≤ .05 level. 
 
Table 15 Risk Behaviors Related To Knowledge 
Correlations 
 Knowledge Score Risk Behaviors Score  
Knowledge 
Score 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.110* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .013 
N 514 514 
Risk Behaviors 
Score 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.110* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013  
N 514 514 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The correlation between knowledge and risk behaviors among new nurses is statistically 
significant with a Pearson’s Correlation of r = -.110 (p ≤ .05).  This two-tailed test indicates that 
knowledge is inversely related to risk.  In other words, those with a high level of knowledge 
related to the information security of mobile devices have a lower risk associated with their 
mobile device habits.   
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Knowledge	Related	To	Concern	For	Information	Privacy	
 
 The following table shows the correlation analysis of the Concern For Information 
Privacy (CFIP), Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR), and Knowledge of 
Information System Security (KISS).  With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to 
determine significance at the p ≤ .05 level. 
 
Table 16 Knowledge related to CFIP and IPPR 
Correlations 
  Knowledge Score 
Knowledge 
Score 
Pearson Correlation 1 
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 514 
Total CFIP 
Pearson Correlation 0.037 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.411 
N 505 
Total IPPR 
Pearson Correlation 0.072 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.102 
N 514 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 The correlation between knowledge and participants’ CFIP and the IPPR among new 
nurses are not statistically significant (p=NS) with a Pearson’s Correlation of r = .037 (p=NS) 
and r = .072 (p=NS) (Table 16).  Although the CFIP is correlated with the IPPR (r = .414, p<.05) 
(see Table 17), which was expected as the study by Kuo, Ma and Alexander (2014) identified the 
factors of concern for information privacy (CFIP) converging on participants’ individual 
personal protective responses (IPPR). These, however, have no connection to knowledge. 
These findings indicate a likelihood among new nurses with an increasing rate of CFIP to 
have an increase in their personal protection responses. However, knowledge is neither 
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correlated with the CFIP nor the IPPR.  The CFIP items are related to the concern for the 
information privacy of the patient whereas the IPPR relates to the protective responses related to 
the information privacy of the nurse.  Speculatively, these results could infer a correlation in 
nurses’ disposition of information privacy between the patients and themselves regardless of the 
level of information security knowledge related to mobile devices. 
Question: Are Risk Behaviors Related to Concern for Information Privacy Total and Factors? 
 
The following are hypotheses associated with the research question: 
 
1. Hypothesis: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
2. Hypothesis:  An increase in Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
3. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Medical Facility Errors (ME) results in a 
decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
4. Hypothesis:  An increase in Concern for Unauthorized Access to Medical 
Information (UA) results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
5. Hypothesis:  An increase in Concern for Secondary Use of Medical Information 
(SU) results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
6. Hypothesis: An increase in Concern for Personal Collection of Medical 
Information (CO) results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
7. Hypothesis: An increase in Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR) 
results in a decrease in identified risk behaviors. 
 
 The Risk Behaviors related CFIP and IPPR table shows the correlation analysis of the 
Concern For Information Privacy (CFIP), Information Privacy Protective Responses (IPPR), and 
Risk Behaviors (RB).  With an N=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to determine 
significance at the p ≤ .05 level. 
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Table 17 Risk Behaviors related to CFIP and IPPR 
Correlations 
 Total Risk Behaviors  Total CFIP Total IPPR 
Risk Behaviors Pearson Correlation 1 .132** .116** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .003 .008 
N 514 505 514 
Total CFIP Pearson Correlation .132** 1 .412** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003  .000 
N 505 505 505 
Total IPPR Pearson Correlation .116** .412** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .000  
N 514 505 514 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The correlation between risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR among new nurses is statistically 
significant.  Risk behaviors shows a positive correlation with CFIP and IPPR with Pearson’s 
Correlation values of r = .132 and r = .116 respectively at the p ≤ .01 level. With a Pearson’s 
Correlation of r = .412 at the p ≤ .01 level, CFIP and IPPR are more strongly related to one 
another than risk is related to either, however, this was expected as the study by Kuo, Ma and 
Alexander (2014) identified the factors of concern for information privacy (CFIP) converging on 
participants’ individual personal protective responses (IPPR).  This two-tailed test indicates that 
in this modified version of the questionnaire of the nurses’ responses about concern for 
information privacy and information privacy protective responses are directly related to one 
another with a stronger correlation than that of risk behaviors.  Although informative, this was 
not the hypothesis to be tested, and in fact, significant in the opposite direction.  This suggests 
that it may be associated with how the risk behaviors interact with the concerns for privacy and 
protective responses, which were hypothesized to be inversely correlated with risk. 
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The hypotheses suggesting a relationship between CFIP, IPPR and risk behaviors were 
predicted to be inversely correlated. The findings demonstrated an increase in risk behaviors is 
associated with increases in the CFIP and IPPR.  Therefore, new nurses tend to have increased 
concern for their patients’ information privacy and their own protective responses as their own 
level of risk behaviors increase. This was not expected and runs counterintuitive to industry 
notions, with a prediction that one’s concern would decrease one’s risk behaviors. What might be 
evident is that participants’ risk behaviors make them more suspicious of information protection 
privacy and more likely to select stronger protective responses – thus, yielding an inverse 
relationship – and suggesting that risk influences concern and protective responses, rather than 
concern and protective responses influences risk. With only a correlation analysis, this logic 
cannot be tested, and the model proposed may need to be modified. 
Question: Is Threat Appraisal Associated with Knowledge, Risk, Concern for Information 
Privacy Total and Factors, and Personal Protective Responses? 
 
To compare the knowledge, risk, concern and protective response mean scores by threat 
appraisal groups, two general null hypotheses were developed: 
 
Internal Null Hypotheses: Internal threats are not associated with knowledge, risk, concerns 
or protective responses. 
 
External Null Hypotheses: External threats are not associated with knowledge, risk, 
concerns or protective responses. 
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Threat – Internal and External 
 The survey instrument contained four statements, two developed to reflect “internal” 
threats (i.e. threat to self, such as fine, loss of position or job) and “external” threats (i.e. threat to 
others such as hospital fines, patient privacy breached). Participants were asked to rank order 
them from “lowest threat/worry” to “highest threat/worry” that yielded four groups of threat 
assessments for each threat. These threat groups were used to test for differences in mean scores 
on the variables of interest including knowledge, risk, concern and protective responses. 
The results yielded four groups indicating from least to most worrisome that a breach event 
could cause an impact to the nurse (internal) such as a personal threat (job, position) or that a 
breach event could cause an impact to others (external) vis-à-vis an impact to either the patient or 
hospital (external). 
Threat	of	Nurse	Fine	
The following table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors, 
CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of fines (internal threat). With an n=514, an 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed. 
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Table 18 Threat of fine ranks on differences in knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Knowledge 
Score 
Between Groups .124 3 .041 3.721 .011 
Within Groups 5.337 480 .011   
Total 5.461 483    
Risk Behaviors Between Groups 351.794 3 117.265 1.366 .252 
Within Groups 41195.386 480 85.824   
Total 41547.180 483    
Total IPPR Between Groups 35.687 3 11.896 1.288 .278 
Within Groups 4433.575 480 9.237   
Total 4469.262 483    
Total CFIP Between Groups 155.819 3 51.940 1.110 .344 
Within Groups 22124.294 473 46.774   
Total 22280.113 476    
 
The ANOVA indicates a statistically significant difference for knowledge scores by the 
threat groups for fines (internal threat) between knowledge and the worry about fines among new 
nurses (F = 3.72, df=3,480, p<.05).  No other significant differences exist with the threat levels 
of fines and risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP. 
 
Table 19 Threat of fine level related to knowledge scores 
Knowledge Score 
Fines on me or loss of position Mean N Std. Deviation 
1 .82 52 .087 
2 .85 182 .099 
3 .83 164 .106 
4 .81 86 .125 
Total .83 484 .106 
 
 
 
94 
 An analysis of knowledge mean score by highest threat ranking indicates that with a 
mean score of .81, those indicating the highest threat of fine have the lowest knowledge score. 
Threat	of	Job	Loss	
 The following table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors, 
CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of job loss (internal threat).  With an n=514, an 
ANOVA was performed. 
 
Table 20 Threat of job loss ranks on differences in knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Knowledge 
Score 
Between Groups .016 3 .005 .499 .683 
Within Groups 5.340 489 .011   
Total 5.356 492    
Risk Score Between Groups 222.435 3 74.145 1.011 .387 
Within Groups 35855.362 489 73.324   
Total 36077.797 492    
Total IPPR Between Groups 1.125 3 .375 .041 .989 
Within Groups 4464.124 489 9.129   
Total 4465.249 492    
Total CFIP 
(AU/SU/ERCO)  
Between Groups 65.306 3 21.769 .470 .703 
Within Groups 22330.786 482 46.329   
Total 22396.093 485    
 
  
 
 
95 
The ANOVA indicates that there are no differences among mean scores for knowledge, 
risk behaviors, CFIP and IPPR with the threat ranking of threat of job loss (internal).  
Threat	To	Patient	Privacy	
 The Threat to patient privacy table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, 
risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of patient privacy breaches 
(external threat).  With an n=514, an ANOVA was performed. 
 
Table 21 Threat to patient privacy related to knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Knowledge 
Score 
Between Groups .079 3 .026 2.443 .063 
Within Groups 5.311 491 .011   
Total 5.390 494    
Risk Score Between Groups 46.863 3 15.621 .210 .890 
Within Groups 36601.128 491 74.544   
Total 36647.992 494    
Total IPPR Between Groups 32.808 3 10.936 1.255 .289 
Within Groups 4279.374 491 8.716   
Total 4312.182 494    
Total CFIP 
(AU/SU/ERCO)  
Between Groups 98.849 3 32.950 .725 .537 
Within Groups 21984.624 484 45.423   
Total 22083.473 487    
 
The ANOVA indicates that there are no differences among mean scores for knowledge, 
risk behaviors, CFIP and IPPR with the threat ranking of patient privacy (external threat) in new 
nurses.  It is important to note, however, that with the knowledge mean score comparisons 
suggesting potential differences by threat ranking (F = 3.443, df=3,491, p=.063), it would be 
prudent to follow up on this variable in future studies. 
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Threat	of	Hospital	Fine	
 
 The following table shows the mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors, 
CFIP, and IPPR by the threat ranks on the threat of hospital fines (external threat).  With an 
n=514, an ANOVA was performed. 
 
Table 22 Threat of hospital fine related to knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Knowledge 
Score 
Between Groups .008 3 .003 .230 .876 
Within Groups 5.447 495 .011   
Total 5.455 498    
Total Habit Between Groups 224.496 3 74.832 1.005 .390 
Within Groups 36873.071 495 74.491   
Total 37097.567 498    
Total IPPR Between Groups 13.488 3 4.496 .500 .683 
Within Groups 4452.769 495 8.995   
Total 4466.257 498    
Total CFIP Between Groups 89.059 3 29.686 .648 .584 
Within Groups 22348.866 488 45.797   
Total 22437.925 491    
  
The ANOVA indicates no significant differences among mean scores for knowledge, risk 
behaviors, CFIP and IPPR with the threat ranking of patient privacy threat in new nurses. 
 In summary, the hypotheses related to the main variables of interest, knowledge, risk, 
concern for privacy, personal protective responses and threat appraisal yielded some statistically 
significant findings. Of note is that knowledge and risk are correlated in the direction predicted: 
as knowledge of participants increased, risk behaviors decreased. While knowledge and risk 
were significantly related, knowledge was not related to concern for information privacy or 
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personal protective responses. Risk, however, was related to concern for information privacy and 
personal protective responses but not in the direction predicted. What is suggested by the results 
is that new nurses’ risk behaviors influence their concern and protective responses directly – that 
perhaps those who take more risks are more concerned and are likely to engage in more personal 
protective responses. Finally, ranked groups of the internal threat appraisal for fines or loss of 
position did appear to affect participants’ knowledge, but not risk behaviors, concern or personal 
protective responses. The highest threat ranking for personal fine (internal) was associated with 
the lowest knowledge score. The null hypotheses were not rejected for any other threat appraisal 
ranking differences in mean scores for the variables of interest: knowledge, risk, concern or 
personal protective responses. 
Hypothesis Testing: Demographic Variables 
Is knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses influenced by select demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age and education (program type or school type)? 
 
Differences in Knowledge, Risk, and Concern for Information Privacy and Protective Responses 
The following sections will present the results testing the hypotheses generated around 
these questions. They will include variables about the nurses (i.e. gender, age, school type) as 
they may or may not influence the variables in the study including: 
(1) Do men and women differ in their knowledge and risk behaviors related to 
cybersecurity? 
(2) Do men and women differ in their reported mobile device practices? 
(3) Does the age of nurses differ on their scores for knowledge, risk behaviors, threat 
appraisal, or concern for information protection? 
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(4) Does nursing education type or school type affect knowledge, risk behaviors, threat 
appraisal, or concern for information protection? 
Gender Related to Knowledge, Risk Behaviors and Reported Mobile Device Practice 
To test the hypotheses that the study variables of knowledge, risk, concern or protective 
responses and mobile device practices differ by gender, a t test was performed on study variables 
with no significant differences (p=NS) for KISS, RS, CFIP or IPPR, and no significant 
correlations for frequency of mobile device use for any study items (p=NS). 
Age Related To Knowledge, Risk Behaviors 
  
 To test the hypotheses if age and study variables are associated, the age of participants 
was collapsed into three categories to correct for multiple age ranges selected by participants. 
These became three age ranges: Younger Age Range (ages <30); Middle age range (ages 30 to 
45); Older age range (ages >45). 
 The following table shows the correlation analysis of age range, knowledge of 
information security systems (KISS), and Risk Behaviors (RB), concern (CFIP) and personal 
protective responses (IPPR).  With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to 
determine significance at both the p ≤ .01 and p ≤ .05 levels. 
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Table 23 Age related to knowledge, risk, concern and personal protective responses 
 Age Range 
Age Range Pearson Correlation 1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
N 514 
Knowledge 
Score 
Pearson Correlation .124** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 
N 514 
Total Risk Pearson Correlation -.078 
Sig. (2-tailed) .079 
N 514 
CFIP Pearson Correlation -.023 
Sig. (2-tailed) .601 
N 505 
IPPR Pearson Correlation -.099* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 
N 512 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlations between age range and knowledge as well as age range with personal 
protective response are significant, but age is not significant for risk (RB) or age for concern 
(CFIP).  Age range shows a positive correlation for knowledge (KISS) with a Pearson’s 
Correlation value of .124 significant at the p ≤ .01 level and a negative value of -.099 for 
personal protective responses (IPPR) significant at the p<.05 level.  These results indicate that 
older nurses have high level of knowledge of information system security and are less 
“protective” in their responses to using information technology.  Neither risk nor concern are 
related.  
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Age Related To Time Spent Using Mobile Device 
 The following table shows the correlation analysis of age range and time spent using a 
mobile device. With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to determine significance 
at the p ≤ .01 level. 
 
Table 24 Age related to time spent using mobile device 
Correlations 
 Age Range Time Spent 
Age Range Pearson Correlation 1 -.121** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .006 
N 514 513 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations between age range and time spent using a mobile device among new nurses 
has been determined to be significant.  Age range shows a negative correlation with mobile 
device usage with Pearson’s Correlation value of r = -.121 (p ≤ .01). This two-tailed test 
indicates that the younger age range tends to spend more time using mobile devices. 
Age Related To Activity Type 
The following table shows the correlation analysis of age range and types of mobile 
device activities. With an n=514, a Pearson’s Correlation was performed to determine 
significance at both the p ≤ .01 and p ≤ .05 levels. 
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Table 25 Age activity for significant correlations 
Correlations                   
  Web IM Text MMS Camera Notes Navigation Social Media Music 
Age 
Range 
Pearson 
Correlation -.149** -.106* -.131** -.119** -.116** -.095* -.103* -.202** -.147** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .017 .003 .007 .009 .031 .020 .000 .001 
 N 513 511 514 512 514 513 512 514 514 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 26 Age activity for non-significant correlations 
    Talking Email Calendar Contact List Video/Movies Online Library 
Age 
Range 
Pearson 
Correlation .019 -.032 -.029 .071 -.029 -.013 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) .673 .473 .510 .105 .513 .768 
 N 514 511 514 514 513 513 
 
 All significantly correlated activities are inversely related to age. Therefore, the younger 
age group of new nurses have more mobile device activity related the use of web browsing, 
instant messaging (IM), multimedia messaging (MMS), camera, notes, navigation, social media, 
and music. Social medial has the strongest negative Pearson’s Correlation value at -.202.  Those 
activities not significantly correlated to age include talking by voice, email, calendar, contact list, 
video/movies, and the online library. 
 
Education Related To Knowledge, Risk Behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR 
 Since the results of the study will be important to inform nursing education practice in 
was important to test for differences among types of nursing programs and to test for differences 
in types of schools (public, private not-for-profit, private for-profit).  
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To test the hypotheses that knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses differ by 
types of programs (i.e. Associate Degree, Diploma, Baccalaureate Degree, Masters, etc. Other) 
an analysis of variance was done to compare mean scores for the education groups. 
The following table shows the results of education differences in knowledge, risk 
behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR. With an n=514, an ANOVA was performed. 
 
Table 27 Education type effects on knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Knowledge 
Score  
Between Groups .098 8 .012 1.084 .373 
Within Groups 5.714 503 .011   
Total 5.812 511    
Risk Behaviors Between Groups 883.638 8 110.455 1.266 .259 
Within Groups 43880.362 503 87.237   
Total 44764.000 511    
Total IPPR  Between Groups 113.408 8 14.176 1.600 .122 
Within Groups 4457.199 503 8.861   
Total 4570.607 511    
Total CFIP Between Groups 551.916 8 68.990 1.475 .164 
Within Groups 23106.231 494 46.774   
Total 23658.147 502    
 
 The ANOVA analysis indicates that that no significant difference exists in new nurses in 
their knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, or CFIP related to their type of education program. 
Students enrolled in Associates, Baccalaureate and Master’s degree programs did not differ on 
these variables related to security and privacy using mobile devices. 
 To test if the types of schools (public, private not-for-profit, private for-profit) has an 
effect on the knowledge, risk, concern and protective responses of new nurses, analysis of 
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variance of the mean scores were calculated. The following table shows the results of the 
ANOVA on school type comparisons of knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR. 
 
Table 28 School type effects on knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, and CFIP 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Knowledge 
Score 
Between Groups .043 3 .014 1.267 .285 
Within Groups 5.794 510 .011   
Total 5.838 513    
Total Risk Between Groups 139.946 3 46.649 .532 .660 
Within Groups 44685.969 510 87.620   
Total 44825.914 513    
Total IPPR Between Groups 9.533 3 3.178 .354 .786 
Within Groups 4580.803 510 8.982   
Total 4590.337 513    
Total CFIP Between Groups 184.431 3 61.477 1.308 .271 
Within Groups 23543.925 501 46.994   
Total 23728.356 504    
 
The ANOVA analysis indicates that that no significant difference exists in new nurses in 
their knowledge, risk behaviors, IPPR, or CFIP related to their type of schools, public, private 
not for-profit and private for-profit. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, the hypotheses related to demographics yielded some statistically significant 
findings. Of note is that gender made no difference on any of the study variables of knowledge, 
risk, concern or personal protective responses. Age had a significant influence on types of mobile 
device activities as well as participants’ knowledge but not risk behaviors. Age was also 
inversely related to personal protective responses, suggesting that older nurses were less likely to 
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use personal protection responses. Types of nursing programs and types of schools did not affect 
any of the study variables. These findings suggest important considerations when addressing 
overall findings of the study as they relate to recommendations for practice. 
 In summary, the following conclusions can be made from the analyses in the study: 
1. Based upon the aforementioned results, the following variables are related: 
• Knowledge and risk are inversely related. 
• CFIP is directly related to IPPR. 
• Risk behavior is directly related to both the CFIP and IPPR. 
• Age is inversely related to time spent using mobile devices. 
• Age is inverse related to the following mobile activities: Web, IM, Text, MMS, Camera, 
Notes, Navigation, Social Media, and Music. 
• Age is directly related to knowledge. 
• Age is inversely related to IPPR. 
• Threat of nurse fine (internal) and knowledge are related. 
 
2. Based upon the aforementioned results, the following variables are not related: 
 
• Knowledge is related neither to CFIP nor to IPPR. 
• Threat of nurse fine (internal) is not related to risk behaviors (RB), CFIP, or IPPR. 
• Threat of job loss (internal) not related to core variables. 
• Threat to patient privacy (external) not related to core variables (however knowledge 
p=.06 and suggests further exploration that may be warranted) 
• Threat of hospital fine (external) not related to core variables. 
 
3. Based upon the aforementioned results, the following demographic variables are not related: 
 
• Gender is not related to any core variables. 
• Age is not related to CFIP. 
• Age is not related to risk behavior. 
• Age is not related to the following mobile activities: Talking, Email, Calendar, Contact 
List, Video/Movies, and Online Library. 
• Type of education is not related to any core variables. 
• Type of school is not related to any core variables. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents an organized discussion on the study findings, implications, 
measurement instruments, and limitations.  The overall intent of this study was to explore the 
information security knowledge, risk behavior in the use of portable electronic devices, the 
concern for and protective response related to protecting patient information, and the threat 
appraisal of consequences for security breaches in a sample of new nurses from across the nation 
who had graduated approximately one year prior, thereby sharing a common length of time in the 
role of nurse and similar nursing education completion dates.  The sample also shared in their 
membership of the National Student Nurses Association (NSNA) and its associated nursing 
student educational programs and assistance. With respect to experience, this sample of nurses 
was homogenous in order to be able to inform educators, both within the educational institution 
and the workplace, as to factors examined herein this study.  These recommendations are also 
discussed, along with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
Characteristics and Demographics 
The survey elements related to demographics consisted of the standard used in prior 
NSNA surveys.  As the NSNA administered the delivery of the instrument to its members who 
agreed to correspondence for survey purposes, consistency with their standard demographic 
elements was a requirement.  This requirement is the basis for the manner in which the 
demographic elements as drafted instead of other standards, including those stock elements from 
SurveyMonkey® itself. 
Gender data collected for analysis was determined to be congruent with the gender 
demographic makeup of the overall population of nurses in the United States. A 92% female to 
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8% male composition accounts for the gender of nurses in the United States (United States 
Department of Labor, 2015).  These gender related statistics did not contain granular information 
as to experience, age, or other demographic information collected in this study.  Therefore, these 
national statistics may be considered generally harmonious and consistent with the study sample 
which had an 87.9% female to 12.1% male composition with a sample population of N=541.  
This gender makeup, although slightly higher for male responders perhaps based on a higher 
likelihood to answer a computer-related survey, also does align with membership of the NSNA 
among its reported 60,000 members from across the nation. 
The gender demographic was analyzed against all of the core variables; KISS, CFIP, 
IPPR, RB, and Threat Appraisal. Of note is that no significant relation has been found between 
gender and any of the core variables.  This should inform educators, both in nursing education 
and in the workplace, of the homogenous nature of nurses respective to gender related to both 
knowledge and risk behavior associated with mobile devices. 
 Consistent with NSNA survey elements, race was one of the collected data elements.  
The majority of respondents at 73.3% reported themselves as Caucasian. With low representation 
among certain categories such a Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander having a single 
representative, analysis with respect to race would not likely be informative.  The descriptive 
data are reported for information but not tested in the core analyses.  
The data related to age included an expansive range with some groups too small for 
separating out. After collection, the NSNA-defined age categories were collapsed into the three 
sections of those aged 32 and younger, 33 to 48, as well as 49 and older.  The rationale for 
selecting three groups was to explore general inferences about age related to the other core 
variables.  The specific values were selected based upon the age range standards for NSNA-
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administered surveys.  Specific age values were not collected, only ranges that were collapsed 
into three general categories for analysis. 
As anticipated with new nurses, the majority (71%) fell into 32 and younger section 
whereas a small section (7%) fell into the 49 and older category.  As only age ranges were 
collected in lieu of actual ages, the ability to determine cutoff points for age ranges was limited 
to those range numbers already in use.  Hence, the values ≤32 (younger nurses), 33-48 (mid-age 
nurses), and ≥49 (older nurses) were designated as the age groups consolidated for analysis and 
not suggesting their experience since they were all one-year post graduation. 
 By separating the respondents into three age groups, this survey has been able to 
demonstrate associations with age range and the other factors.  Among the most prominent of 
findings was the positive association with age and knowledge of information security related to 
mobile devices.  Counter to the narrative that younger populations have a propensity toward 
technology as digital natives, the security knowledge was found to increase with those in the 
older age range.  Congruent with the digital native narrative associated with younger 
populations, this study did find that the inverse association between age range and the use of 
mobile electronic devices.  Not only did the younger group tend to use their devices more often, 
but also the duration of different types of activities or mobile device features varied among the 
age groups. Mobile device features such as web, instant/text/multimedia messaging, camera, 
notes, navigation, social media, and music tended to be used with a longer duration among the 
younger age group. 
 The younger group of those aged 32 and younger accounted for just over double those in 
the other age groups combined.  With only 7% of the sample at age 49 and older, the survey was 
most represented by the younger nurses.  A plausible explanation for the age makeup of the 
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sample is that an effort to limit variation in experience was done by surveying NSNA members 
who had graduated from a nursing program roughly one year prior.  Moreover, as the sample 
consisted of mainly nurses who did not graduate with an advanced degree but rather those 
associated with degrees required for the entry into the profession of nursing, the expectation is 
that survey respondents overall had recently commenced entry into their nursing careers. Overall, 
91.4% of the sample had education types typically associated with entry into the profession of 
nursing. 
Age also had an inverse relationship with the respondents’ information privacy protection 
response (IPPR) but not their concern for information privacy (CFIP).  Those in the higher age 
groups tended to show a response to the end of protecting their own data.  However, there was no 
difference in age regarding the concern for information privacy of their own patients. 
 While the sample was generally homogenous with respect to having had an education 
type consistent with the entry into the profession, no relation was found between the type of 
education and any of the core variables study.  Furthermore, the type of school (public, private, 
for-profit) did not yield any results as to its relationship with any of the core variables either.  
Therefore, neither education type nor school type had any impact on knowledge or risk. 
As one of this study’s intentions is to inform educators, this finding should be particularly 
noteworthy considering the current zeitgeist in which the baccalaureate degree has been sought 
after as the minimum entry point into the profession by multiple groups and in some cases 
encouraged through market forces in certain regions within the United States.  The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) has recommended an increase to an 80% composition of nurses at the 
baccalaureate level by the year 2020 (Yakusheva, 2014).  Furthermore, higher baccalaureate-
level proportions are associated with better outcomes according to hospital studies (Yakusheva, 
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2014). While improved outcomes have been appraised in the clinical setting, knowledge of 
information security or risk behavior does not supply any addition evidence in support of raising 
the entry level into the profession, as those factors are not related to education type. 
 The 71% majority of respondents had nursing education at the baccalaureate or higher 
level with 27.6% having reported a nursing education from an Associate Degree or diploma 
program. This nursing education type is consistent with NSNA survey data.  As the survey 
question inquired at the type of nursing program degree, a determination cannot be presumed as 
to the highest level of education obtained.  For example, a person with a master’s degree may 
have pursued a nursing career by way of an Associate Degree and thus would have be 
constrained to report that lower level degree on the survey. 
Phone Characteristics 
 To texture a survey regarding new nurses’ mobile device usage, information pertaining to 
their particular mobile device of use was collected with respect to phone manufacturer, model, 
and operating system by derivation if such a determination could be extrapolated. While these 
data elements were not analyzed in relation to the core variable, this information could be used 
for future research or informative unto itself as indicative of the current landscape of mobile 
device usages among new nurses. Due to a plethora of phone manufacturers and continuously 
emerging models, the decision was made to leave this survey element as a free text field.  In 
retrospect, data analysis on such a field was arduous due to variations in spelling and imprecise 
responses.  For any future research capturing such data, a single-select option with the most 
pervasive operating systems of the time along with an “other” selection could yield cleaner data 
from which to analyze.  
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The information collected pertained to the “personal use of technologies at work and at 
home.” As such, the distinction could not be made as to which devices were employer-supplied 
or intended for personal use.  As stated in Chapter 4, clinical nurse usage of phones for clinical 
usage is limited and often for the voice communication.  While the collected data cannot be 
definitively attributed to personal phone usage, a general inference may be based upon 
commonplace mobile device usage for work purposes among nurses in a clinical setting. 
While the emergence of bring-your-own-device (BYOD) modalities are becoming more 
pervasive in healthcare, this technology is often limited to non-clinical staff for business 
purposes.  Current trends indicate an increased prevalence of mobile devices in the healthcare 
workplace without the adoption of adequate security standards (Hewitt, Dolezel, & McLeod, 
2017).  Therefore, the burden in part is placed upon healthcare entities and nurses in particular to 
protect sensitive information thus making the understanding of their information security 
knowledge, risk behavior, and other factors are the more relevant with this emerging paradigm. 
The overwhelming majority of the world’s phone market consists of Android phones at 
86.1%.  Android-operated phones using Google’s Android operating system and include a 
plethora of manufacturers and models with variations in terms of functionality and security 
features.  This diverse Android marketplace at times may see the need for configuration 
requirements on the phones themselves in order to bring these devices in alignment with 
employers’ mobile device management systems (MDM) compared to Apple models with 
inherent security safeguards.  An MDS provides security assurances and configuration control.  
As this Android marketplace is diverse, such configurations are not universally applicable as 
different models have different security feature implementations. 
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Relatively inverse to worldwide prevalence, the 70.73% majority of new nurses tend to 
use Apple phones, which have the iOS operating system. The new nurse usage is a departure 
from the general population.  This finding should be encouraging from an information security 
perspective as such devices come from a single manufacturer with limited model offerings, and 
therefore has a somewhat predictable security posture.  Both the hardware and software come 
from a single manufacturer with limited supported devices and a single operating system line.  
These devices tend to require less configuration to align with the employer-based MDM.  While 
using an employer-based MDM is not commonplace as is the introduction of personal phones 
into the nurses’ clinical practice, it nonetheless serves as a marker for the security standards 
employed by the iOS devices. 
Samsung had a 21.64% usage in the study and remains the largest of Android-based 
manufacturers in both the study and the world.  Microsoft’s Windows phone has a single report 
and may have been an outlier as worldwide usage of these models is quite sparse. 
Descriptive Findings of the Study 
This section will address the overarching main question of the study, “How much do new 
nurses know about security of information systems and does their knowledge influence their risk 
behaviors in using mobile technology?” In doing so, common mobile technology usage is 
described with data related to mobile application and security usage analyzed using descriptive 
statistical analysis. This information was included in the study to provide background 
information on new nurses’ usage in the context of the major variables examined herein this 
study. 
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Mobile	Application	Use	
 
A series of descriptive analyses were performed in an effort to answer the question “What 
is the reported level and type of new nurse mobile application use?”  The prevailing features 
were Text Messaging (N=272), Social Media (N=250), and Web Browsing (N=234). 
The 88.5% majority of respondents used social media either sometimes or very often.  
The type of social media platform was not asked. At the time of this analysis, the predominant 
social media platform is Facebook with 2.2 billion active users (Statista, 2018).  This survey was 
conducted prior to the privacy disclosure involving the purported misuse of user-related data by 
Cambridge Analytica (Granville, 2018).  There may be opportunities for future research to be 
conducted on nurses’ social media usage in light of this privacy issue taking on the massive 
media and political attention it has caused related to personal privacy. 
Not surprisingly, chatting, online library, and video/movie usage was low.  It should be 
noted that chatting might be considered uncommon vernacular supplanted by the term texting.  
This could perhaps account for the low level of reported usage.  The online library usage may 
have been more apt to a student sample as the studied group consisted of nurses who had already 
graduated.  These new nurses may use online medical references but speculatively may not have 
equated that usage with the term “online library” which may be more associated with school use.  
With fourteen participants declaring that the online library was not available, those respondents 
may have speculatively referred to the feature as not being available as a native application in the 
manner that camera, text, mail, and contact apps are commonly included as default operating 
system features.  
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Security	Practice	Results	
The survey had an element related to a common security practice, which is the locking of 
a device.  The purpose of locking a device is to prevent unauthorized access to the device.  
Locking may occur automatically by the device at a pre-set interval without any use activity or 
through manual intervention often manifesting itself with the click of a button.  The locking of a 
device would require re-authentication to the device by the authorized user.  At the time of this 
survey, standard authentication methods may consist of a numerical passcode, username-
password combination, fingerprint scan, pattern drawing or facial recognition.   
Instead of a binary response selection, the question was asked in a matrix format about 
the frequency to which this locking practice occurred with phones and tablets both personally 
owned and employer-supplied.  The distinction of frequency is informative and may be 
indicative of a propensity to protect information.  Opportunities may exist for future studies 
regarding such a propensity relating other security practices to the key variables in this study. 
 A majority listed hospital phones and mobile devices as not applicable regarding locking 
at 56.0% and 58.2% respectively. As previously discussed, the supposition is that nurses do not 
commonly use their mobile phones for clinical practice.  The MDM solutions typically include 
those mandatory locking features in addition to likely requiring more secure authentication 
methods than the device’s native minimum requirements.  This could include a requirement for a 
complex numerical passcode of six digits as opposed to a simpler one of four digits or even no 
authentication required at all.  With the emergence of the MDM solution, this security practice 
may be automatically performed.  Perhaps a plausible explanation for the reported lack of 
availability might be the absence of required nurse intervention to perform this security function. 
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 Regarding personal phones and mobile devices, the “always” response prevailed.  This 
indicates that new nurses recognize the existence of the security feature and actively use it.  New 
nurses lock their personal phones and devices at 83.5% and 70.5% respectively for often and 
always indicated as a practice. Nurses are aware of and take action to safeguard their own 
devices from unauthorized physical access.  While this process may be automated in the 
workplace for those employers who have implemented an MDM solution and configured it for 
this feature, educations and employers should know that nurses typically safeguard data 
habitually at least in respect to unauthorized physical access based upon the finding that 83.5% 
of new nurses reported locking their phones often or always. 
Level	of	Knowledge	
 The survey instrument included the knowledge of information security (KISS) measure, 
developed by the principal investigator, and administered as a pilot to a convenience sample of 
nursing students (N=167) prior to the full study implementation. 
 A predicted finding, and comforting result albeit a weak correlation, is that knowledge is 
inversely related to risk.  Those with greater knowledge of information system security have a 
reduced predilection toward risk behavior in their use of mobile devices, as those with higher 
knowledge scores tend to have a safer posture.  The new nurses with information security 
knowledge may understand risks and therefore participate in fewer risk activities. This finding 
could be informative and possible lead to future research in behavior analysis.  This should also 
inform educators and employers that knowledge may be a mitigating factor in reducing risk 
behavior.  This finding supports healthcare employer practices of HHS-mandated security 
awareness training, which tends to focus on knowledge.  Perhaps behavior-based practices may 
be more suitable for risk behavior reduction as a supplement to knowledge.  There is an 
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opportunity for future studies in order to understand the relationship between risk behavior and 
knowledge in light of this finding. 
 For the most part, the knowledge portion of the survey had the majority responding 
correctly and the histogram showed a normal distribution and grade score consistent with that of 
a college education program.  However, there were a few outliers of interest. 
Most notable is that only 27.4% of the sample responded correctly to item 15 in the KISS 
instrument.  The question refers to a nefarious attempt to by a third party to acquire a person’s 
credentials through a cleverly designed email.  This type of email correspondence, commonly 
known as a “phishing” attack, is a social engineering technique with the intended purpose to trick 
the recipient. Phishing is a type of social engineering attack, which may target healthcare, a 
specific institution, a specific person, or may simply be delivered to a nurse incidentally as part 
of a larger campaign to steal credentials.  The broader subject of social engineering is discussed 
in chapter two. 
  With this item being the lowest score, perhaps the result could inform educators and 
employers of an identified gap to pursue. Credentials may be stolen for not only direct access to 
patient and financial information but may also be used to control computer systems.  At the time 
of this analysis, many phishing emails contain or compel the user to obtain malicious code that 
could cause severe disruption in computer systems such as Ransomware (Palmer, 2017).  
Ransomware is essentially malicious software or a virus, which scrambles one or more computer 
systems rendering them unusable until an untraceable financial ransom is provided to the 
perpetrator.  The impact of such an attack has been proven to affect the clinical functioning of a 
healthcare entity for extended periods as clinical systems moreover are digitally connected.  
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Therefore, understanding this knowledge question may have not only privacy implications but 
clinical ones as well. 
Several questions were related to the proper disclosure of PHI for which legal guidance 
has been outlined.  In 2013, HHS provided direction for permissible cases of PHI disclosure (45 
CFR parts 160 and 164).  The KISS item 4 refers to permission to view a relative’s chart.  The 
ability to access the chart does not infer permission.  There are circumstances whereby access to 
a relative’s PHI would be permitted by law but being a nurse does not warrant an exception unto 
itself.  In the absence of certain conditions and generally speaking, the law does not permit 
access to a relative’s data.  However, 57.8% of new nurses believed that access to relative’s data 
was permissible.  This item too offers a potential knowledge gap worth further exploration for 
education and employers. 
Knowledge is related to neither the CFIP nor the IPPR.  This describes how new nurses 
may have concern over the protection of patient information and exhibit responses whether or 
not they have an understanding of information system security.   
Level	of	Risk	
Analysis of risk behavior has produced a paradoxical unanticipated finding.  Risk 
behavior has already been discussed as having an inverse relationship with knowledge.  Unlike 
knowledge, risk behavior is also directly related to both the CFIP and IPPR.  This infers that new 
nurses who engage in higher rates of risk behavior activities related to their use of mobile 
devices have both a low knowledge of information security and an affinity to not only have 
concern for privacy but also exhibit protective responses.  A plausible elucidation is that new 
nurses with an elevation in risk behavior may have a sense of self-awareness that their actions 
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may put sensitive information at risk and are therefore more cognizant of the implications to the 
safeguarding of protected health information. 
The acceptance of using personal email for patient information by a minor segment of 
new nurses is an education gap that could be filled.  While the HHS final ruling modifying the 
HIPAA Security Rule does not explicitly prohibit the use of personal email for PHI, the onus is 
on the healthcare entity to safeguard protected health information and personal email is 
considered a risk vehicle for the correspondence of PHI.  Yahoo, a large provider of personal 
email, reported that all three billion of their accounts were hacked in 2013 (Business Time 
Singapore, 2017).  The willingness of some to use PHI in email textured with a relatively low 
number of respondents appropriately responding to a phishing attack and in context with Yahoo 
hack disclosure should indicate that targeted education and the implementation of security 
controls regarding email use may be suitable. 
  Unexpectedly, 19.9% of new nurses declared that they download pirated material 
although most stated the occurrences to be rare.  Employers should be aware and have security 
measures in place to prevent the downloading of unauthorized material regardless of the finding.  
Legal considerations notwithstanding, the acquisition of products without using reputable means 
could lead to cybersecurity incidents such as the introduction of malware and viruses.  Note that 
the use of antivirus is not to be considered a universal protector or panacea against viruses as 
seen with numerous cybersecurity incidents in the news, the most noteworthy at the time of this 
data collection, being WannaCry, a virus that caused billions of dollars in damage worldwide; 
including the healthcare sector (Reuters, 2017).  Although WannaCry was not propagated by 
illegally obtained software or even by email (as widely falsely reported), the example serves as 
the degree to which virus can cause damage.  WannaCry is used in this instance, as it is the 
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widest cybersecurity attack to date and affected systems worldwide including clinical systems.  
This risk behavior has the potential to affect the functionality of clinical systems. 
In the reported behaviors, it would appear that financial data breaches occurred in 30% of 
new nurses.  Conversely and in alignment with the new nurses’ financial data breach finding, 
only 27.4% of new nurses recognized the phishing attack from the knowledge survey. The 
question did not offer any determination as to how the data may have been breached or to what 
degree.  The data suggests that new nurses may lack knowledge of key areas of common attack 
by nefarious agents and many may have already suffered data breaches with financial 
implications by the time they embarked on their career. Both the data breach and knowledge 
question statistics support a lack of knowledge and sophistication with both security practices 
and knowledge.  This confluence of factors indicates a need for better education both in school 
and in the workplace to recognize phishing attacks.  Simulated phishing attacks are offered by 
vendors as part of an effort to educate employees and encourage engagement to report instances 
to the employer. 
Information	Privacy	Protection	Responses	and	Concern	for	Information	Privacy	
 
 New nurses’ Concern For Information Privacy and the Information Privacy Protective 
Responses are directly related to one another.  Analysis included the subscales of the CFIP as 
well as the variable as a whole.  This finding was anticipated as the CFIP elements were posed in 
the context of nurses’ concern for patient information.  The IPPR, although questioned in the 
context of responding to transgressions involving the nurses’ information, is consistent in its 
relation to the IPPR as prior studies (Kuo, Ma, & Alexander, 2014).  Age is not related to the 
CFIP but it is related to the IPPR even as CFIP and IPPR are however related to one another. 
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The level of concern about patient information is unrelated to age. There is no significant 
relation between age and CFIP.  Although there is a negligible correlation between age and the 
IPPR, the direction is inverse. 
Reliability	of	All	Measurement	Scales	
As discussed in Chapter 4, the instrument reliability has been assessed and reported in 
descriptive and tabulated formats using Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimates for the pilot (n=167) 
and the nationwide study (n=514).  While the goal of having Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate 
values of .70 or greater for each instrument, the KISS instrument was accepted at the principal 
investigator’s discretion with a Cronbach’s alpha statistic estimate of .669.  Based upon the 
discovery that the reduction in knowledge score elements would yield only minor increments in 
improving the value and that the reduction of elements would reduce informative results, the 
score was accepted without reduction in items.  The knowledge score was developed by the 
principle investigator with an expert jury panel and delivered to a convenience sample of nursing 
student.  The Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP), Information Personal Protective 
Response, the four subscales for the Concern for Information Privacy (AU= Unauthorized 
Access; SU=Secondary Use; ME=Medical Errors; CO=Personal Collection of Medical 
Information), Knowledge of Information Security Systems (KISS) and the Risk Behaviors (RB) 
were the scales modified from existing scales in the literature (Kuo, Ma, & Alexander, 2014) and 
used with permission in this study with demonstrated reliability. 
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Reported	Threat	Appraisal	–	“Worry”	About	a	Consequence	–	Ranked	Groups	
Threat appraisal was surveyed to determine the degree to which new nurses would be 
worried about consequences resulting from a security incident.  This was a rank-order question 
on a scale of 1-4 with 4 being the most severe sense of worry.  This was an effort to determine 
the level of internal versus external threat.  Internal threat was related to the nurses themselves 
whereas external was related to consequences for others.  More specifically, the internal threat 
asked about job loss and fines to the nurse.  The external threat asked about the consequences to 
the patient and fines to the hospital. 
 The internal threat of the fine to the nurse was directly related to knowledge. Results 
related to the external threat to patient privacy suggests that further exploration may be 
warranted.  The internal threat of job loss was not found to relate to any of the core variables, nor 
were any other aggregate associations. Further study might be warranted on focusing on some of 
the factors associated with these threat appraisal categories. 
 
Question:	Is	Knowledge	a	Predictor	of	Risk	and	Concern	for	Information	Privacy	Total	and	
Factors?	
	
Knowledge	Related	To	Risk	
Speculatively, these results could infer that having a workforce membership with higher 
knowledge of information security could result in a lower level of risk behaviors associated with 
those devices.  This finding could inform educators and stakeholders of information security of 
the need for knowledge in order to reduce risk behaviors among nurses who make up the largest 
segment of workforce membership in the healthcare industry. 
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Knowledge	Related	To	Concern	For	Information	Privacy	
 Knowledge is related to neither the CFIP nor IPPR, which are closely correlated to one 
another. 
Question:	Are	Risk	Behaviors	Related	to	Concern	for	Information	Privacy	Total	and	
Factors?	
 
CFIP and IPPR are related to one another with risk behaviors showing a positive 
correlation to both.  However, CFIP and IPPR are more strongly correlated than either is to risk 
behavior.  As discussed, the CFIP and IPPR correlation was anticipated and are consistent with 
findings from the Kuo, Ma, and Alexander (2014) study from which elements of this study were 
derived. 
Although the relation between risk behavior to both the IPPR and CFIP is informative, 
this was not the hypothesis to be tested, and in fact, significant in the opposite direction from the 
hypothesis.  The hypotheses suggesting a relationship between CFIP, IPPR and risk behaviors 
were predicted to have an inverse correlation.  That is to state that lower risk behavior was 
anticipated to show an increase in both concern and response. 
Perhaps those new nurses who engage in an increased risk behavior may be aware of the 
harm potential.  The nurses may be more apprehensive about the protection of sensitive data 
given their understanding and susceptibility to behaviors that increase risk.  As this finding was 
unanticipated and counterintuitive, there may be an opportunity for further study of these factors’ 
relationship. 
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Question: Is Threat Appraisal Associated with Knowledge, Risk, Concern for Information 
Privacy Total and Factors, and Personal Protective Responses? 
Threat is not related to risk behavior, CFIP, or IPPR.  The internal threat of nurse fine is 
however related to knowledge whereas the external threat to patient privacy approaches 
significance and may be worthwhile of further investigation. 
OCR is the branch of HHS charged with enforcement of regulation infractions related to 
PHI.  OCR action has resulted in large fines to healthcare entities and those actions have been 
covered by the media in addition to being placed onto the proverbial “wall of shame.”  However, 
nurses are not typically named in any of these high-profile actions.  The anecdotal messages 
through either school or the employment experience may have shaped these nurses’ sense of 
threat. 
Threat – Internal and External 
 The survey contains four elements that are evenly divided into external and internal 
related threats.  Those results are discussed in the subsequent sections as analysis was performed 
to test for differences in mean scores on the core variables. In future studies, these should be 
more granularly described to produce a more meaningful distribution of responses. 
An ANOVA was performed on the mean score for the threat of nurse fine (internal 
threat) showing statistically significant differences for knowledge but none of the other core 
variables.  The highest threat ranking with a mean score of .81 indicates the highest threat of fine 
have the lowest knowledge score.  Perhaps those who have a greater understanding of 
information system security are less worried of fines as opposed to those without knowledge 
having a fear of the unknown.  It should be noted that this fear is unsubstantiated as newsworthy 
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action taken by OCR typically results in fines and corrective action directed at institutions and 
physician practices, not individual nurses. 
 The mean score comparisons for knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, and IPPR by the threat 
ranks on the threat of job loss (internal threat) showed no differences among mean scores.  The 
same results stand for threat to patient privacy (external threat) and threat of hospital fine 
(external threat).  The threat to patient privacy (external) may have implication for further 
research as this was the only other factor approaching significance. 
 
Hypothesis Testing: Demographic Variables 
Is knowledge, risk, concern or protective responses influenced by select demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age and education (program type or school type)? 
 
Differences in Knowledge, Risk, and Concern for Information Privacy and Protective Responses 
 
Age	Related	To	Knowledge,	Risk	Behaviors	
From the study findings, the conclusion is that risk behaviors are related to knowledge 
and knowledge is related to age, but age is not related to risk behaviors or concern. Age is 
directly related to knowledge.  Those in the older age group had higher knowledge scores.  This 
suggests although nursing experience was primarily eliminated, those in the older group may 
have had other experiences that could have contributed to their knowledge base.  Knowledge of 
information security is different from skills related to the use of clinical information systems. 
Although the younger group may be considered digital natives, it is their older counterparts that 
have the insight to produce significantly higher knowledge scores. 
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While not a primary variable, the time spent using mobile devices is inversely related to 
age.  There are also notable differences in the use of mobile device features by age.  Age is 
inversely related to the IPPR but not related to the CFIP or risk behavior.   
	
Education	Related	To	Knowledge,	Risk	Behaviors,	CFIP,	and	IPPR	
In general, nursing education prepares prospective nurses for entry into the profession.  It 
serves as a major component of the prerequisites mandated by the individual state board to 
receive licensure with each state regulatory body setting such licensure requirements.  
Educational institutions are subject to accreditation requirements set forth by sanctioned 
accreditation bodies. 
The NSNA serves over 60,000 members from across the United States and its territories 
serving in both an advocacy and promotional role in its mission to support the development of 
emerging professional nurses.  With its vast membership, this organization could serve as a 
vehicle for delivering cybersecurity guidance to the masses.  None of the core variables studied 
were related to the type of education program or type of school which indicates that tailoring 
cybersecurity guidance to those demographic targets is not necessary.  However, gaps in 
cybersecurity knowledge of new nurses were uncovered by this study. 
 Furthermore, cybersecurity education tends to be deficient for nurses in their education 
programs and even for students of computer science where such information may be considered 
more germane to this area of study (Rozenfeld, 2016).  This absence of cybersecurity knowledge 
in education is not unique to nursing program and member associations. 
The National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NSCSBN) offers guidance mostly 
related to social media use which has implications tangentially related to cybersecurity but is for 
the most part lacking in cybersecurity knowledge needed to support the safeguard of PHI in the 
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workplace.  Both the NSNA and the NSCSBN could see the gap as an opportunity to educate its 
members through a program of cybersecurity guidance.  
The standard demographic elements from the NSNA included questions related to the 
type of school such as public or private.  The survey also asked the type of education in the 
nursing program such as associate, baccalaureate, or masters.  The type of school and type of 
education did not yield any relation to the core variables.  The nursing education variables did 
not have any impact on their knowledge, risk behaviors, CFIP, or IPPR.  The Institute for 
Medicine has called for an increase to an 80% ratio of nurses with a baccalaureate by the year 
2020 and hospital-based studies have supported this notion with findings showing improved 
outcomes (Yakusheva, 2014).  However, no such supportive findings are evident in this study 
related to the security of mobile devices among new nurses. 
Limitations 
 Information related to employment status, type of employment, healthcare-related 
experience, and Registered Nurse experience for those with advanced degrees was not collected.  
By using a sample of nurses one-year post graduation, the sample was considered mostly 
homogenous in relation to experience. 
 Of the 649 respondents, 135 of those did not opt to complete the knowledge section.  
Speculatively, this section may have seemed daunting as the largest segment of the survey and 
participants may have experienced a sense of survey fatigue. 
The sample consisted only of those nurses who were NSNA members and had agreed to 
receive correspondence such as this survey.  This 514-person sample represented only those 
members who self-selected to perform the study to its completion.  This pool may be considered 
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representative of new nurses from across the nation, but not necessarily the entire population of 
nurses in the United States or the world for that matter. 
NSNA was gracious in administering the survey to their members.  Without their 
collaboration, obtaining such a sample for which to study may not have been possible or at least 
an arduous task at best.  However, the survey product, methodology of delivery, and follow up 
were directed by NSNA.  The demographic questions were also the NSNA standard used on their 
surveys.  While not a constraint unto itself, flexibility to augment the process was nonetheless 
limiting. 
The knowledge score was internally developed by the principal investigator with 
validation by a jury panel and content validity analysis.  This instrument was not based upon a 
gold standard instrument as one does not currently exist for the population studied and with the 
content used to construct the instrument.   
 
Conclusion 
 Data security incidents and issues are regularly featured in the media.  The public has 
been exposed to a growing sense of awareness about cybersecurity and the implications for their 
privacy.   
Former government contractor Eric Snowden provided revelations as to the United States 
government operation with data collection and analytic activities.  Russian government 
operations have been implicated in hacking and social media activites resulting in the 
interference with the  United States 2016 Presidential election (Shane, Sanger, &` Kramer, 
2017). 
Related to the reports of Russian hacking is the disclosure that Facebook users’ 
information was misappropriated by a data analytics company for the expressed purpose of 
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influencing the same election (Granville, 2018).  The disclosure about the misue of Facebook 
data is an example of the Concern For Information Privacy subscales. Collection:  The data was 
collected. Secondary Use: The data was then used by a third party unbeknownst to the users that 
had their data collected. 
 Other political activites include North Korea’s purported creation and spread of the 
WannaCry virus, the most vast cybersecurity incident in history resulting in detrimental effects 
to the world’s economy and to the clinical operations of healthcare facilities.  The United States 
Department of Homeland Security has issued a bulletin aobut activities by the Russian 
Government resuling in the infiltration into energy sector computers (DOH, 2018). The 
techniques described in the bulletin may also be applied to the healthcare sector. 
The general public may relate more to nefarious activities that are personally-directed.  
These include identify theft, credit card fraud, hijacked online accounts, and even phishing phone 
scams.  An example of phone phishing are those prevalent calls with fake Internal Revenue 
Service representatives demanding back taxes. Related to healthcare, an emerging scam is the 
fake hospital representative calling to collect bills or finanical data.  Yahoo had virtually all of its 
accounts hacked.  Equifax, Target, and Home Depot have had high profile breaches affecting 
consumers’ financial data.  Anthem’s 2015 cybersecurity incident was also prominently covered 
in the media after nearly 80 million company records were hacked, including a substantial 
portion from individuals who were not even customers of Anthem. 
In brief, the public has a sense of awareness about information security and its affects on 
their own personal data.  This personal data includes PHI.  Anthem was probably the most 
prevelant healthcare related cybersecurity event reported in the news media. The media has also 
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repeatedly reported on hospital ransomware infections. An identity theft protetion company ran a 
promotional advertisement regarding PHI data theft. 
In addition to public awareness, healthcare entities are faced with the pressure of 
compliance with regulation meant to safeguard PHI  and penalties for both noncompliance and 
incidents. While certainly protective mechanisms span a multitude of factors, the workforce is a 
major part of an overall cybersecurity strategy.  In healthcare, the largest professional segment 
consists of nurses; hence the importance of this study. 
For education, this study has produced implications.  First and foremost is that education 
contains only sparse information related to information security.  This is not only true for 
nursing, but other disciplines including computer science (Rozenfeld, 2016).  Some of the data 
elements with the knowledge section indicated key weaknesses which have the potential to put 
patient data at risk. 
A recommendation from this study is that security awareness training should be 
conducted at all levels of nursing education meant for entry into the profession.  As variations in 
quality and content may result from organically-grown institution-specific programs, perhaps a 
national or international organization may develop education standards or a framework to 
provide uniform coverage of education material across the nation.  This investigator is a member 
of the Health Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS) National Education Task 
Force and would look to organizations such as this with a history of successfully implementing 
standards. 
Employers already have a mandate from HHS to provide security awareness training to 
its workforce members.  However, regulations are not perscriptive as to the content or manner of 
instruction.  This study should  provide information to employers not only on key areas of 
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knowledge to address but also the understanding of nurse risk behavior and mobile device usage.  
A vehicle to provide comprehenisve education akin to the aforementioned nursing education 
recommendation might be via the state and local hospital associations that supply its members 
with recommendations and services. 
Mobile device manufacturers and MDM vendors are already addressing the security 
needs of its healthcare use base.  However, the lines between clinical systems, medical devices, 
wearable devices, and mobile devices is becoming blurred and likely to continue as new 
innovations emerge and are facilitated by mobile device platforms that are condusive to the rapid 
development of highly usabel system. The term IOT (internet of things) describes the 
phenomenon of smart internet-connected devices such a locks, alarms, and other innovations. 
With these factors in mind, mobile device vendors should develop hardened systems and 
platforms which address the cybersecurity needs of the healthcare industry at present and with a 
flexible foundation to endure the foreseeable future.  Currently, healthcare does not have 
uniformly perscriptive standards for safeguarding these devices by legislation, only market 
forces (customers) and government agency guidance. 
Employers should focus on implementing technology and processes that remove the 
human element from security wherever possible while having the least negative impact on 
clinical function and system usability.  As discussed in the social engineering section, humans 
are the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain.  Removing human factors from cybersecurity 
should be a key endeavor and permit clinicians to focus on patients. The solutions should be 
turn-key and transparent to the nurses. Make security compliance easy to obtain and expect a 
higher rate of security compliance in return. 
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 In conclusion this nationwide study has examined new nurses’ knowledge of information 
systems, risk behaviors, concern for information privacy, information privacy protective 
responses, threat appeal, associations among the variables, and associations with collected 
demographic detail.  Nurses are the largest segment of the healthcare workforce and the human 
element in the protection of patient information. Therefore this study is imperative to understand 
nurses as a key endeavor protecting our health system in the informatics age.  The study also 
provides recommendations to educators, employers, and mobile device manufacturers. Findings 
also offer opportunities for further research which will undoubtably be necessary as the 
information system landscape evolves.  
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Appendix A – Study Permission Fuzzy Logic 
 
 
Figure 11 Permission: Fuzzy Assessment of Health Information System Users Security 
Awareness Survey and Study 
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Appendix B – Fuzzy Logic Materials 
 
Figure 12 Permission: Fuzzy Assessment of Health Information System Users Security 
Awareness Survey and Study With Materials 
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Appendix C – Study Permission Violation of Information Security 
 
Figure 13 Permission: How Patients Respond To Violation of Their Information Privacy 
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Appendix D – Molloy College Institution Review Board Approval 
 
Figure 14 Molloy Institution Review Board Approval Letter 
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Appendix E - Pilot Survey 
Demographic Background Information 
1.  Are you male or female? 
o Male 
o Female 
 
2.  When did you graduate from your basic nursing (RN) program? 
o 2016 
o 2015 
o 2014 
o Before 2014 
 
3. What program did you complete for your nursing degree? 
o Baccalaureate Degree in Nursing 
o Associates Degree in Nursing 
o Accelerated Baccalaureate Degree in Nursing 
o Master’s Degree in Nursing 
o Other 
3.  What is your age? 
o <17 
o 18-20 
o 21-29 
o 30-39 
o 40-49 
o 50-59 
o 60+ 
 
6. Does your program include educational sessions regarding the security of electronic health 
records? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Other (please specify)  __________________________________________________ 
 
7. Does your program include educational material regarding the security of electronic health 
records? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Other (please specify)  __________________________________________________ 
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Information Systems Security Survey 
Professional Habits (Risk Taking Behaviors) 
(Includes All Items – Content Review by Experts) 
*(R) = Reverse Coded Item (âRisk) 
8. For my mobile device (phone/tablet), I ….. 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Always N/A 
…use my fingerprint complex passcode, or 
gesture to log on. (R) 
      
       
…regular update my operating system. (R)       
       
…“jailbreak”, or use a customized 
environment to get free apps. 
      
       
…click on email links to reset my password.       
       
…use free Wi-Fi at public locations such as 
cafes and airports. 
      
       
…keep my device attended and in my 
possession. (R) 
      
       
…encrypt my device (Apple users may select 
always). (R) 
      
       
…text patient information with colleagues 
(aside from corporate applications). 
      
       
…use personal email containing patient 
information. 
      
       
…accept invitations for games and apps 
through social networks. 
      
       
…download movies/music/apps by pirating or 
otherwise without paying (aside from legit 
streaming services). 
      
       
…have a complex Wi-Fi password on the 
home router. (R) 
      
…share my password (any) with others such 
as family, friends, or coworkers 
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…use autofill to complete my information in 
websites. 
      
       
…submit my personal information such as 
name, address, phone number, and credit card 
info into websites when requested. 
      
       
…chat with strangers online.       
       
…post personal information on social media 
sites. 
      
       
…have had my financial/credit information 
personally breached (aside from publicized 
breaches of corporations). 
      
       
…have had my passwords stolen/misused.  
This would be evident by unauthorized 
emails/posts sent or known to sites/services 
accessed by unauthorized entities.  
      
 
9.  I would…… 
 Never Sometimes Frequently Always 
…report chart printouts found 
in a garbage can or publicly-
accessible fax/printer. (R) 
    
     
…chat with others about 
patient information outside of 
work. 
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Information System Security Knowledge 
(Includes All Items Used for Content Review by Experts) 
Choose the best answer. 
You may not be fully in agreement with the answer. 
You may have to choose one answer from what you feel may be multiple correct answers. 
* = Correct Response 
10.  If my co-worker’s login does not work, I may share mine. 
o True 
o False * 
 
11. Putting patient information on a USB drive is acceptable if…. 
o My superior instructs me to do so. 
o The USB drive encrypted and used in a manner consistent with institutional policy. * 
o I delete it shortly thereafter. 
o I keep the USB drive securely on my person at all times. 
 
12. Texting patient information is acceptable if…. 
o My supervisor instructs me to do so. 
o I am using a hospital-issued cell phone. 
o I am using a hospital-issued secure messaging system. * 
o I urgently need to communicate with a physician. 
 
13. Placing patient information on my personal computer is acceptable if…. 
o My supervisor instructs me to do so. 
o I have antivirus and a firewall. 
o I am a private contractor with contracted responsibility and liability. 
o I have a HIPAA-compliant logon. 
o None of the above. * 
 
14. I may access my relative/spouse/partner/friend’s electronic health information if…. 
o This person gave me permission to do so. 
o I need information to care for this relative at home. 
o I am helping this person to access information though the patient portal. * 
o My supervisor instructs me to do so. 
 
15. If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s chart… 
o I provide it on a USB drive 
o I print out the chart. 
o I ask my supervisor for guidance. 
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o I do not provide any information without a court order and would refer the office to the 
medical records department. * 
 
16. If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I…. 
o Hand it in to security or lost and found. * 
o Use it at home. 
o Use it at the hospital. 
o Dispose of it in the garbage. 
 
17. If I discover a coworker/classmate has an accessed their relative’s information, I…. 
o Report this person to the supervisor or other personnel per institution policy. * 
o Remind the person that this behavior is not acceptable and in violation of HPAA 
regulations. 
o Do nothing as no action is necessary on my part. 
o Contact administration or hospital-supplied privacy number. * 
 
18. If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my password, I…. 
o Provide it as the helpdesk is a trusted entity. 
o Would never provide my password. * 
o Call back to helpdesk to verify identity. 
o Check with my supervisor first. 
 
19. If IT (computer department) sends me an email to upgrade my email and asks me to verify 
my password. I…. 
o Enter my username and password after clicking on the email in order to upgrade 
o Report the email to the proper person. * 
o Ask my supervisor for advice. 
o Delete the email. * 
 
20. If my password is not working and my coworker/classmate offers to log in for me, I…. 
o Let my coworker to log in so I can continue working. 
o Respectfully refuse and contact the helpdesk for assistance. 
o Already have no coworker/classmate’s password and log in. 
o Remind my coworker not to share passwords and report if appropriate. 
o Both D & B * 
 
21. I can put patient data on a USB stick if…. 
o I use it for work purposes. 
o I always keep it in my possession. 
o Make sure to delete the data when finished. 
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o It is encrypted/scrambled and used according to hospital policy.  * 
 
22. If a website informs me that JAVA must be updated, I…. 
o Contact the helpdesk. * 
o Install the file from the website. 
o Ask my supervisor. 
o Ignore the message. 
 
23. If a computer message from the FBI states my files have been scrambled and I must pay 1 
$300 fine, I… 
o Pay the file and have my files accessible. 
o Ignore the message and use another computer. 
o Contact the helpdesk. * 
o Ask my supervisor. 
 
24. If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and requests a wire transfer, I…. 
o Follow the instructions to avoid legal repercussions. 
o Contact the helpdesk or security. * 
o Hang up. 
o Report the call to the authorities. 
 
25. If my phone regularly requires updates every few months. I…. 
o Update promptly. * 
o Ignore the message. 
o Call the helpdesk. 
o Contact the phone carrier. 
 
26.  An email from my bank states my account had been compromised and I must verify my 
identity by clicking on a link and filling out some information, I…. 
o Enter my personal information to verify my identity and preserve my account. 
o Ignore and delete the email. 
o Contact the helpdesk. * 
o Call the bank. 
 
27. My coworker received a strange email from me requesting money, I…. 
o Tell the coworker it’s a mistake and to ignore the email. 
o Ask the coworker to respond to the other email address listed in the email to state that 
this is a mistake. 
o Contact the helpdesk. * 
o Contact that other email address in the email with a nasty message. 
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28. A well-known national realtor sends an email with the subject “Hot Properties in Your 
Neighborhood”. The link requests a Gmail or Yahoo login to proceed.  Assuming there’s an 
interest, I…. 
o Log in using my Gmail or Yahoo account. 
o Contact the helpdesk. * 
o Delete the email. 
o Ask my supervisor. 
 
29. The corner deli that typically delivers lunch complains they received a fax with patient 
information, I…. 
o Instruct the deli to throw out the papers. 
o Instruct the deli to wait for me to pick up papers. 
o Contact helpdesk, compliance or other department per policy. * 
o Ask the deli to return the papers with the next lunch delivery.  
 
30. When leaving a computer logged in with my password, I…. 
o Lock the computer. * 
o Sign out. 
o Leave it out courtesy for my coworker. 
o Leave it asking my coworkers not to touch it. 
 
31. A pop-up appears informing me the computer is running slow, I…. 
o Follow the instructions as the computer has been running quite slow. 
o Close the pop-up and continue working. 
o Contact the helpdesk. * 
o Ask the supervisor. 
 
32.  Taking patient or chart photos with my own cell phone is acceptable if…. 
o Delete after using. 
o A program is used to cover any identifiable information. 
o Done so in strict accordance with hospital policy permits. 
o Requested to do so by a doctor. 
o Never. * 
 
33. A person without a hospital badge states he is from IT and needs me to login for him to fix 
the slowness problem, I…. 
o Log in for him as the electronic records as the system has been slow. 
o Ask him for his hospital badge and upon display log in for him. 
o Ask him for the hospital badge and state policy will not permit you to log in for him. * 
 
 
148 
o Call security if he does not show the badge upon request. * 
 
34. I may work with documents containing patient information on my home computer or 
laptop…. 
o If I delete the files afterwards. 
o If I password protect my computer. 
o If my supervisor gives me permission. 
o No, this is not permitted. * 
 
35.  If I need to look at my health records, I…. 
o Look in the electronic health records as this is my data and policy applies to other 
patient’s data. 
o Look in the electronic health records if explicitly permitted by policy. 
o Use the patient portal or medical records department. * 
o Ask any doctor to look up my information. 
 
36. If a law firm requests patient information, I…. 
o Provide the information on a USB stick the supply. 
o Print out the information for them. 
o Allow them to view the information, but not have a copy. 
o Contact medical records, security, supervisor, or other personnel as per policy. * 
 
37. If a standard computer without encryption has a sensitive file that is purposefully deleted… 
o I can be sure that it is gone as I emptied the computer trash container. 
o Do not know if it is really gone. * 
o Definitely gone no matter what because I have password on my computer. 
o Only gone once I reboot. 
 
38. It is acceptable to backup patient information to my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox, 
iCloud, etc...) for safekeeping. 
o If I make sure I use a strong password. 
o If I delete the files when I’m done with them 
o If I do not let anyone know. 
o Never as this is not permitted. * 
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39. If my coworker suspects someone must have looked at his/her health record due to gossip 
about his/her condition, I would… 
o Assure my coworker that no one would have looked at the health records. 
o Ask around who looked at the health records. 
o Warn people no to look at coworkers’ health information. 
o Make an inquiry/report to corporate compliance or appropriate entity per policy. * 
 
40. If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing sensitive information, I… 
o Wait until the device turns up and take later if it does not. 
o Know it’s secure because I need a password to log in. 
o Know it’s secure because I erased all of the sensitive information. 
o Contact security, helpdesk or other entity as required by policy. * 
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Nurses’ Belief About Medical Facilities and Personal Health Information 
Concern for Information Protection (CFIP) Scales 
 
Regarding the use of technology related to personal health information, please state your opinion 
on the following statements. Medical facilities should……. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree 
…devote more time and effort to preventing the 
unauthorized access of patients’ personal 
information. (UA) 
     
      
… prevent unauthorized people from accessing 
patients’ personal information without 
considering the cost. (UA) 
     
      
…take more measures to ensure that 
unauthorized people cannot use their computer 
to access patient’s information. (UA) 
     
      
… never use patients’ personal information for 
purposes other than medical care unless it has 
been authorized by the patient. (SU) 
     
      
… not use the personal information provided by 
the patient for any purpose other than those 
required for medical care. (SU) 
     
      
… never sell their patients’ personal 
information to other institutions unless it has 
been authorized by the patient. (CO) 
     
      
… not share patients’ personal information with 
other institutions unless it has been authorized 
by patients. (SU) 
     
      
… repeatedly check the accuracy of patients’ 
personal information without considering the 
cost. (ME) 
     
      
… use more procedures to check the accuracy 
of patients’ personal information. (ME) 
     
      
… have more comprehensive procedure to 
correct the errors in patients’ personal 
information. (ME) 
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Nurses Beliefs as Patients 
Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) - Scales Integrated Throughout Items 
42. Please indicate the extent at which you agree for the following statements. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree 
I would refuse to provide information to medical 
facilities because I think it is too private. 
     
      
I would misrepresent some of my personal 
information if it is requested by medical facilities. 
     
      
I would take some action to have my private 
information removed from the EHR database when 
it was not properly used. 
     
      
I would speak with my acquaintances about my poor 
experience with medical facilities’ mishandling of 
my personal information.  
     
      
I would contact medical facilities to complain about 
the way they mishandled my personal information. 
     
      
I would contact an elected official or consumer 
protection organization to complain about the way 
they mishandled my personal information by 
medical facilities. 
     
I would refuse to provide information to medical 
facilities because I think it is too private. 
     
      
I would misrepresent some of my personal 
information if it is requested by medical facilities. 
     
      
I would take some action to have my private 
information removed from the EHR database when 
it was not properly manipulated. 
     
      
I would speak with my acquaintances about my poor 
experience with medical facilities’ mishandling of 
my personal information. 
     
      
I would contact medical facilities to complain about 
the way they mishandled my personal information. 
     
      
I would contact an elected official or consumer 
protection organization to complain about the way 
they mishandled my personal information by 
medical facilities. 
     
      
      
 
 
152 
It bothers me when medical facilities ask me for 
personal information. 
     
      
I sometimes think for a while when medical 
facilities ask me to provide personal information. 
     
      
It bothers me to find personal information in so 
many facilities. 
     
      
It bothers me that medical facilities collect so much 
personal information. 
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Appendix F – Abbreviation Definitions 
ARRA: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
CFIP: Concern For Information Privacy 
o AU: Unauthorized access to medical information 
o CO: Personal collection of medical information 
o ME: Medical facilities errors 
o SU: Medical facilities’ secondary use of medical information 
EHR: Electronic Health Record 
ePHI: Electronic Protected Health Information 
HIT: Health Information Technology 
HITECH: Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
IPPR: Information Privacy Protective Responses 
KISS: Knowledge of Information Systems Security 
MDH: Mobile Device Habits 
PHI: Protected Health Information 
PTP: Personal Technology Practices 
RB: Risk Behaviors 
RN: Registered Nurse 
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Appendix G – National Student Nurse Association Social Media Guidelines 
 
Figure 15 NSNA Social Media Guidelines  
NSNA Guidelines Example
Student nurses should be cognizant of the potential impact of each post made, with 
the understanding that patients, classmates, instructors, employers, and other 
personal or professional contacts may view an individual’s online activity as a 
reflection of the individual’s career as well as the nursing profession in general.
Student nurses should stay informed about the privacy settings of the social media 
sites they utilize, as privacy settings often change.
 For example, Facebook previously offered a privacy setting that restricted anyone (even friends) 
from viewing photos that you are tagged in. This was discontinued.
Student nurses who utilize social networking sites should actively maintain an 
awareness of how their
professionalism may be affected by friends’ and peers’ usage of the same sites.
For example, Jane posts photos from a weekend party and tags Dave in several of them. Dave
immediately untags himself to maintain his professionalism. However, Jane has set her privacy 
settings for the photo album so that “friends of friends” may view them. Even though Dave is no 
longer tagged, all of Jane’s friends—and everyone connected to each friend of Jane—can view photos 
of Dave that Jane uploaded.
Student nurses who are elected/appointed officers should restrict their personal 
activity to family and friends, and maintain a second option for their “public face” for 
colleagues, classmates and peers while in office. This is also recommended for student 
nurses who want to maintain a separation of their personal lives from their 
professional lives. 
A school president creates a public Facebook page that followers can “like” to maintain
professional networking and communications with the school chapter Board.
After thoroughly reviewing the privacy setting options, a student chooses a
customized setting so that anyone in their “Restricted” group may only view their profile photo and 
contact information. When a new professional contact requests friendship, the student adds the new 
contact to their “Restricted” group and accepts the request. If the student would like to post a 
healthcare related article, she/he may change the settings for that particular post so that all friends 
can view it
Student nurses should not share, post, or otherwise disseminate any information, that 
can identify a patient, or in any way violate a patient’s rights or privacy. Limiting access 
through privacy setting is not sufficient to ensure privacy of patients. 
Student nurses should never refer to anyone in a disparaging manner, even if the 
person cannot be identified
with the information stated.
Student nurses should not make threatening, harassing, sexually explicit, or 
derogatory statements regarding any person’s race, ethnicity, gender, age, citizenship, 
national origin, sexual orientation, disability, religious beliefs, political views, or 
educational choices.
Student nurses should not make disparaging remarks about any college, university, or 
school of nursing, including the students, faculty members and staff.
Student nurses should not post content or otherwise speak on behalf of any college, 
university, school of
nursing, or other student nurses association unless authorized to do so.
NSNA constituent school chapters, state associations and individual members should 
refrain from social media usage that individually represents—or attempts to 
represent—the voice of NSNA.
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Appendix H - Content Validity: Student Nurses’ Knowledge of Information System Security and 
Risk Behaviors 
(Original – Content Validity) 
• Please circle the appropriate number and provide comments where applicable. 
• Use the numerical value if corrected according to your commentary, not as it was originally 
written 
Survey Items Representativeness 
The purpose of this nation-wide pilot 
survey is to assess student nurses’ 
knowledge of information system 
security and assess their risk behaviors. 
1 = the item is not representative of a student nurse’s knowledge 
or behavior of information system security. 
 
2 = the item needs major revisions to be representative of a 
student nurse’s knowledge or behavior of information system 
security. 
 
3 = the item needs minor revisions to be representative of a 
student nurse’s knowledge or behavior of information system 
security. 
 
4 = the item is representative of a student nurse’s knowledge or 
behavior of information system security. 
  
What is your current level of nursing 
education? 
First Year 
Second Year 
Third Year 
Fourth Year 
Enrolled in Diploma Program 
Enrolled in Certificate Program (non-
NP) 
Enrolled in Master’s Program (non-
NP) 
Enrolled in an NP Program 
Enrolled in PhD Program 
Enrolled in DNP Program 
Other (Please state) 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
Have you already been a Registered 
Nurse? 
 
  Yes    No 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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Does your program include lesson 
material regarding Information System 
security or electronic health record 
security? 
 
  Yes    No 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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(CONTINUED) 
For my mobile device (phone/tablet), I…. 
 
<Never/Sometimes/Frequently/Always> 
 
• use my fingerprint, complex passcode, or gesture to 
log in. 
• regularly update my operating system. 
• “jailbreak”, or use a customized environment to get 
free apps. 
• click on email links to reset my passwords. 
• use free wifi at public locations such as cafes and 
airports. 
• keep my device attended and in my possession. 
• encrypt my device (Apple uses may select always). 
• text patient information with colleagues (aside from 
corporate applications). 
• use personal email containing patient information. 
• accept invitations for games and apps through social 
networks. 
• download movies/music/apps by pirating or otherwise 
without paying (aside from legit streaming services). 
• use filesharing programs such as Azure, uTorrent, 
Vuse, etc… 
• have a complex wifi password on the home router. 
• share my passwords (any) with others such as family, 
friends, or coworkers. 
• use autofill to complete my information in websites. 
• submit my personal information such as name, 
address, phone number, and credit card info into 
websites when requested. 
• chat with strangers online. 
• post personal information on social media sites. 
• have had my financial/credit information personally 
breached (aside from publicized breaches of 
corporations). 
• have had my passwords stolen/misused.  This would 
be evident by unauthorized emails/posts sent or known 
of sites/services accessed by unauthorized entities. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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1) If my co-worker’s login does not work, I may 
share mine. 
  True    False 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
2) Putting patient information on a USB drive is 
acceptable if… 
 
a. my superior instructs me to do so. 
b. the USB drive is encrypted and used in a manner 
consistent with institutional policy. 
c. I delete it shortly thereafter. 
d. I keep the USB drive securely on my person at all 
times. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
3) Texting patient information is acceptable if… 
 
a. my superior instructs me to do so. 
b. I am using a hospital-issued cell phone. 
c. I am using a hospital-issued secure messaging 
system. 
d. I urgently need to communicate with a physician. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
4) Placing patient information on my personal 
computer is acceptable if… 
 
a. my superior instructs me to do so. 
b. I have antivirus and a firewall. 
c. I am a private contractor with contracted 
responsibility and liability. 
d. None of the above 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
5)  I may access my relative’s electronic health 
information if… 
a. my relative gave me verbal permission to do so. 
b. I need information to care for this relative at home. 
c. I was helping my relative access information 
through the patient portal. 
d. my superior instructs me to do so. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
1 2 3 4 
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6) If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s 
chart…. 
a. I provide it on a USB drive. 
b. I print out the chart. 
c. I ask my supervisor for guidance. 
d. I do not provide any information without a court 
order and guidance from a supervisor. 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
7) If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I… 
a. Hand it in to security or lost and found. 
b. Use it at home. 
c. Use it at the hospital. 
d. Dispose of it in the garbage. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
8) If I discover a coworker has accessed their 
relative’s information, I… 
a. Report this person to the supervisor or other 
personnel per institution policy. 
b. Remind the person that this behavior is not 
acceptable and in violation of HIPAA regulations. 
c. Do nothing as no action is necessary on my part. 
d. Contact administration or hospital-supplied 
privacy number. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
9) If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my 
password, I…. 
a. Provide it as the helpdesk is a trusted entity. 
b. Would never provide my password. 
c. Call back to helpdesk to verify identity. 
d. Check with my supervisor first. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
10) If IT (computer department) sends me an email to 
upgrade my email and asks me to verify my 
password, I… 
a. Enter my username and password after clicking on 
the email link in order to upgrade. 
b. Report the email to the proper person. 
c. Ask my supervisor for advice. 
d. Delete the email. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
11) If my password is not working and my coworker 
offers to log in for me, I…. 
a. Let my coworker to log in so I can continue 
working. 
b. Respectfully refuse and contact the helpdesk for 
assistance. 
c. Already have no coworker’s password and log in. 
d. Remind my coworker not to share passwords and 
report if appropriate. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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12) I can put patient data on a USB stick if… 
a. I use it for work purposes. 
b. I always keep it in my possession. 
c. Make sure to delete the data when finished. 
d. It is encrypted/scrambled and used according to 
hospital policy. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
13) If a website informs me that JAVA must be 
updated, I… 
a. Contact the helpdesk. 
b. Install the file from the website. 
c. Ask my supervisor. 
d. Ignore the message. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
14) If a computer message from the FBI states my 
files have been scrambled and I must pay a $300 fine, 
I… 
a. Pay the file and have my files accessible. 
b. Ignore the message and use another computer. 
c. Contact the helpdesk. 
d. Ask my supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
15) If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and 
requests a wire transfer, I…. 
a. Follow their instructions to avoid legal 
repercussions. 
b. Contact the helpdesk or security. 
c. Hang up. 
d. Report the call to the authorities. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
16) If the phone regularly requires updates every few 
months, I… 
a. Update promptly. 
b. Ignore the message. 
c. Call the helpdesk. 
d. Contact the phone carrier. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
17) An email from my bank states my account has 
been compromised and I must verify my identity by 
clicking on a link and filling out some information.  
I… 
a. Enter my personal information to verify my 
identity and preserve my account. 
b. Ignore and delete the email. 
c. Contact the helpdesk. 
d. Call the bank. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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18) My coworker received a strange email from me 
requesting money.  I… 
a. Tell the coworker it’s a mistake and to just ignore 
the email. 
b. Ask the coworker to respond to the other email 
address listed in the email to state that this is a 
mistake. 
c. Contact the helpdesk. 
d. Contact that other email address in the email with a 
nasty message. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
19) A well-known national realtor sends an email 
with the subject “Hot Properties In Your 
Neighbourhood”.  The link requests a Gmail or 
Yahoo login to proceed.  Assuming there’s an 
interest, I… 
a. Log in using my Gmail or Yahoo account. 
b. Contact the helpdesk. 
c. Delete the email. 
d. Ask my supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
20) The corner deli that typically delivers lunch 
complains they received a fax with patient 
information.  I…. 
a. Instruct the deli to throw out the papers. 
b. Instruct the deli to wait for me to pick up the 
papers. 
c. Contact helpdesk, compliance or other department 
per policy. 
d. Ask the deli to return the papers with the next 
lunch delivery. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
21) When leaving a computer logged in with my 
password, I… 
a. Lock the computer. 
b. Sign out. 
c. Leave it out of courtesy for my coworker. 
d. Leave it asking my coworkers not to touch it. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
22) A pop-up appears informing me the computer is 
running slow, I…. 
a. Follow the instructions as the computer has been 
running quite slow. 
b. Close the pop-up and continue working. 
c. Contact the helpdesk. 
d. Ask the supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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23) Taking patient or chart photos with a cell phone 
is acceptable if…. 
a. Deleted after using. 
b. A program is used to cover any identifiable 
information. 
c. Done so in strict accordance with hospital policy if 
policy permits. 
d. Requested to do so by a doctor. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
24) A person without a hospital badge states he is 
from IT and needs me to login for him to fix the 
slowness problem. I… 
a. Log in for him as the electronic record as the 
system has been slow. 
b. Ask him for his hospital badge and upon display 
log in for him. 
c. Ask him for the hospital badge and state policy 
will not permit you to log in for him. 
d. Call security if he does not show the badge upon 
request. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
25) I may work with documents containing patient 
information on my home computer or laptop. 
a. If I delete the files afterward. 
b. If I password protect my computer. 
c. I my supervisor gives me permission. 
d. No, this is not permitted. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
26) If I need to look at my health record, I… 
a. Look in the electronic health record as this is my 
data and policy applies to other patients’ data. 
b. Look in the electronic health record if explicitly 
permitted by policy. 
c. Use the patient portal or medical records 
department. 
d. Ask any doctor to look up my information. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
27) If a law firm requests patient information, I… 
a. Provide the information on a USB stick they 
supply. 
b. Print out the information for them. 
c. Allow them to view the information, but not have a 
copy. 
d. Contact medical records, security, supervisor, or 
other personnel as per policy. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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28) If a standard computer without encryption has a 
sensitive file that is purposefully deleted… 
a. I can be sure that it is gone as I emptied the 
computer trash container. 
b. Do not know if it is really gone. 
c. Definitely gone no matter what because I have a 
password on my computer. 
d. Only gone once I reboot. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
29) It’s acceptable to backup patient information to 
my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox, iCloud, 
etc..) for safekeeping… 
a. If I make sure I use a strong password. 
b. If I delete the files when I’m done with them. 
c. If I do not let anyone know. 
d. Never as this is not permitted. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
30) If my coworker suspects someone must have 
looked at his/her health record due to gossip about 
his/her condition, I would… 
a. Assure my coworker that no one would have 
looked at the health records. 
b. Ask around who looked at the health record. 
c. Warn people not to look at coworkers’ health 
information. 
d. Make an inquiry/report to corporate compliance or 
appropriate entity per policy. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
31) If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing 
sensitive information, I…. 
a. Wait until the device turns up and take action later 
if it does not. 
b. Know it’s secure because I need a password to log 
in. 
c. Know it’s secure because I erased all of the 
sensitive information. 
d. Contact security, helpdesk or other entity as 
required by policy. 
1 2 3 4 
Comments: 
Item well written and succinct.   Yes    No 
If no, please provide edits. 
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Appendix I – Survey Instrument (National Survey) 
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Appendix J – Knowledge Test and Results Key 
 
*Denotes designated correct response 
Bold knowledge heading represents the corresponding reference number in the data analysis. 
 
Knowledge 1 
18. Putting patient information on a USB drive is acceptable if…. 
a) My superior instructs me to do so. 
b) The USB drive encrypted and used in a manner consistent with institutional policy.* 
c) I delete it shortly thereafter. 
d) I keep the USB drive securely on my person at all times. 
 
Knowledge 2 
19. Texting patient information is acceptable if…. 
a) My supervisor instructs me to do so. 
b) I am using a hospital-issued cell phone. 
c) I am using a hospital-issued secure messaging system.* 
d) I urgently need to communicate with a physician. 
 
Knowledge 3 
20. Placing patient information on my personal computer is acceptable if…. 
a) My supervisor instructs me to do so. 
b) I have antivirus and a firewall. 
c) I am a private contractor with contracted responsibility and liability. 
d) I have a HIPAA-compliant logon. 
e) None of the above.* 
 
Knowledge 4 
21. I may access my relative/spouse/partner/friend’s electronic health information if…. 
a) This person gave me permission to do so. 
b) I need information to care for this relative at home. 
c) I am helping this person to access information though the patient portal* 
d) My supervisor instructs me to do so. 
 
Knowledge 5 
22. If a police officer requests a copy of the patient’s chart… 
a) I provide it on a USB drive 
b) I print out the chart. 
c) I ask my supervisor for guidance.* 
d) I do not provide any information without a court order and would refer the office to the medical 
records department.* 
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Knowledge 6 
23. If I find a USB drive around the hospital, I…. 
a) Hand it in to security or lost and found.* 
b) Use it at home. 
c) Use it at the hospital. 
d) Dispose of it in the garbage. 
 
Knowledge 7 
24. If I discover a coworker has accessed their relative’s information, I… 
a) Report this person to the supervisor or other personnel per institution policy.* 
b) Remind the person that this behavior is not acceptable and in violation of HIPAA regulations. 
c) Do nothing as no action is necessary on my part. 
d) Contact administration or hospital-supplied privacy number.* 
 
Knowledge 8 
25. If someone calls from the helpdesk requesting my password, I…. 
a) Provide it as the helpdesk is a trusted entity. 
b) Would never provide my password.* 
c) Call back to helpdesk to verify identity. 
d) Check with my supervisor first. 
 
Knowledge 9 
26. I can put patient data on a USB stick if…. 
a) I use it for work purposes. 
b) I always keep it in my possession. 
c) Make sure to delete the data when finished. 
d) It is encrypted/scrambled and used according to hospital policy.* 
 
Knowledge 10 
27. If a website informs me that JAVA must be updated, I…. 
a) Contact the helpdesk.* 
b) Install the file from the website. 
c) Ask my supervisor. 
d) Ignore the message. 
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Knowledge 11 
28. If a computer message from the FBI states my files have been scrambled and I must pay a 
$300 fine, I… 
a) Pay the fine and have my files accessible. 
b) Ignore the message and use another computer. 
c) Contact the helpdesk.* 
d) Ask my supervisor.* 
 
Knowledge 12 
29. If the IRS calls me about overdue taxes and requests a wire transfer, I…. 
a) Follow the instructions to avoid legal repercussions. 
b) Contact the helpdesk or security.* 
c) Hang up.* 
d) Report the call to the authorities.* 
 
Knowledge 13 
30. An email from my bank states my account had been compromised and I must verify my 
identity by clicking on a link and filling out some information, I…. 
a) Enter my personal information to verify my identity and preserve my account. 
b) Ignore and delete the email.* 
c) Contact the helpdesk.* 
d) Call the bank.* 
 
Knowledge 14 
31. My coworker received a strange email from me requesting money, I…. 
a) Tell the coworker it’s a mistake and to ignore the email. 
b) Ask the coworker to respond to the other email address listed in the email to state that this is a 
mistake. 
c) Contact the helpdesk* 
d) Contact that other email address in the email with a nasty message. 
 
Knowledge 15 
32. A well-known national realtor sends an email with the subject “Hot Properties in Your 
Neighborhood." 
The link requests a Gmail or Yahoo login to proceed. Assuming there’s an interest, I…. 
a) Log in using my Gmail or Yahoo account. 
b) Contact the helpdesk.* 
c) Delete the email. 
d) Ask my supervisor. 
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Knowledge 16 
33. The corner deli that typically delivers lunch complains they received a fax with patient 
information, I…. 
a) Instruct the deli to throw out the papers. 
b) Instruct the deli to wait for me to pick up papers. 
c) Contact helpdesk, compliance or other department per policy.* 
d) Ask the deli to return the papers with the next lunch delivery 
 
Knowledge 17 
34. When leaving a computer logged in with my password, I…. 
a) Lock the computer.* 
b) Sign out.* 
c) Leave it out courtesy for my coworker. 
d) Leave it asking my coworkers not to touch it. 
 
Knowledge 18 
35. A pop-up appears informing me the computer is running slow, I…. 
a) Follow the instructions as the computer has been running quite slow. 
b) Close the pop-up and continue working. 
c) Contact the helpdesk.* 
d) Ask the supervisor. 
 
Knowledge 19 
36. Taking patient or chart photos with my own cell phone is acceptable if…. 
a) Delete after using. 
b) A program is used to cover any identifiable information. 
c) Done so in strict accordance with hospital policy permits. 
d) Requested to do so by a doctor. 
e) Never.* 
 
Knowledge 20 
37. A person without a hospital badge states he is from IT and needs me to login for him to fix 
the slowness problem, I…. 
a) Log in for him as the electronic records as the system has been slow. 
b) Ask him for his hospital badge and upon display log in for him. 
c) Ask him for the hospital badge and state policy will not permit you to log in for him.* 
d) Call security if he does not show the badge upon request.* 
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Knowledge 21 
38. I may work with documents containing patient information on my home computer or 
laptop…. 
a) If I delete the files afterwards. 
b) If I password protect my computer. 
c) If my supervisor gives me permission. 
d) No, this is not permitted.* 
 
Knowledge 22 
39. If I need to look at my health records, I…. 
a) Look in the electronic health records as this is my data and policy applies to other patient’s data. 
b) Look in the electronic health records if explicitly permitted by policy.* 
c) Use the patient portal or medical records department.* 
d) Ask any doctor to look up my information. 
 
Knowledge 23 
40. If a law firm requests patient information, I…. 
a) Provide the information on a USB stick the supply. 
b) Print out the information for them. 
c) Allow them to view the information, but not have a copy. 
d) Contact medical records, security, supervisor, or other personnel as per policy.* 
 
Knowledge 24 
41. If a standard computer without encryption has a sensitive file that is purposefully deleted… 
a) I can be sure that it is gone as I emptied the computer trash container. 
b) Do not know if it is really gone.* 
c) Definitely gone no matter what because I have password on my computer. 
d) Only gone once I reboot. 
 
Knowledge 25 
42.  It’s acceptable to backup patient information to my personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox, 
iCloud, etc...) for safekeeping... 
a) If I make sure I use a strong password. 
b) If I delete the files when I’m done with them 
c) If I do not let anyone know. 
d) Never as this is not permitted.* 
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Knowledge 26 
43. If my coworker suspects someone must have looked at his/her health record due to gossip 
about his/her condition, I would… 
a) Assure my coworker that no one would have looked at the health records. 
b) Ask around who looked at the health records. 
c) Warn people not to look at coworkers’ health information. 
d) Make an inquiry/report to corporate compliance or appropriate entity per policy.* 
 
Knowledge 27 
44. If I cannot find my laptop/tablet containing sensitive information, I… 
a) Wait until the device turns up and possibly report later. 
b) Know it’s secure because I need a password to log in. 
c) Know it’s secure because I erased all of the sensitive information. 
d) Contact security, helpdesk or other entity as required by policy.* 
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Appendix K – Survey Raffle 
 
 
 
